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THE OCC’S PREEMPTION RULES EXCEED THE
AGENCY’S AUTHORITY AND PRESENT A SERIOUS
THREAT TO THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.*
I. Introduction
II. The OCC’s Preemption Rules Proclaim a Sweeping Preemption of State
Laws That Is Comparable in Scope to the “Field Preemption” Regime
Established by the OTS’s Rules
III. The OCC’s Preemption and Visitorial Powers Rules Exceed the
Agency’s Authority, Threaten to Destroy the Dual Banking System,
and Undermine the States’ Ability to Protect Consumers
A. The OCC’s Claim that National Banks Are Generally Exempt
from State Regulation Is Contrary to Leading Supreme Court
Decisions
1. The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Held that National Banks
Are Subject to State Laws
2. The OCC’s Rules Contravene the Standards for Preemption
Established by the Supreme Court with Respect to National
Banks
*
 Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A., Yale University; J.D.,
Harvard University. This article grew out of (i) testimony that I presented before a
joint hearing held by committees of the California State Senate and State Assembly
on May 21, 2003, and (ii) a memorandum that I prepared for the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”) in August 2003. I have acted as counsel or consultant
to CSBS and individual state banking departments for more than twenty years. I am
presently acting as counsel for state officials appearing as amici curiae in the following
two cases, which raise issues related to the subject matter of this article: Wachovia
Bank v. Burke, No. 3:03 CV 0738 (JCH) (D. Conn.), and Wachovia Bank v. Watters,
No. 5:03-CV-0105 (W.D. Mich.).  
I wish to thank John Day, Vincent DiLorenzo, Mary Jo Parrino, Elizabeth Renuart,
Heidi Schooner and Joe Vincent for their helpful comments on preliminary drafts
of this article. Unless otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through
March 18, 2004. 
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B. In Order to Maintain Competitive Balance Within the Dual
Banking System, Congress Has Endorsed the General Application
of State Laws to National Banks
1. Since 1910 Congress Has Followed a Policy Designed to
Maintain a Competitive Equilibrium within the Dual Banking
System
2. Congress’s Preservation of the Dual Banking System Has
Promoted Innovation and Flexibility in Banking Regulation
3. Congress Has Endorsed the General Application of State
Laws to National Banks as an Important Mechanism for
Preserving the Dual Banking System
4. Congress Has Withheld From the OCC Any Independent
Power to Preempt State Laws
C. The OCC’s Rules Threaten to Destroy the Dual Banking System
1. The OCC’s Rules Are Designed to Convince Large, Multi-
state Banks to Operate under National Charters
2. The OTS’s Adoption of Similar Preemption Rules Destroyed
the Significance of the State-Chartered Thrift System
D. The OCC’s Preemption Rules and Recent Lower Court Decisions
Are Contrary to Longstanding Judicial Precedents and Congressio-
nal Policy Regarding the Application of State Laws to National
Banks
1. In Recent Years, the OCC and Large National Banks Have
Used a Coordinated Litigation Strategy to Preempt State
Consumer Protection Laws
2. In View of the OCC’s Self-Interest in Preempting State Law
to Attract Large Banks to Its Regulated Constituency, the
Courts Should Not Give Chevron Deference to the OCC’s
Preemption Rulings
E. The OCC Does Not Have Authority to Provide National Banks
with a General Exemption from State Laws in the Area of Real
Estate Lending
1. Section 371(a) Does Not Authorize the OCC’s Real Estate
Lending Rule
2. The OCC Has No Authority to Preempt Nondiscriminatory
State Laws That Are Reasonably Designed to Prevent Abu-
sive and Unsound Lending Practices
F. The OCC Has No Authority to Implement a General Preemption
of State Laws with Regard to the Deposits, Loans, and Operations
of National Banks
1. Sections 24(Seventh) and 93a Do Not Empower the OCC
to Adopt §§ 7.4007–7.4009
2. The OCC Does Not Possess a Preemptive Rulemaking Power
Similar to the OTS’s Authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a)
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G. The OCC’s Attempt to Bar States From Regulating Operating
Subsidiaries of National Banks Is Unlawful
1. The OCC’s Proposal Violates Fundamental Principles of
Financial Regulation and Corporate Governance
2. Sections 484 and 36(f) Do Not Preempt the States’ Authority
to Enforce State Laws Against National Banks and Their
Operating Subsidiaries
a. Sections 484 and 36(f) Permit State Officials to Sue in
Federal and State Courts to Enforce State Laws Against
National Banks
b. Sections 484 and 36(f) Do Not Restrict the Authority of
State Officials to Enforce State Laws Against Operating
Subsidiaries of National Banks
3. Sections 24(Seventh) and 24a Do Not Preempt the Authority
of States to Regulate Operating Subsidiaries of National
Banks
H. The OCC’s Regulations Do Not Provide a Valid Basis for
Exempting Operating Subsidiaries from State Regulation
1. The OCC’s Rulings Are Contrary to the Manifest Intent of
Congress
2. The OCC’s Rules Undermine the Enforcement of Consumer
Protection Laws Against National Banks and Their Operating
Subsidiaries
3. The OCC’s Rules Violate Fundamental Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance and Invade the Sovereign Power of the
States to Regulate State-Chartered Corporations
IV. Conclusion
I. Introduction
On January 7, 2004, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(“OCC”) issued new regulations that preempt a broad range of state
laws from applying to national banks’ activities.1 The OCC’s rules
declare that state laws are preempted if they “obstruct, impair, or
condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise” its federally-
authorized powers, either directly or through operating subsidiaries.2
1
 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg.
1904 (Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 7, 34) [hereinafter OCC Docket
04-04]. These regulations were issued in proposed form at 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119
(proposed Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Docket 03-16]. 
2
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1911–13. In an accompany-
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As discussed in Part II of this article, the new regulations effectively
bar the application of all state laws to national banks, except where
(i) Congress has expressly incorporated state-law standards in federal
statutes or (ii) particular state laws have only an “incidental” effect
on national banks. The OCC has said that state laws will be deemed
to have a permissible, “incidental” effect only if such laws (i) are part
of “the legal infrastructure that makes it practicable” for national banks
to conduct their federally-authorized activities and (ii) “do not regulate
the manner or content of the business of banking authorized for
national banks.”3 The OCC has also claimed that, by virtue of § 7.4006
of its regulations, the new preemption rules will apply to operating
subsidiaries of national banks.4 
As explained in Part II, the OCC has deliberately crafted its rules
to accomplish a sweeping preemption of state laws that is equivalent
to the “field preemption” regime established by the Office of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”) for federal savings associations and their operat-
ing subsidiaries. The OCC asserts that it possesses the same authority
to override state laws that the OTS has proclaimed in its own
regulations.5 
In a second notice of final rulemaking, also published on January
7, 2004,6 the OCC amended § 7.4000 of its regulations, which restricts
ing article, Howard Cayne and Nancy Perkins defend the OCC’s authority to adopt
the regulations discussed in this article. Howard N. Cayne & Nancy L. Perkins,
National Bank Act Preemption: The OCC’s New Rules Do Not Pose a Threat to
Consumer Protection or the Dual Banking System, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN.
L. 365 (2004). In large part, Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins reiterate arguments advanced
by the OCC in support of its regulations. For specific responses to some of their major
claims, see infra notes 71, 80, 82, 109, 169, 196, 206, 245, 339, 396, 429, 435, and
544. 
3
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1911–13. 
4
 Id. at 1913 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006). Under § 5.34(e) of the OCC’s regulations,
a subsidiary of a national bank qualifies as an “operating subsidiary” if (i) the
subsidiary engages only in “activities that are permissible for a national bank to engage
in directly either as a part of, or incidental to, the business of banking” and (ii) the
parent bank “controls” the subsidiary (typically by owning more than fifty percent
of the subsidiary’s voting stock). 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1)–(2) (2003). 
5
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1914 (stating that “the
preemption regulations adopted by the OCC are substantially identical to the
preemption regulations of the OTS”); OCC, Preemption Final Rule, Questions and
Answers 3–4 (Jan. 7, 2004), at http://www.occ.treas.gov [hereinafter OCC Questions
and Answers] (asserting that the OCC’s rulemaking authority is “comparably broad
to that of the OTS”). 
6
 Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 7, 2004) (to be codified
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the exercise of “visitorial powers” over national banks.7 The preamble
to this amendment asserts that, “Federal law commits the supervision
of national banks’ Federally-authorized banking business exclusively
to the OCC (except where Federal law provides otherwise), and does
not apportion that responsibility among the OCC and the states
. . . .”8 The amended rule bars state officials from suing in federal
or state courts to compel national banks to comply with state laws.9
According to the OCC, state officials will be allowed only to seek
a declaratory judgment as to whether a particular state law applies
to national banks. Even if a state official obtains a court order affirming
that a state law does apply to national banks, the amended rule gives
the OCC sole discretion to decide whether to enforce that law against
a national bank.10 The OCC further claims that its amended visitorial
powers rule will operate in conjunction with § 7.4006 of its regula-
tions11 to “prevent states from exercising visitorial authority over
national bank operating subsidiaries.”12 The OCC’s assertion of
exclusive enforcement authority over national banks and their operat-
ing subsidiaries encompasses both administrative and judicial proceed-
ings.13 
Part III of this article contends that the OCC’s new rules, unless
overturned by Congress or the courts, will do great harm to the state
banking system, thereby threatening the viability of the dual banking
system. In addition, application of the OCC’s rules to operating
subsidiaries of national banks will seriously impair the states’ ability
to regulate state-chartered corporations and protect consumers from
illegal, fraudulent, and unfair financial practices. Part III also sets forth
several reasons why the OCC’s new rules exceed the boundaries of
its statutory authority.
at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000) [hereinafter OCC Docket 04-03]. These regulations were issued
in proposed form at Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities; Bank
Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 6363
(proposed Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Docket 03-02]. 
7
 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000. 
8
 OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1895 (emphasis added). 
9
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1911. 
10
 See id. at 1899–900. 
11
 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. 
12
 OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900. 
13
 See id. at 1897–900; see also OCC Docket 03-02, supra note 6, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 6369–70. 
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First, as discussed in Part III.A, the OCC’s attempt to create a
regime of de facto “field preemption” is contrary to a long line of
decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and other courts. Those
decisions have consistently upheld the principle that “federally char-
tered banks are subject to state law.”14 Based on that principle, the
courts have required national banks to comply with applicable state
laws except in situations where such laws “prevent or significantly
interfere with” the ability of national banks to exercise their congres-
sionally-authorized powers.15 
Second, as described in Part III.B, Congress has repeatedly acted
during the past century to preserve the dual banking system by
maintaining a competitive equilibrium between national and state
banks in the most important areas of banking operations. When it
passed the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency
Act of 1994,16 Congress reiterated its support for core principles of
the dual banking system, including the presumptive application of state
laws to national banks. The House-Senate conference report on the
Riegle-Neal Act declared that (i) “States have a legitimate interest in
protecting the rights of their consumers, businesses and communities,”
(ii) “States have a strong interest in the activities and operations of
depository institutions doing business within their jurisdictions, re-
gardless of the type of charter an institution holds,” and (iii) “[u]nder
well-established judicial principles, national banks are subject to State
law in many significant respects.”17 In view of this explicit congressio-
nal support for the application of state laws to national banks, the
OCC’s rules clearly exceed the agency’s authority.
As discussed in Parts III.C and III.D, the OCC’s regulations conflict
with congressional intent and threaten to disrupt the competitive
balance that has long existed between national and state banks. The
OCC’s rules assert that national banks are exempt from a broad range
of state laws, including those dealing with fair lending and consumer
protection. Unless the OCC’s rules are overturned, large state-
chartered banks that operate across state lines will have strong
incentives to convert to national charters. Over time, it seems likely
14
 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997). 
15
 Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (emphasis
added). 
16
 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994). 
17
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074. 
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that the state banking system will be reduced to a group composed
primarily of smaller, community-oriented banks, while the national
banking system will be increasingly dominated by large multistate
banks. As a consequence, even if the state regulatory system could
survive as a chartering authority for community banks, there would
no longer be a meaningful chartering option for most banks. Such an
outcome would severely weaken the dual banking system’s current
incentives for regulatory innovation, responsiveness, and flexibility.
Third, as set forth in Part III.E, the OCC does not have authority
under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) to bar the states from regulating real estate
loans made by national banks. Under § 371(a), the OCC’s rulemaking
power with regard to real estate loans is expressly limited by the
uniform standards for real estate lending adopted by the federal
banking agencies pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o). Those uniform
interagency standards require all banks insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)—including national banks—to com-
ply with “all real estate related laws and regulations,” a phrase that
on its face includes applicable state laws.18 The uniform standards
are consistent with judicial decisions that have upheld the application
of state laws to real estate transactions by national banks, except in
cases involving a direct conflict between a state law and a federal
statute or authorized regulation. Accordingly, the OCC’s far-reaching
preemption rules for real estate loans are not authorized by § 371.
Fourth, as discussed in Part III.F, the OCC also lacks authority to
create a regime of de facto “field preemption” for the non-real estate
transactions of national banks, such as the acceptance of deposits and
the making of unsecured loans. Decisions of the Supreme Court and
lower courts have held that state laws do apply to such transactions,
except in cases where state law creates an irreconcilable conflict with
federal law. Under 12 U.S.C. § 93a, the OCC has no authority to adopt
rules that expand the powers or immunities of national banks by
preempting applicable state laws. The OCC also cannot rely on the
OTS’s broad claims of preemptive power. The courts have consistently
held that the OCC’s authority to override state laws is far more
circumscribed than the OTS’s comparable power. Accordingly, the
OCC’s preemption rules for non-real estate transactions are unlawful.
Fifth, as described in Part III.G, the OCC cannot prevent state
officials from filing lawsuits to enforce applicable state laws against
18
 See infra notes 287–90, 294–95, and accompanying text (discussing the intera-
gency uniform standards for real estate loans made by federally-insured banks). 
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national banks. Federal and state courts have held that 12 U.S.C.
§ 484(a) authorizes state officials to obtain compulsory judicial
remedies to stop violations of state laws by national banks. In addition,
federal statutes do not restrict the authority of state officials to use
administrative or judicial measures to enforce state laws against
operating subsidiaries of national banks. State enforcement has proven
to be a highly effective and necessary supplement to federal efforts
to protect the public against illegal, fraudulent, and unfair practices
by consumer lenders, securities firms, and mutual funds. National
banks and their affiliates have been implicated in abusive practices
in all three areas.
Public policy does not favor entrusting the OCC with sole discretion
and authority to enforce consumer protection laws against national
banks and their operating subsidiaries. Virtually the entire OCC budget
is funded by fees and assessments paid by national banks. The OCC
therefore has an obvious self-interest in pursuing a preemption agenda
that will encourage large, multistate banks to operate under national
charters. In addition, during the past decade the OCC has not initiated
a single public prosecution of a major national bank for violating a
consumer protection law. The OCC’s unimpressive enforcement
record is, unfortunately, consistent with its strong budgetary interest
in maintaining the loyalty of leading national banks. Given the OCC’s
financial self-interest and its empire-building agenda, the OCC faces
a clear conflict of interests (and the risk of regulatory capture)
whenever the agency considers the desirability of (i) preempting state
consumer protection laws or (ii) taking vigorous enforcement measures
against one of its most important constituents.
Finally, as set forth in Part III.H, the OCC lacks authority to apply
its preemption and visitorial powers rules to operating subsidiaries of
national banks. The OCC does not have power to bar the states from
licensing, examining and otherwise regulating state-chartered corpora-
tions that are subsidiaries of national banks. Federal banking statutes
and state corporate laws establish a clear legal separation between
national banks and their “affiliates,” including their operating subsidia-
ries. Operating subsidiaries are chartered as separate and distinct
corporate entities under the authority of state law. Because they are
creatures of state law, operating subsidiaries must comply with all
applicable state requirements. The OCC’s rules effectively “federalize”
state-chartered subsidiaries by placing them under the exclusive
supervisory control of the OCC. The OCC has no authority to take
such a radical step under 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) or any other federal
[Vol. 23: 225ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW232
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statute. Indeed, the OCC’s rules create serious constitutional questions
under the Tenth Amendment, because they infringe upon the sovereign
power of the states to regulate corporations chartered under state law.
II. The OCC’s Preemption Rules Proclaim a Sweeping
Preemption of State Laws That Is Comparable in
Scope to the “Field Preemption” Regime Established
by the OTS’s Rules
In OCC Docket 04-04 the OCC adopted regulations that preempt
state laws in four broadly-defined areas—real estate lending, other
lending, deposit-taking, and other federally-authorized national bank
“activities.”19 In all four areas, the OCC’s rules (i) preempt state laws
that “obstruct, impair, or condition, a national bank’s ability to fully
exercise”20 its federally-authorized powers and (ii) permit a narrowly-
defined subset of state laws to apply to national banks, but only “to
the extent that [such laws] only incidentally affect”21 the business of
national banks. The preamble to the OCC’s preemption rules declares
that state laws will be deemed to have an “incidental” effect on
national banks, and will not be preempted, only if such laws (i) “form
the legal infrastructure that makes it practicable” for national banks
to conduct their federally-authorized activities and (ii) “do not attempt
to regulate the manner or content of the business of banking authorized
for national banks.”22 
As explained above, the OCC’s amended visitorial powers rule
asserts that the OCC has the exclusive authority to determine whether
to initiate administrative or judicial proceedings to enforce state laws
applicable to national banks or their operating subsidiaries.23 The OCC
also claims that its new preemption and visitorial powers rules apply
to operating subsidiaries to the same extent as those rules apply to
national banks.24 This claim is based on the OCC’s view that
19
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1916–17 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–7.4009, 34.3–34.4). 
20
 Id. (text of 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d), 7.4009(b), 34.4(a)). 
21
 Id. (text of 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c), 34.4(b)). 
22
 Id. at 1912–13. 
23
 See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text (discussing the OCC’s amendment
to § 7.4000). 
24
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913. 
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“operating subsidiaries and their parent banks [are] equivalents,” as
indicated in § 7.4006 of the OCC’s regulations.25 
Unlike the OTS, the OCC has not formally adopted a rule of “field
preemption” with regard to lending, deposit-taking, and other business
activities of national banks and their operating subsidiaries. Neverthe-
less, the OCC has asserted a virtually unlimited power to override state
laws in order “to enable national banks to operate to the full extent
of their powers under Federal law, without interference from inconsis-
tent state laws, consistent with the national character of the national
banking system. . . .”26 The OCC has further claimed that its
authority to preempt state laws is comparable in scope to that of the
OTS, because:
[t]he extent of Federal regulation and supervision of Federal savings
associations under the Home Owners’ Loan Act is substantially the
same as for national banks under the national banking laws, a fact
that warrants similar conclusions about the applicability of state laws
to the conduct of the Federally authorized activities of both types of
entities.27 
25
 Id. at 1905, 1913; OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900; OCC
Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,129–30. The OCC also explained
that its preemption and visitorial powers rules “make[] no change” to the “existing
provisions” of § 7.4006. OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913;
OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900. 
26
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1908. In 2003 the OCC took
a regulatory action indicating the agency’s belief that it does possess field preemption
authority, at least in the area of real estate lending. In Notice of Request for Preemption
Determination, 68 Fed. Reg. 8959 (Feb. 26, 2003), the OCC invited comments on
a request for a preemption determination filed by National City Bank of Indiana
(“National City”) and two of its operating subsidiaries that were engaged in making
residential mortgage loans. Id. at 8959–60. National City and its subsidiaries asked
the OCC to determine that the Georgia Fair Lending Act (“GFLA”) was completely
preempted by federal law as to both national banks and their operating subsidiaries.
Id. at 8959. The GFLA placed a number of restrictions on high-cost home loans for
the purpose of deterring predatory lending abuses. See id. In Preemption Determination
and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003) [hereinafter OCC Docket 03-17], the
OCC granted National City’s request. The OCC declared that federal law preempted
the GFLA with respect to “any national bank or national bank operating subsidiary
that is engaged in real estate lending activities in Georgia.” Id. at 46,265. For
discussions of the OCC’s preemption determination and order with respect to the
GFLA, see, for example, Douglas Cantor, OCC Preempts in Ga.—and Details Policy,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 1, 2003, at 1; Jathon Sapsford, Comptroller Warns States Not
to Meddle With National Banks, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2003, at C1. 
27
 OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,129 n.91; see also supra
note 5 and accompanying text. 
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The OCC’s preemption rules give national banks and their operating
subsidiaries essentially the same immunity from state laws in the areas
of real estate lending, other lending, deposit-taking, and other “activi-
ties” that federal savings associations and their operating subsidiaries
enjoy under the OTS’s regulations.28 The OCC has publicly described
its rules as having a preemptive reach that is at least equal to the scope
of the OTS’s regulations.29 
In sum, the OCC’s preemption rules override all state laws that
apply to national banks and their operating subsidiaries, with the
exception of two narrowly-defined categories of laws: (i) state-law
standards that Congress has expressly incorporated by reference in
federal statutes;30 and (ii) general state laws—such as contracts, torts,
criminal law, the right to collect debts, acquisition and transfer of
property, taxation, and zoning—that “do not regulate the manner or
content of the business of banking authorized for national banks, but
rather establish the legal infrastructure that makes practicable the
28
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1914 (stating that “the
preemption regulations adopted by the OCC are substantially identical to the
preemption regulations of the OTS”). The OTS has declared that its regulations
“occup[y] the field” with respect to lending, deposit-taking, and other “operations”
of federal savings associations. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2(a), 557.11(b), 545.2. Compare
OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1916–17 (text of 12 C.F.R.
§§ 7.4007(b)–(c), 7.4008(d)–(e), 7.4009(b)–(c), 34.4), with 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (OTS
rule regarding “operations” of federal savings associations); id. §§ 557.11–557.13
(OTS rules regarding deposit-taking); id. § 560.2 (OTS rule regarding lending). For
OCC and OTS regulations that purport to grant operating subsidiaries the same
immunity from state law enjoyed by their parent institutions, see 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006
(OCC rule) and 12 C.F.R. § 559.3(n) (OTS rule). 
29
 See OCC, Comparison of the OCC’s Preemption Rules with the OTS’s and NCUA’s
Current Rules (Jan. 7, 2004), at http://www.occ.treas.gov (stating that the OCC’s
preemption rules override every category of state law that is preempted under the
OTS’s regulations and also override two types of state real estate laws that are not
preempted by the OTS’s regulations); OCC Issues Final Rules on National Bank
Preemption and Visitorial Powers, OCC News Release 2004-3, at 1, 4 (Jan. 7, 2004)
[hereinafter OCC NR 2004-3], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov (stating that the
OCC’s preemption rule “establishes symmetry with federal thrifts regarding the types
of state laws that apply to national banks,” because “the list of preempted state laws
[in the OCC’s rule] is nearly identical to the list incorporated into the regulations
of the [OTS]”); see also R. Christian Bruce, National Banks: OCC Releases Final
Preemption Regulations; Spitzer Says Change Cannot Deter Lawsuits, 82 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 57, 57 (2004) (stating that the OCC’s new preemption rules “are important
for the OCC itself, which has long sought to match the expansive preemption authority
enjoyed by the [OTS]”). 
30
 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2000) (regarding branching); 12 U.S.C. § 92a (regarding
trust powers). 
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conduct of that business.”31 Evidently, in the OCC’s view, all other
state laws are barred from applying to national banks and their
operating subsidiaries without the express authorization of Congress.
By declaring that state laws are applicable only if they “make[]
practicable” the business of national banks and are preempted if they
“regulate the manner or content” of that business, the OCC has created
a regime of field preemption in everything but name.32 
The OCC’s arguments for its preemption and visitorial powers rules
echo similar claims of broad preemptive authority that the OCC has
made during the past two years. For example, in a letter written to
the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (“CSBS”) in February 2003,
the OCC declared: “National banks were established by Congress as
instrumentalities to carry out multiple Congressional objectives and
were designed to constitute a national banking system, independent
of State direction or supervision, operating under Federal standards
administered by the OCC.”33 In an advisory letter issued in November
2002, the OCC asserted: “Congress provided that the uniform federal
standards that would govern national banks—and state laws, where
federal law makes them applicable—would be enforced by a single,
federal supervisor, the OCC.”34 In a speech delivered in February
2002, Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., argued:
There is no question that national banks’ immunity from many state
laws is a significant benefit of the national charter—a benefit that the
OCC has fought hard over the years to preserve. The ability of national
banks to conduct a multistate business subject to a single uniform set
of federal laws, under the supervision of a single regulator, free from
visitorial powers of various state authorities, is a major advantage
of the national charter.35 
31
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1912–13. 
32
 Cf. id. at 1910–11 (declining to formally “declare that these regulations ‘occupy
the field’ of national banks’ real estate lending, other lending, and deposit-taking
activities,” but asserting that (i) “state laws do not apply to national banks if they
impermissibly contain a bank’s exercise of a federally authorized power” and (ii) “the
effect of labeling,” such as the use of the term “occupation of the entire field,” is
“largely immaterial in the present circumstances”). 
33
 Letter from John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, to Neil Milner,
CSBS President 4 (Feb. 21, 2003) (emphasis added) (on file with author). 
34
 OCC Advisory Letter 2002-9, 3 (Nov. 25, 2002) [hereinafter OCC AL 2002-9],
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov (emphasis added). 
35
 Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., Remarks Before the Women
in Housing and Finance (Feb. 12, 2002), reprinted in OCC News Release 2002-10,
at 2 [hereinafter Comptroller Hawke Speech on Feb. 12, 2002], available at http://
www.occ.treas.gov (emphasis added). 
[Vol. 23: 225ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW236
 0012 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 70     32/33 
As shown in Part III, the OCC’s novel theory of de facto field
preemption is contrary to court decisions and congressional mandates.
Those judicial and congressional authorities demonstrate that the
OCC’s preemption and visitorial powers rules extend far beyond the
OCC’s lawful authority. Unfortunately, several recent victories in
federal appellate and district courts have encouraged the OCC to
pursue its efforts to prevent the states from exercising any meaningful
regulatory authority over national banks and their operating subsidia-
ries. While state officials should continue to contest the OCC’s claims
in court, they also need to persuade Congress to clarify the limits on
the OCC’s authority to override state laws.
III. The OCC’s Preemption and Visitorial Powers Rules
Exceed the Agency’s Authority, Threaten to Destroy
the Dual Banking System, and Undermine the
States’ Ability to Protect Consumers
A. The OCC’s Claim that National Banks Are Generally
Exempt from State Regulation Is Contrary to Leading
Supreme Court Decisions
1. The Supreme Court Has Repeatedly Held that National
Banks Are Subject to State Laws
The OCC has declared that “the exercise by Federally-chartered
national banks of their Federally-authorized powers is ordinarily not
subject to state law.”36 According to the OCC, its preemption rules
are justified because they promote “a ‘complete’ national banking
system, free from state control, and subject to uniform national
standards.”37 These assertions are clearly wrong because they ignore
core principles of federalism embodied in our dual banking system.
Under the dual banking system, the states have authority to regulate
the business activities of all banks, including national banks, except
in specific areas where Congress has affirmatively chosen to preempt
state laws.38 Thus, court decisions have frequently upheld the
36
 OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,120. 
37
 Id. at 46,129. 
38
 As discussed in Part III.B, infra, Congress has allowed (by express mandate or
by statutory silence) the states to apply their laws to many operations of national banks.
In contrast, the Supreme Court recently determined that 12 U.S.C. §§ 85–86 were
intended by Congress to provide “an exclusive federal cause of action for usury against
national banks.” Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 10 (2003) (emphasis
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application of state laws to national banks without requiring any
explicit incorporation of state-law standards into federal statutes. In
1997, for example, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the general principle
that “federally chartered banks are subject to state law.”39 As support
for that principle, the Court cited prior decisions reaching back more
than a century to National Bank v. Kentucky.40 In Kentucky, the Court
declared that national banks:
are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.
All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their
acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts,
and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law.
It is only when State law incapacitates the [national] banks from
discharging their duties to the [federal] government that it becomes
unconstitutional.41 
In Kentucky, the Court expressly distinguished its famous decision in
McCulloch v. Maryland.42 In McCulloch, the Court struck down a
Maryland law that imposed a tax on the Baltimore branch of the
Second Bank of the United States. In Kentucky, the Court focused on
Chief Justice John Marshall’s statement in McCulloch that “the power
to tax involves the power to destroy.”43 Based on Marshall’s state-
ment, the Supreme Court held in Kentucky that McCulloch does not
bar state laws from applying to national banks except in situations
added). In view of this congressional purpose, the Court held that “there is . . . no
such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank.” Id. Thus, usury
is a specific area in which Congress has determined that state-law rules should not
apply to national banks.  
As shown below, Congress has not manifested any intent to provide national banks
or their operating subsidiaries with a general exemption from state laws. Moreover,
in the area of usury, Congress adopted a statute in 1980 that establishes parity for
all FDIC-insured banks with respect to interest rates chargeable on loans. This 1980
statute provides FDIC-insured state banks with the same exemption from state usury
laws that national banks enjoy under 12 U.S.C. §§ 85–86. Congress thereby ensured
that its specific preemption of state usury laws would not give national banks a decisive
competitive advantage over state banks. See infra notes 124–26 and accompanying
text (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1831d). 
39
 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997). 
40
 Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1869); see Atherton, 519 U.S.
at 222–23 (citing Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky and other decisions). 
41
 Id. at 362; quoted in Atherton, 519 U.S. at 222–23. 
42
 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
43
 Id. at 431. 
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where a state regulation “may be so used . . . as to destroy” the ability
of national banks to exercise their federally-authorized powers:
[I]t is argued that the [national] banks, being instrumentalities of the
Federal government, by which some of its important operations are
conducted, cannot be subjected to such State legislation. It is certainly
true that the [Second] Bank of the United States and its capital were
held to be exempt from State taxation on the ground here stated, and
this principle, laid down in the case of McCulloch v. The State of
Maryland, has been repeatedly affirmed by the court. But the doctrine
has its foundation in the proposition, that the right of taxation may
be so used in such cases as to destroy the instrumentalities by which
the [federal] government proposes to effect its lawful purposes in the
States, and it certainly cannot be maintained that banks or other
corporations or instrumentalities of the [federal] government are to
be wholly withdrawn from the operation of State legislation. . . . [T]he
agencies of the Federal government are only exempted from State
legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair
their efficiency in performing the functions by which they are designed
to serve that government. Any other rule would convert a principle
founded alone in the necessity of securing to the government of the
United States the means of exercising its legitimate powers, into an
unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of the States.44
As shown by the foregoing excerpts from Kentucky, McCulloch
prohibits the states from enforcing only such laws as are likely to
“incapacitate[] the [national] banks from discharging their duties to
the [federal] government.”45 Furthermore, as Kentucky makes clear,
McCulloch does not exempt national banks from their general duty
of complying with reasonable and nondiscriminatory state laws.46 In
Atherton47 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this understanding of
McCulloch as set forth in Kentucky. Thus, both Kentucky and Atherton
establish that McCulloch does not bar the general application of state
laws to national banks.
44
 Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. at 361–62 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court
reaffirmed the principles of National Bank v. Kentucky seven years later in Waite
v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527 (1877). In Waite, the Court upheld the validity of a Vermont
law that required all banks, including national banks, to provide the names of their
resident shareholders to local officials responsible for collecting Vermont’s tax on
bank shares. 94 U.S. at 533–34. 
45
 Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. at 361–62. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Atherton, 519 U.S. at 222–23. 
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In its notice of proposed rulemaking, the OCC quoted McCulloch
as support for its claim that states “have no power, by taxation or
otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the
operations of an entity created under Federal law.”48 However, in view
of the Court’s subsequent decisions in Kentucky and Atherton, this
quote from McCulloch cannot reasonably be interpreted as providing
national banks with a general immunity from state regulation. The
McCulloch decision dealt with the Second Bank of the United States,
an institution that was partly owned by the federal government, served
as the government’s fiscal agent, and operated as a de facto central
bank.49 In Osborn v. Bank of the United States,50 Chief Justice
Marshall declared that the Second Bank “would certainly be subject
to the taxing power of the State, as any individual would be,” if the
Second Bank was a “mere private corporation, engaged in its own
business,” and “having private trade and private profit for its great
end and principal object.”51 In Marshall’s view, the Second Bank was
totally exempt from state taxation because it was “a public corporation,
created for public and national purposes . . . [as] the great instrument
by which the fiscal operations of the government are effected.”52 Thus,
48
 OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,120 (quoting McCulloch,
17 U.S. at 436). The OCC quoted the same statement from McCulloch in a recent
paper that the OCC issued on the dual banking system. See National Banks and the
Dual Banking System, OCC Release No. 2003-83, at 1, 5 (Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter
2003 OCC Dual Banking Paper], available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/
2003-83a.pdf. 
49
 One-fifth of the Second Bank’s stock was owned by the federal government.
The Second Bank served as the depositary and paying agent for the federal
government. Additionally, the Second Bank regulated the nation’s currency supply
(i) by issuing its own notes (which accounted for about one-fourth of the paper
currency issued by all U.S. banks) and (ii) by presenting state bank notes for
redemption in specie by the issuing banks. Nicholas Biddle, president of the Second
Bank from 1823 to the Bank’s demise in 1836, followed policies that were consciously
designed to make the Bank “a central bank with effective power over the nation’s
money market.” PAUL STUDENSKI & HERMAN E. KROOSS, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 83–88, 103–07 (2d ed. 1963) (quote at 87); HERMAN E. KROOSS
& MARTIN R. BLYN, A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 44–45, 52–54
(1971); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal
Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1133, 1153 (1990) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Dual Banking System]; Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of Nationwide
Banks, 77 IOWA L. REV. 957, 970 (1992) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail].
50
 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
51
 Id. at 859; see MICHAEL P. MALLOY, PRINCIPLES OF BANK REGULATION 6–7
(2d ed. 2003) (discussing Osborn). 
52
 Osborn, 22 U.S. at 860 (describing the Second Bank at 863 as “a machine for
the money transactions of the [federal] government”). 
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Marshall sharply distinguished the public functions of the Second
Bank from “the mere business of banking [that] is, in its own nature,
a private business.”53 
In Osborn, Marshall acknowledged that the Second Bank was
“transacting private as well as public business” by “lending and
dealing in money.”54 He argued, however, that the private activities
of the Second Bank were “inseparably connected” to its “public
functions” because its private business supported “the currency in
which all transactions of the [federal] government are conducted.”55
Accordingly, Marshall concluded that the Second Bank’s “capacity
of carrying on the trade of banking” was “essential to its character,
as a machine for the fiscal operations of the government.”56 Based
on this essential connection between the Second Bank’s “trade of
banking” and its public fiscal operations, Marshall held that the Bank’s
“trade must be as exempt from State control as the actual conveyance
of the public money.”57 
The Second Bank of the United States was a far different institution
from today’s national banks. All national banks currently operate as
privately-owned corporations for the benefit of their shareholders.58
Since Congress adopted the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (“FRA”),59
the Federal Reserve System (“FRS”) has performed all central banking
functions for the nation. A central objective of the FRA was to provide
the FRS with sole control over the nation’s money supply, thereby
terminating the roles that national banks had previously played in
funding government operations and issuing a national currency under
the original National Bank Act of 1864 (“NBA”).60 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. at 860–61. 
55
 Id. at 863. 
56
 Id. at 867. 
57
 Id. 
58
 First Agric. Nat’l Bank of Berkshire County v. State Tax Comm’n, 392 U.S.
339, 354 (1968) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
59
 Fed. Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522). 
60
 National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864) (codified as amended in 12 U.S.C.).
Under the original NBA, national banks were the principal purchasers of U.S.
government bonds and issued bank notes backed by those bonds. The NBA’s sponsors
intended that the newly-created national banks would promote the federal govern-
ment’s funding operations for the Civil War and would also help the nation to maintain
a more stable supply of currency. However, national banks lost their role as the primary
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As a consequence of the FRA, present-day national banks do not
perform any of the public functions that were exercised by either the
Second Bank of the United States or the system of national banks
created under the original NBA. Today’s national banks cannot be
fairly viewed as public institutions comparable to the Second Bank
of the United States. Therefore, the OCC’s attempt to justify its
preemption rules by citing McCulloch is unpersuasive. Similarly, the
OCC cannot validate its regulations by citing other Supreme Court
decisions that were decided before 1913, when national banks were
still performing important public functions through their government
funding and currency operations.61 
issuers of the nation’s currency after the FRA was enacted in 1913. Since 1913, Federal
Reserve notes have functioned as the nation’s currency in place of the superseded
national bank notes. See, e.g., Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409,
413 (1874) (stating that, under the original NBA, national banks were “National
favorites” because “[t]hey were established for the purpose, in part, of providing a
currency for the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of the
General government”); MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A
MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1867–1960, at 196 (Princeton Univ.
Press 1963) (observing that the FRA “greatly reduced the importance of the distinction
between national and nonnational banks”); KROOSS & BLYN, supra note 49, at 96–100,
118–21; MALLOY, supra note 51, at 10–11; STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 49,
at 258–61; Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1153–54; Wilmarth,
Too Big to Fail, supra note 49, at 972. 
61
 See OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,121 (quoting Easton
v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 229, 231–32 (1903); Farmers & Mechanics Nat’l Bank v.
Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33, 34 (1875)); 2003 OCC Dual Banking Paper, supra note 48,
at 19–20. In Easton, the Supreme Court quoted the important distinction made by
Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn between a private corporation carrying on the “mere
business of banking” and a public corporation that is “an instrument which is
‘necessary and proper for carrying into effect the powers vested in the government
of the United States.’ ” Easton, 188 U.S. at 230. The Court held that national banks
established under the original NBA were public institutions within Marshall’s
description. Easton, 188 U.S. at 229–30. In Farmers & Mechanics, the Court cited
Osborn and explained that national banks were “instruments designed to be used to
aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public service.”
Farmers & Mechanics, 91 U.S. at 33 (quoted in Easton, 188 U.S. at 230). Given
the Court’s reliance in Easton and Farmers & Mechanics on Marshall’s distinction
between private and public banking institutions, the Court might have applied a more
tolerant preemption standard in those cases if, at the time, national banks were engaged
only in private, for-profit activities and were not involved in currency or government
funding operations.  
In the preamble to its final preemption rules, the OCC referred to the Supreme
Court’s statement in National Bank v. Kentucky that “agencies of the Federal
government are only exempted from State legislation, so far as that legislation may
interfere with, or impair their efficiency in performing the functions by which they
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In First Agricultural National Bank of Berkshire County v. State
Tax Commission,62 decided in 1968, three dissenting Supreme Court
Justices argued that, by reason of the FRA, national banks had become
completely private institutions and should no longer be viewed as “tax-
immune federal instrumentalit[ies]” under the principles announced
in McCulloch and Osborn:
[A] national bank [today] cannot be considered a tax-immune federal
instrumentality. It is a privately owned corporation existing for the
private profit of its shareholders. It performs no significant federal
governmental function that is not performed equally by state-chartered
banks. Government officials do not run its day-to-day operations nor
does the Government have any ownership interest in a national bank.
. . . [T]he fact that [national banks] ‘owe their very existence to,’
i.e., are chartered by, the [federal] Government, has been definitively
rejected as a basis alone for determining that they should be tax
immune. Similarly, a whole host of businesses and institutions are
subject to extensive federal regulation and that has never been thought
to bring them within the scope of the ‘federal instrumentalities’
doctrine.63 
The majority in First Agricultural National Bank (consisting of five
Justices) did not reply to the dissenters’ argument. Instead, the majority
found it “unnecessary to reach the constitutional question of whether
today national banks should be considered nontaxable as federal
instrumentalities.”64 The majority relied on 12 U.S.C. § 548, which
at the time allowed states to tax national banks in four specified areas.
are designed to serve that government.” OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed.
Reg. at 1910 (citing 76 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added)). The statement in National
Bank clearly referred to the public functions that national banks were required to
perform under the original NBA, including those related to government funding and
currency issuance. The Court said nothing to indicate that an “impair the efficiency”
standard would be applied to state laws regulating the private business activities of
national banks. On the contrary, as discussed supra, the Court clearly stated that
national banks “are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily
course of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.” 76 U.S.
at 362; see supra notes 40–47 and accompanying text. 
62
 392 U.S. 339 (1968). 
63
 Id. at 354–55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citation omitted); see also id. at 358
(stating “[t]oday the national banks perform no significant fiscal services to the Federal
Government not performed by their state competitors. Any federally insured bank,
state or national, may be a government depository.”). 
64
 Id. at 341. 
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The majority concluded that Congress intended § 548 to define “the
outer limit within which States can tax national banks.”65 
In 1969 Congress responded to First Agricultural National Bank
by amending § 548.66 As amended, § 548 provides that every national
bank is subject to state taxation to the same extent as a state bank
whose principal office is located in the same state.67 In adopting the
1969 amendment, Congress determined that the reasoning of McCul-
loch and Osborn no longer justified giving national banks “immunities
from State taxation” that were not available to similarly-situated state
banks.68 The Ninth Circuit subsequently held that “the general purpose
of [the 1969 amendment] was to promote equality in state taxation
of state banks vis-à-vis national banks.”69 
Based on the analysis employed by Chief Justice Marshall in
Osborn, present-day national banks should be considered private
corporations that are engaged in the “mere business of banking” with
a “principal object [of] individual trade and individual profit.”70
Accordingly, today’s national banks should be viewed as private
entities that are subject to reasonable state regulation.71 Congress
65
 Id. at 345. In contrast to the majority, the three dissenters contended that Con-
gress, by specifying four permissible types of state taxes in § 548, did not intend to
preclude all other forms of “nondiscriminatory state taxation” of national banks. Id.
at 358–59 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
66
 See United States v. State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d 458, 461 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied sub nom. Crocker Nat’l Bank v. State Board of Equalization, 451
U.S. 1028 (1981). 
67
 Id. at 459–61. 
68
 S. REP. NO. 91-530 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1594, 1595, cited
in State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d at 460–61. The Senate committee report
on the 1969 amendment declared:  
There may have at one time been justification for giving national banks
privileges and immunities which were denied State banks, under the theory
that national banks are peculiarly an instrumentality of the Federal govern-
ment, and, as such, hold a unique and distinct position from that of other
institutions. Without specifically addressing the question of whether national
banks remain, in substance, such a Federal instrumentality, the committee
is agreed that there is no longer any justification for Congress continuing
to grant national banks immunities from State taxation which are not afforded
State banks.  
S. REP. NO. 91-530, at 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.A.A.N. 1594, 1595 (cited
in State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d at 460) (emphasis added). 
69
 State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d at 464. 
70
 Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 859–60 (1824). 
71
 Id. at 859–60, 863–68. Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins acknowledge that “national
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seemed to adopt this view in 1969 when it amended § 548 to make
clear that national banks are subject to nondiscriminatory state taxes.
The conclusion that McCulloch does not provide modern national
banks with blanket immunity from state regulation is also made clear
by the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson.72 In Barnett the Supreme Court held that a state
may not “forbid, or impair significantly, the exercise of a power that
Congress explicitly granted” to national banks.73 However, immedi-
ately following that statement the Court explained that “[t]o say this
is not to deprive States of the power to regulate national banks, where
. . . doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the
national bank’s exercise of its powers.”74 
banks no longer serve in a currency-issuing role as they did at the outset of their
establishment.” Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 393. Nevertheless, they contend
that the dissent in First Agricultural National Bank supports only the application of
state tax laws to national banks. Id. This claim overlooks two important points. First,
far from being a trivial matter, the immunity of federally-chartered banks from state
taxation was a fundamental issue at stake in McCulloch and Osborn, and also in the
congressional debates over the original NBA. See supra notes 42–43, 49–57 and
accompanying text (discussing the tax immunity issue involved in McCulloch and
Osborn); Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 393 n.123 (quoting Senator Sumner’s
1864 speech declaring that national banks must be immune from “local taxation”
because of their role in “creat[ing] a new currency”). Second, the reasoning of the
dissent in First Agricultural National Bank has a potential application that extends
well beyond the issue of state taxation. The dissent argued persuasively that modern
national banks should no longer be treated as “federal instrumentalities” because they
are private, for-profit business entities that do not conduct any of the “public” functions
carried on by the Second Bank of the United States or by national banks prior to
1913. 392 U.S. at 349–59 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Osborn, Chief Justice
Marshall described the “mere business of banking” as a “private business” that could
lawfully be “taxed, regulated, or restrained” by the states, even if that business was
conducted by a corporation holding a federal charter, as long as the corporation did
not carry out important “public” functions designated by Congress. See 22 U.S. at
860, 862 (stating that “[w]e do not maintain that the corporate character of the Bank
exempts its operations from the action of State authority”). Likewise, when Congress
subjected national banks to nondiscriminatory state taxes in 1969, Congress indicated
that modern national banks should no longer expect to receive special “privileges and
immunities” that are denied to state banks. See supra note 68 (quoting the 1969 Senate
committee report). Thus, all of the foregoing authorities can reasonably be interpreted
as supporting my view that modern national banks are subject to reasonable state
regulation, unless a particular state law creates an irreconcilable conflict with a
congressional mandate. 
72
 517 U.S. 25 (1996). 
73
 Id. at 33. 
74
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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As the Supreme Court made clear in Barnett, the NBA does not
create a regime of field preemption, and, therefore, state laws are
preempted only when they create an “irreconcilable conflict” with
federal statutes governing the operations of national banks.75 In
Barnett and Atherton the Court cited several of its earlier decisions
that required national banks to comply with state laws that did not
create any impermissible conflict with federal statutes.76 In those
earlier decisions the Court affirmed that “national banks are subject
to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws or
impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks’ func-
tions.”77 
2. The OCC’s Rules Contravene the Standards for
Preemption Established by the Supreme Court with
Respect to National Banks
As shown in the preceding section, the Supreme Court has made
clear in Barnett and other decisions that state laws apply to national
banks unless they either (i) prevent a national bank from exercising
a federally-authorized power,78 or (ii) significantly interfere with the
75
 Id. at 31 (explaining the difference between field preemption and conflict pre-
emption). 
76
 Id. at 33–34; Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1997). 
77
 Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944); accord Lewis v.
Fid. & Deposit Co., 292 U.S. 559, 564–66 (1934); First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v.
Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656–59 (1924); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356–59
(1896).  
Three Supreme Court decisions that the OCC has frequently cited actually agree
with the standard articulated in Luckett. Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank, 161 U.S. 275,
287 (1896) (affirming that “so far as not repugnant to acts of Congress, the contracts
and dealings of national banks are left subject to the state law”); First Nat’l Bank
of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 368–69 (1923) (recognizing that “[the]
contracts and dealings [of national banks] are subject to the operation of general and
undiscriminating state laws which do not conflict with the letter or the general object
and purposes of congressional legislation”); Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347
U.S. 373, 378 n.7 (1954) (noting that “national banks may be subject to some state
laws in the normal course of business if there is no conflict with federal law,” even
if Congress has not incorporated such state laws into the NBA). 
78
 E.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996). In OCC
Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,121, the OCC quoted the Court’s
statement in Barnett that “where Congress has not expressly conditioned the grant
of ‘power’ upon a grant of state permission, the Court has ordinarily found that no
such condition applies.” 517 U.S. at 34. The OCC reads this statement far too broadly
in claiming that it gives national banks a general exemption from state regulation.
What Barnett actually said was that a state may not seek to prohibit the use of a
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bank’s exercise of that power.79 To remove all doubt that the Supreme
Court intended this formulation to provide the governing preemption
standard, the Court in Barnett also used the synonymous phrase barring
the states from acting “to forbid, or to impair significantly, the exercise
of a power that Congress explicitly granted.”80 Remarkably, the OCC
does not follow either standard in its preemption rules. Instead, the
OCC declares that state laws are preempted if they “obstruct, impair,
or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise the powers
authorized to it under Federal law.”81 
federal power by requiring national banks to obtain the state’s permission as a
“condition” for exercising that power. See id. at 31–32 (responding to the state’s
argument in Barnett that “the Federal Statute removes only federal legal obstacles,
not state legal obstacles, to the sale of insurance by national banks”). Barnett did
not say that a state may never affect the exercise of a federal power by requiring
national banks, in the course of using that power, to satisfy reasonable “conditions”
that all similarly-situated persons must meet. 
79
 E.g., Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33. In OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 46,121, the OCC also quoted the Court’s statement in Barnett that the express and
incidental “powers” of national banks should be interpreted as “grants of authority
not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state law.” 517
U.S. at 32. Again, the Supreme Court’s statement does not support the OCC’s claim
that national banks are generally exempt from state regulation. The Court’s use of
the terms “normally,” “ordinarily,” and “contrary” in this passage clearly indicates
that a finding of preemption can only be made after determining whether, in fact,
a state law is “contrary” to federal law under the “prevent or significantly interfere”
test for conflict preemption articulated in Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33. See Peatros v. Bank
of Am. NT&SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542–43, 550 (Cal. 2000) (construing Barnett in a
similar manner). 
80
 Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33 (emphasis added). Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins claim
that I have “distort[ed] key aspects” of the Barnett opinion, and that I “erroneously”
interpret Barnett as “establishing a presumption against preemption of state law as
applied to national banks.” Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 370 (emphasis in
original). This charge is unfounded for three reasons. First, Barnett used the same
formulation twice (“forbid, or . . . impair significantly”; “prevent or significantly
interfere with”) to make clear that state laws do apply to national banks unless they
create a significant conflict with federal law. See supra notes 73–74, 78–80 and
accompanying text. Second, Congress specifically endorsed the “prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere with” formulation as the governing preemption standard under Barnett.
See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. Third, Barnett cited three earlier
Supreme Court decisions as authority for the “prevent or significantly interfere with”
test for preemption. Those earlier cases do uphold the presumptive application of state
laws to national banks. Barnett, 517 U.S. at 33–34 (citing Luckett, McClellan, and
Kentucky); see also supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing Kentucky);
infra notes 86–92, 101–06, 152, 172 and accompanying text (discussing McClellan
and Luckett). 
81
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1912; see id. at 1916–17 (text
of 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d)(1), 7.4009(b), 34.4(a)). 
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The OCC’s “obstruct, impair, or condition” standard for preemption
appears nowhere in Barnett. Unless it is overturned by Congress or
the courts, the OCC’s self-created preemption standard will obviously
have a far greater impact in preempting state laws than the “prevent
or significantly interfere” rule that the Supreme Court actually adopted
in Barnett. Under the OCC’s newly-invented standard, state laws
would be preempted if they have any impact on national banks other
than merely an “incidental” effect that “makes it practicable” for
national banks to conduct their business.82 In contrast, under the
Barnett standard state laws apply to national banks unless they either
prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of a congressional-
ly-authorized power.
In 1999 Congress adopted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(“GLBA”),83 which regulates, among other things, the sale of insur-
ance products by depository institutions and their affiliates.84 GLBA
contains a specific preemption provision that governs the application
of state laws to the sale or marketing of insurance products by
depository institutions and their affiliates. This provision declares that
“the legal standards for preemption set forth in the decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States in [Barnett]” mean that “no State
may . . . prevent or significantly interfere with the ability of a
depository institution, or an affiliate thereof, to engage, directly or
82
 Id. at 1912; see OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1896, 1896
n.7 (explaining that, under the OCC’s preemption rules, state laws will apply to
national banks only if such laws establish “the legal infrastructure that surrounds and
supports the ability of national banks—and others—to do business”).  
Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins contend that the OCC’s self-created preemption test
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s statement in Barnett that state laws are
preempted when they create “an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.” Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 371 (quoting Barnett,
517 U.S. at 31 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). However,
as shown below in Part III.B, the “full purposes and objectives of Congress” since
1910 have been to maintain a competitive equilibrium within the dual banking system,
achieved in part through the general application of state laws to national banks.
Because the OCC’s rules now threaten to destroy that equilibrium, it is the OCC’s
rules that create an “obstacle” to the accomplishment of Congress’s true purposes
for the banking industry. 
83
 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C.). 
84
 For a discussion of GLBA’s provisions allowing depository institutions to sell
insurance and affiliate with insurance underwriters, see Lissa L. Broome & Jerry W.
Markham, Banking and Insurance: Before and After the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
25 IOWA J. CORP. L. 723, 757–61 (2000). 
[Vol. 23: 225ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW248
 0024 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 108    83/91 
indirectly, . . . in any insurance sales, solicitation or cross-marketing
activity.”85 Thus, Congress expressly endorsed the “prevent or signifi-
cantly interfere with” standard for preemption, which the Supreme
Court articulated in Barnett. In view of this congressional endorsement
of the Barnett standard, the OCC has no authority to invent its own
“obstruct, impair, or condition” preemption test.
The OCC’s self-created standard is also contrary to several Supreme
Court decisions that held that national banks must comply with state
laws that imposed reasonable, nondiscriminatory conditions and
limitations on the ability of national banks to exercise their federal
powers. For example, in McClellan a Massachusetts law prohibited
insolvent debtors from making preferential transfers of property to any
creditor.86 A national bank claimed that its power to accept convey-
ances of real estate as security for debts under Rev. Stat. § 5137 (the
predecessor to 12 U.S.C. § 29) preempted the state statute and
permitted the bank to accept a preferential transfer of land from an
insolvent borrower.87 The NBA was silent on the issue of whether
a state could place restrictions on transfers of real estate to national
banks. The national bank argued that the NBA’s failure to include an
express reference to state law in Rev. Stat. § 5137 meant that the NBA
was “exclusive of any [state] legislation” in allowing national banks
“to take securities for past debts by a conveyance of land, either
directly or in mortgage.”88 The Supreme Court, however, rejected the
bank’s “assertion that national banks in virtue of the [NBA] are
entirely removed, as to all their contracts, from any and every control
by the state law.”89 Following the rule announced in National Bank
v. Kentucky, the Court declared that the purpose of the NBA “was
to leave such banks as to their contracts in general under the operation
of the state law.”90 Accordingly, the Court held that state laws govern
the business transactions of national banks unless (i) Congress has
“expressly . . . directed” that state law should be preempted or (ii) a
state law “frustrates the lawful purpose of Congress or impairs the
85
 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (2000) (emphasis added); see H.R. CONF. REP. NO.
106-434, at 156–57 (1999), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 251 (explaining that
the “prevent or significantly interfere with” standard for preemption, used in
§ 6701(d)(2)(A), was “set forth in Barnett”). 
86
 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896). 
87
 Id. 
88
 Id. at 352–54 (argument by counsel for the bank). 
89
 Id. at 359. 
90
 Id.; see id. at 356–57. 
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efficiency of the banks to discharge the duties imposed upon them
by [federal law].”91 The Court found “no conflict between the special
power conferred by Congress upon national banks to take real estate
for certain purposes, and the general and undiscriminating law of the
State of Massachusetts subjecting the taking of real estate to certain
restrictions, in order to prevent preferences in case of insolvency.”92
In First National Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri93 the Supreme Court
rejected a similar field preemption claim asserted by the defendant
national bank.94 In overruling the bank’s argument, the Court declared
that “national banks are subject to the laws of a State in respect of
their affairs unless such laws interfere with the purposes of their
creation, tend to impair or destroy their efficiency as federal agencies
or conflict with the paramount law of the United States.”95 
The Supreme Court reiterated the core principles of Kentucky,
McClellan, and St. Louis in subsequent decisions. For example, in
Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.96 the receiver for an insolvent national
bank argued that the bank, in accepting deposits of state funds, had
no power to provide the surety bond required by state law.97 The
receiver asserted that “a national bank is an instrumentality of the
United States and cannot subject itself by contract to the laws of a
State.”98 The Supreme Court overruled that argument in the following
terms:
[A] national bank is subject to state law unless that law interferes with
the purposes of its creation, or destroys its efficiency, or is in conflict
with some paramount federal law. . . . What obligations to the State
the bank assumes may be defined by the law of that State. It is quite
possible that the legislature might attempt to impose, under the
conditions of the bond, a duty which the bank would be without
authority to undertake; and to that extent the contract would be
unenforceable. But it is not shown that the obligations as now defined
91
 Id. at 359. 
92
 Id. at 361 (emphasis added). 
93
 263 U.S. 640 (1924). 
94
 See id. at 643 (summarizing argument by the bank’s counsel, who contended
that “Congress, having defined the powers of the [national] bank, . . . occupied the
entire field of legislation on that subject”). 
95
 Id. at 656 (emphasis added). 
96
 292 U.S. 559 (1934). 
97
 Id. at 564–71. 
98
 Id. at 566. 
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by the courts of Georgia are contrary to anything in the National Bank
Act.99 
Thus, Lewis expressly upheld the state’s authority to impose conditions
on the terms of its deposit relationship with a national bank, as long
as those conditions did not create an impermissible conflict with the
NBA.100 
Similarly, in Anderson National Bank v. Luckett101 the Court upheld
a Kentucky law that required all banks, including national banks, to
transfer dormant bank accounts to the state so that the state could
initiate judicial proceedings to determine whether those accounts were
abandoned and should escheat to the state.102 Again, the NBA was
silent on the question of whether states could apply their escheat laws
to deposits held by national banks. However, the Court rejected the
plaintiff national bank’s argument that the Kentucky statute created
an unconstitutional burden on the authority of national banks to accept
deposits under 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh).103 The Court found that the
Kentucky statute did not discriminate against national banks or conflict
with any specific provision of the NBA.104 The Court further declared
that bank deposits are “part of the mass of property within the state
whose transfer and devolution is subject to state control. . . . It has
never been suggested that non-discriminatory [state] laws of this type
are so burdensome as to be inapplicable to the accounts of depositors
in national banks.”105 
99
 Id. at 566 (1934) (citing Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 361
(1869); McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356 (1896); St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 656).
100
 Id. 
101
 321 U.S. 233 (1944). 
102
 Id. at 252–53. 
103
 Id. at 236, 252–53. 
104
 Id. at 247–48. 
105
 Id. at 248. In Luckett, the Court carefully distinguished First National Bank
of San Jose v. California, 262 U.S. 366 (1923), a case that the OCC has frequently
cited in support of its broad preemption theory. Luckett, 321 U.S. at 250. In San Jose
the challenged California statute required the automatic escheat to the state of inactive
bank accounts without any proof that the accounts were actually abandoned. San Jose,
262 U.S. at 366. As the Court explained in Luckett, the California law in San Jose
was declared unconstitutional because the seizure and escheat of bank accounts for
“mere dormancy” was “so unusual and so harsh . . . as to deter [depositors] from
placing or keeping their funds in national banks.” Luckett, 321 U.S. at 250. By contrast,
the Kentucky law upheld in Luckett (i) required the state to maintain “protective [state]
custody of long inactive bank accounts” in a manner that could “operate for the benefit
and security of depositors” and (ii) permitted the state to escheat only those accounts
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The foregoing Supreme Court decisions preclude the OCC from
adopting its sweeping preemption rules, which, as shown above in Part
II, amount to de facto field preemption. The OCC’s rules are based
on an aggressively preemptive construction of the NBA that the
Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected. In contrast to the OCC’s
position, the Court’s decisions establish that state laws do apply to
national banks unless they create an irreconcilable conflict with the
NBA by (i) discriminating against national banks or (ii) preventing or
significantly interfering with the banks’ ability to exercise a specific,
congressionally-authorized power.106 
that were proved to be abandoned through judicial proceedings that complied with
requirements of due process. Id. at 252, 238. 
106
 See the discussion above in this Part III.A with respect to National Bank v.
Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869), Waite v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527, 533
(1877), McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 361 (1896), First National Bank in
St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924), Lewis v. Fidelity & Deposit Co.,
292 U.S. 566 (1934), Luckett, 321 U.S. at 248, and Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213,
222–23 (1997). In cases where the Supreme Court found that federal law did preempt
a state statute, the Court determined that the challenged state laws either discriminated
against national banks, or prohibited or significantly impaired the exercise of an
express power granted to national banks under federal law. Barnett Bank of Marion
County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31–32 (1996) (invalidating a Florida law that
prohibited national banks from exercising their express authority to sell insurance in
towns with populations of less than 5000 under 12 U.S.C. § 92); Franklin Nat’l Bank
v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 374 (1954) (striking down a New York law that favored
state-chartered savings banks and prohibited national banks from using advertising
to promote their express power to accept “savings deposits” under former 12 U.S.C.
§ 371); San Jose, 262 U.S. at 370 (invalidating a California statute that escheated
bank accounts to the state upon mere dormancy for a specified period and without
any proof of abandonment, because the state law threatened a “possible confiscation”
of depositors’ funds and thereby significantly interfered with national banks’ ability
to exercise their express authority to accept deposits); Davis v. Elmira Sav. Bank,
161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896) (striking down a New York law requiring receivers of
insolvent national banks to give priority to deposit claims by state-chartered savings
banks; held, the state law violated the NBA’s express command that the OCC, as
receiver for national banks, must make a “ratable distribution” to all creditors); Easton
v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 230 (1903) (invalidating Iowa statutes that prohibited insolvent
national banks from accepting deposits and imposed criminal penalties for violations
on officers of national banks; held, the state laws significantly interfered with the
NBA’s express grant of exclusive authority to the OCC to determine whether a national
bank was insolvent and, if so, to supervise the winding up of its business and
liquidation of its assets); Farmers’ & Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29,
35 (1875) (invalidating a New York law that required national banks to forfeit the
principal of usurious loans, because that forfeiture penalty was contrary to the express
terms of section 30 of the NBA, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 85–86). 
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B. In Order to Maintain Competitive Balance Within the
Dual Banking System, Congress Has Endorsed the
General Application of State Laws to National Banks
1. Since 1910 Congress Has Followed a Policy Designed to
Maintain a Competitive Equilibrium within the Dual
Banking System
As the OCC has noted, many members of Congress expected that
the new national banking system created in 1863 would “supersede
the existing system of State banks.”107 Contrary to this expectation,
only a small number of state banks voluntarily chose to convert to
national charters.108 In 1865 Congress attempted to drive state banks
out of business by imposing a punitive ten percent tax on state bank
notes.109 State banks survived, however, by shifting from a note-based
business to a deposit-based system based on checking accounts.110
State legislatures also enhanced the attractiveness of state bank
charters by allowing state banks to establish branches, to make real
estate loans, and to offer trust services.111 National banks found
themselves at a serious competitive disadvantage because they could
not perform any of these functions under the original NBA. As a result,
107
 OCC Docket No. 04-03, supra note 6, at 1898; see also OCC Docket 03-16,
supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,120 n.5; 2003 OCC Dual Banking Paper, supra note
48, at 16. 
108
 Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1153–54. 
109
 Id. Like the OCC, Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins argue that the legislative history
of the original NBA reveals a congressional purpose to “insulate” the newly-created
national banks from “interference” by state officials. Compare Cayne & Perkins, supra
note 2, at 393, with OCC materials cited supra note 107. Also like the OCC, Mr.
Cayne and Ms. Perkins deemphasize the subsequent history of the dual banking system
described in Part III of this article. That history shows that, at least since 1910,
(i) Congress has repeatedly acted to preserve a basic equality of competitive
opportunities between national and state banks and (ii) the competitive equilibrium
intended by Congress has depended to a significant degree on the general application
of state laws to national banks. 
110
 Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1154; see also WILLIAM
J. BROWN, THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (table 1) (showing
that the number of state banks fell from 1,466 in 1863 to 247 in 1868, before rising
to 650 by 1880); FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 60, at 18–19; ROBERT E. LITAN,
WHAT SHOULD BANKS DO? 21 (Brookings Inst. 1987); STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra
note 49, at 178. 
111
 E.g., LITAN, supra note 110, at 21–22; Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note
49, at 976. 
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the state banking system controlled about two-thirds of the bank
charters and bank deposits by 1910.112 
Between 1913 and 1933, Congress responded to repeated demands
from national banks for new powers to meet the competitive threat
posed by state banks. Significantly, however, Congress did not repeat
its previous efforts to destroy the state banking system. Instead,
Congress adopted a series of banking statutes designed to establish
a basic equality of competitive opportunities between national and
state banks. For example, Congress granted to national banks intrastate
branching privileges, fiduciary powers, and real estate lending authori-
ties that were essentially equivalent to those enjoyed by state banks.113
In 1933 Congress rejected proposals by Senator Carter Glass,
Federal Reserve Governor Eugene Meyer, and others to create a
unified national banking system under federal supervision.114 Propo-
nents of a unified system advocated (i) a statute permitting national
banks to establish interstate branches without regard to state laws and
(ii) a federal deposit insurance program limited to banks that were
members of the FRS.115 Defenders of the dual banking system argued
that such measures would “wipe out the State banking system . . .
by giving the national system such an advantage that the competitive
State system can not exist.”116 Congress chose to preserve the dual
banking system, because it (i) rejected proposals for interstate branch-
ing by national banks, (ii) allowed national banks to establish only
such intrastate branches as similarly-situated state banks could operate
112
 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 110, at 13–15 (table 1) (showing that there were
14,348 state banks and 7138 national banks in 1910); KROOSS & BLYN, supra note
49, at 135; STUDENSKI & KROOSS, supra note 49, at 246 (reporting that state banks
held almost seventy percent of all bank deposits in 1908); Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail,
supra note 49, at 972. 
113
 See, e.g., LITAN, supra note 110, at 22, 24; H. PARKER WILLIS & JOHN M.
CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION 215–19, 398–408, 585–91 (1934). In the areas
of intrastate branching and fiduciary activities, Congress ensured equal treatment of
national and state banks by incorporating state-law standards into the statutes
governing national banks. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c), 92a(a) (2000). 
114
 S. REP. NO. 72-584, pt. 2, at 1 (1932) (minority views); Wilmarth, Too Big
to Fail, supra note 49, at 972–74 (discussing the strong opposition to those proposals).
115
 BROWN, supra note 110, at 28–31 (describing proposals for a unified national
banking system presented during 1931–1933). 
116
 S. REP. NO. 72-584, pt. 2, at 1, 3–7 (arguing against interstate branching powers
and against a deposit insurance program limited to national banks). 
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under state law, and (iii) authorized deposit insurance for all national
and state banks that could meet the FDIC’s criteria for insurance.117
Since 1933 Congress has continued to maintain a competitive
equilibrium within the dual banking system. For example, in 1950 and
1952 Congress adopted statutes ensuring that national banks and state
banks would have equivalent opportunities to convert their charters
or to enter into mergers with each other.118 Similarly, in 1969, as
discussed above, Congress passed legislation to equalize the treatment
of state banks and national banks under state tax laws.119 
In 1980 Congress adopted three provisions designed to eliminate
serious competitive disparities between the national and state sys-
tems.120 First, Congress gave all federally-insured depository institu-
tions (whether operating under federal or state charters) the ability to
provide negotiable order of withdrawal (“NOW”) accounts to individu-
als and nonprofit organizations.121 NOW accounts, which are func-
tionally equivalent to interest-bearing checking accounts, were first
offered by state-chartered banks in New England and New York
pursuant to state law. Congress determined in 1980 that all federally-
insured institutions should have an equal opportunity to offer such
117
 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 110, at 18–19, 28–31; FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ,
supra note 60, at 434–37; Carter H. Golembe, The Deposit Insurance Legislation of
1933: An Examination of Its Antecedents and Its Purpose, 75 POL. SCI. Q. 181, 195–
200 (1960); Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 49, at 973–75. 
118
 Act of Aug. 17, 1950, ch. 729, § 4, 64 Stat. 455, 456 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 214c); Act of July 12, 1952, ch. 696, 66 Stat. 590 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 214c); Act of July 14, 1952, ch. 722, 66 Stat. 599 (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 215a). For evidence of Congress’s intent to establish competitive equality between
state banks and national banks in the areas of charter conversions and mergers, see,
for example, S. REP. NO. 81-1104 (1949), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3012,
3013 (expressing the intent of Congress to establish a “greater degree of equality as
between national banks and State banks” with respect to charter conversions); H.R.
REP. NO. 82-2422 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2103, 2105 (stating that
amendments were needed to the charter conversion statute “to place National banks
and State banks on an equal footing with respect to conditions under which they might
change from one system to the other”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-2421 (1952), reprinted in
1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2133, 2133 (stating that a new bank merger statute was needed
to eliminate “a disadvantage to consolidating under Federal charter as compared to
consolidating under State law”). 
119
 See supra notes 66–69 and accompanying text (discussing 1969 legislation).
120
 See Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 303,
94 Stat. 132, 146 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1832(a)); S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 2, 7–9
(1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236, 238, 241–42. 
121
 S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 2, 7–9 (1979), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 236,
238, 241–42. 
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accounts.122 Second, Congress required all federally-insured deposi-
tory institutions to comply with the reserve requirements of the FRS.
As a justification for applying FRS reserve requirements to state
nonmember banks, Congress determined that the prior exemption of
those banks from reserve requirements had given them a significant
competitive advantage over national banks and state member banks.123
Third, in 1980 Congress adopted a provision ensuring equal treat-
ment for FDIC-insured state banks in the area of interest rate limits
for loans.124 The Supreme Court held in 1874 and again in 1978 that
12 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 86 under the NBA provided “advantages to
National banks over their State competitors” by exempting them from
state usury laws.125 This exemption from state usury limits gave
national banks a major competitive advantage when interest rates rose
sharply during the late 1970s. In order to remove the resulting
competitive disparity between national banks and state banks, Con-
gress adopted 12 U.S.C. § 1831d in 1980. Section 1831d provides
“parity” for all FDIC-insured, state-chartered depository institutions
because it allows them to take advantage of the same federal usury
standards that apply to national banks under §§ 85 and 86.126 
122
 See id. 
123
 See Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 § 103, 94 Stat. 133 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 461(b) (2000)); S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 14 (1979),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 249; H.R. REP. NO. 96-842, at 69–70 (1980) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 299; Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking
System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18–19, 32, 40
n.156, 43–44 (1977) (explaining that the Federal Reserve Board sought federal
legislation requiring state nonmember banks to maintain reserves, because many
national banks viewed reserve requirements as a significant competitive disadvantage
and had converted to state nonmember bank status to avoid those requirements). 
124
 Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 521, 94 Stat. 164 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1831d). 
125
 Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 (1978)
(quoting Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 413 (1874));
see supra note 38 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Beneficial Nat’l Bank
v. Anderson, 125 U.S. 1 (2003), affirming that state usury laws do not apply to national
banks). 
126
 Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 826–27 (1st Cir. 1992);
Hill v. Chem. Bank, 799 F. Supp. 948, 951–52 (D. Minn. 1992).  
It is noteworthy that § 1831d preempted only the limitations on loan interest rates
imposed by state usury laws, and Congress deliberately avoided any broader
preemption of state laws governing non-interest charges. Thus, Congress’s action in
1980 was entirely consistent with its longstanding policy of preserving the general
application of state laws to the activities of national and state banks. See Perdue v.
Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 517, 522–23 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475
U.S. 1001 (1986). 
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Thus, even in the area of usury where the NBA expressly preempted
the application of state laws to national banks, Congress eventually
restored a competitive balance by adopting a parallel preemption in
favor of state banks. Similarly, in 1994 when Congress granted
interstate branching powers to national banks for the first time,
Congress provided equivalent branching privileges to FDIC-insured
state banks.127 In 1999 Congress gave national banks and state banks
comparable authority to expand their activities by establishing finan-
cial subsidiaries that may engage in nonbanking businesses not
permitted for their parent banks.128 
2. Congress’s Preservation of the Dual Banking System
Has Promoted Innovation and Flexibility in Banking
Regulation
As shown in the preceding section, federal legislation since 1910
has established a dynamic interplay between competition and parity
in the dual banking system. This dynamic allows significant room for
diversity and rivalry between the national and state banking systems.
At the same time, Congress has preserved an effective balance between
the two systems. This interplay between competition and parity reflects
a deliberate congressional purpose (i) to allow state laws to apply to
national banks (either by express statutory mandate or by congressio-
nal silence) in many areas of the banking business129 and (ii) to
prevent competitive factors from becoming “so lopsided” in favor of
one system that the other system is unable to make adjustments in
order to reestablish a competitive equilibrium.130 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the foregoing history shows
that Congress has followed a “policy of equalization” designed to
maintain a basic parity of competitive opportunities between national
and state banks.131 In a 1964 district court decision later affirmed by
127
 See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-328, §§ 102-103, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u, 36(g),
1828(d)(4)). Senator Riegle, Senate floor manager for the Riegle-Neal Act, confirmed
that state banks would receive “the same authority to establish [interstate] branches
as national banks” would obtain under the legislation. 130 CONG. REC. S12,786 (daily
ed. Sept. 13, 1994). 
128
 See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 121, 113 Stat. 1338, 1373
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a, 1831w). 
129
 See Scott, supra note 123, at 15–18, 37, 39–40. 
130
 BROWN, supra note 110, at 58. 
131
 First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252, 261
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the Supreme Court, the district court discussed the apparent reasons
for Congress’s decision to follow a policy of maintaining “competitive
equality in at least the most important areas of competition” between
national and state banks:
[I]n order for the “dual banking system” of the United States,
consisting of state chartered banks and national banks . . . to continue
to function as such, there must be a competitive equality in at least
the most important areas of competition between the two systems. If
such were not the case, one or the other of the two types of banks,
the one with the competitive weight against it, would substantially
be driven out of existence, either through failures or conversions to
the other class of banking.
Congress has recognized this need for competitive equality in a
manner that protects the state banks and national banks at the same
time. In many important areas of the National Bank Act, Congress
has incorporated state law as the standard for national banks.132 
In the same year, Senator A. Willis Robertson, then chairman of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Commerce, explained that Con-
gress was determined to preserve a “strong and vigorous” dual banking
system by (i) maintaining an equality in branching privileges between
national and state banks and (ii) preventing “any wide discrepancies”
(1966) (citing, inter alia, McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347 (1896), and Anderson
Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233 (1944)); Lewis v. Fid. & Deposit Co., 292 U.S.
559, 564–66 (1934); see also Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222–23 (1997).  
In Franklin National Bank v. New York, a case frequently cited by the OCC (see,
e.g., OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1910 n.53), the Supreme Court
observed that “the Federal Government is a rival chartering authority for
banks, . . . [and that] these federal institutions may be at no disadvantage in
competition with state-created institutions, the Federal Government has frequently
expanded their functions and authority.” 347 U.S. 373, 375 (1954) (emphasis added).
This statement is consistent with the Court’s recognition, in Walker Bank, 385 U.S.
at 261, and Lewis, 292 U.S. at 564, that Congress has adopted a “policy of
equalization” intended to maintain a basic parity of competitive opportunities within
the dual banking system. Franklin certainly does not identify a congressional desire
to give national banks a decisive competitive advantage over state banks and thereby
threaten the viability of the state banking system. In fact, the Court acknowledged
in Franklin that national banks are subject to state law whenever Congress expressly
incorporates state-law standards in federal statutes, or, “[e]ven in the absence of such
express language, national banks may be subject to some state laws in the normal
course of business if there is no conflict with federal law.” 347 U.S. at 378 n.7. 
132
 Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon, 236 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1964), aff’d
sub nom. First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
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in the other “powers and limitations” of national and state banks
related to “investments, trust powers, and the like.”133 
At the same time, Senator Robertson pointed out that the dual
banking system does not provide “identical” powers to national and
state banks and permits “diversity and experimentation” within a
balanced framework ensuring that “both parts of the system are strong
and effective.”134 In this way, the dual banking system has permitted
states to act as “laboratories” in experimenting with new banking
products, structures, and supervisory approaches, and Congress has
subsequently incorporated many of the states’ successful innovations
into federal legislation. In addition to the examples noted above of
checking accounts, bank branches, real estate loans, trust services, and
NOW accounts, the state banking system originated reserve require-
ments, deposit insurance, adjustable-rate mortgages, automated teller
machines (“ATMs”), bank sales of insurance products, interstate
electronic funds transfer systems, interstate bank holding companies,
and supervisory agreements that promote cooperative oversight of
multistate banking organizations by state bank regulators, the FRB,
and the FDIC.135 
Supporters of the dual banking system argue that this record of
innovation is the product of beneficial competition between federal
and state regulators. For example, Kenneth Scott has suggested that
federal and state bank regulators “can be viewed as firms producing
different brands of regulation and engaged in a species of competition
for market shares.”136 Regulatory competition for bank charters
encourages regulators for both systems to be flexible, responsive, and
133
 A. Willis Robertson, Speech at the 62d Annual Convention of the National Associ-
ation of Supervisors of State Banks, reprinted in Financial Institutions Supervisory
Act of 1966: Hearings on S. 3158 before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking
& Currency, 89th Cong. 33, 36 (1966) [hereinafter 1966 Senate Hearings]; see also
K.A. Randall, FDIC Chairman, Speech before the Texas Bankers Association (June
6, 1967), quoted in BROWN, supra note 110, at 58 (stating that the congressional policy
of “competitive equality . . . can be a constructive means whereby a healthy and
dynamic banking system can be fostered”). 
134
 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 133, at 36–37. 
135
 See Gavin Gee, Why the State Charter?, remarks delivered at the CSBS State
Banking Summit and Leadership Conf., Nov. 6, 2003 [hereinafter Gee Remarks],
available at http://www.csbs.org/events/legreg/links/Gavin-Gee.pdf; Christopher
Rhoads, State Charters Said to Be Gaining Popularity, AM. BANKER, May 10, 1996,
at 6; Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1155–57; Wilmarth, Too Big
to Fail, supra note 49, at 977, 1070–71. 
136
 Scott, supra note 123, at 32. 
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innovative. For example, during the 1960s Comptroller of the Cur-
rency James Saxon liberalized the OCC’s chartering policies and
issued a number of rulings expanding the powers of national banks.
Although several of Mr. Saxon’s rulings were struck down by federal
courts, his initiatives prompted many state banks to convert to national
charters. In turn, this conversion trend caused many states to modern-
ize their state banking codes to improve the attractiveness of state
charters.137 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, the OCC’s success in obtaining
court decisions expanding intrastate branching opportunities for
national banks forced many states to adopt laws granting statewide
branching privileges to state banks.138 During the same period, state
initiatives allowing state banks to offer securities and insurance
products encouraged federal regulators to take similar steps. These
state and federal regulatory innovations helped persuade Congress to
enact GLBA in 1999, which removed legal barriers separating the
banking industry from the securities and insurance businesses.139
Thus, the regulatory competition for bank charters has placed continu-
ing pressure on state officials and the OCC to demonstrate that they
can provide innovative, responsive, and cost-effective supervision to
their regulated constituents.140 
By allowing banks to escape from arbitrary or outdated regulation,
the dual banking system creates a “dynamic” rivalry between the
national and state banking systems, a process that Professor Scott aptly
described in the following terms:
[T]he dual banking system is a dynamic and interactive regulatory
structure, so that a change in the content or effect of regulation in
137
 See BROWN, supra note 110, at 33–38, 57–58; Scott, supra note 123, at 20–36;
Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1157–58. 
138
 See Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1158–59; Wilmarth, Too
Big to Fail, supra note 49, at 963, 977. 
139
 Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1161–69, 1177–81; See gen-
erally Broome & Markham, supra note 84, at 743–61; LITAN, supra note 110, at
50–58; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services
Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL.
L. REV. 215, at 219–23, 318–20 [hereinafter Wilmarth, Transformation]. 
140
 See, e.g., Rob Blackwell, State, Federal Regulators Fight Over Charter Flips,
AM. BANKER, June 19, 2000, at 4; Kenneth Cline, Atlanta’s Bank South Applies for
Conversion to a State Charter, AM. BANKER, June 22, 1995, at 4; Justin Fox, Stampede
Toward State Charters Makes the OCC Change Its Tune, AM. BANKER, Aug. 28,
1995, at 3; Rhoads, supra note 135. 
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one sector releases a series of forces. Banks reassess their profitability
estimations, those at the margin may convert, and the agencies respond
with further changes in regulatory content or policy. This process
certainly is perceived, if not clearly articulated, by those involved with
banks and their regulation, and is reflected in banking legislation.141
While the dual banking system has been attacked by prominent
critics,142 public officials continue to defend the system’s merits. For
141
 Scott, supra note 123, at 34. For further discussion of the regulatory competition
inherent in the dual banking system, see id. at 12–13, 20–36; BROWN, supra note
110, at 33–38, 57–66; Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1155–59.
142
 Critics have challenged the dual banking system on two principal grounds. First,
former FRB chairman Arthur Burns, Geoffrey Miller, and others have maintained
that (i) the dual chartering system tends to foster a “competition in laxity” between
federal and state regulators and (ii) “moral hazard” may encourage regulators to
neglect safety and soundness considerations in favor of building their regulated
constituencies. Second, Henry Butler, Jonathan Macey, and others have argued that
the expanding scope of federal statutory preemption negates any meaningful
competition within the dual banking system. In response to these challenges,
supporters of the dual banking system have argued that (i) bank failures injure the
personal reputations of regulators and the perceived value of their charter “brand,”
and regulators therefore have powerful incentives to uphold prudent safety and
soundness standards; and (ii) while federal preemption presents a potentially fatal
threat to the dual banking system, Congress has thus far given state regulators a
substantial degree of freedom to compete with the OCC. For discussions of, and
responses to, the foregoing criticisms of the dual banking system, see BROWN, supra
note 110, at 38–41, 57–66; Scott, supra note 123, at 12–13, 33, 40–45; Richard M.
Whiting, The New ‘Tri-Partite’ Banking System, 17 BANKING POL’Y REP. (Aspen)
No. 7, at 13 (Apr. 6, 1998); Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at
1239–55.  
It is true that, since 1991, the ability of state banks to develop innovative products
and services has been limited by 12 U.S.C. § 1831a. Under § 1831a, FDIC-insured
state banks may not engage as principal (either directly or through a subsidiary) in
any activity that is not permissible for national banks, unless the FDIC determines
that the activity does not pose a significant risk to the deposit insurance fund. Thus,
under § 1831a, the FDIC has a veto power over the ability of state banks to engage
(except as agent) in activities that are not lawful for national banks.  
It should be noted, however, that the FDIC has announced a policy of responding
positively to proposals by state banks to commence new activities under § 1831a as
long as such proposals do not present undue risks to safety and soundness. The FDIC’s
policy under § 1831a is to permit state banks to “be innovative and stay competitive
in a changing marketplace.” Don Powell, FDIC Chairman, Remarks Before the Annual
Meeting of the Conference of State Bank Supervisors (May 30, 2002), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2002/sp30may02.html. For a list of
activities and investments that the FDIC has approved for state banks under § 1831a,
see FDIC, Equity Investments Approved by the FDIC (Oct. 4, 2002), at http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/approved/page1.html. 
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example, the 1984 report of the Presidential Task Group on Regulation
of Financial Services hailed the dual banking system as “one of the
finest examples of cooperative federalism in the nation’s history.”
Based on the system’s role in encouraging industry innovation and
flexible supervision, the report stressed the importance of preserving
a “balance of state and federal regulatory participation” as a core
policy for financial regulation:
Through the years, the existence of this “dual” federal and state
system has provided a safety valve against out-dated or inflexible
regulatory controls being imposed by either federal or state authorities.
Acting as laboratories for change, the states have frequently developed
new forms of financial services, which then spread nationally through
federal action . . . .
Because it has served the financial needs of the nation so well over
time, state participation in the chartering and regulation of financial
institutions can genuinely be regarded as one of the finest examples
of cooperative federalism in the nation’s history. Because the balance
of state and federal regulatory participation helps promote the public
interest in a safe and competitive financial system, the dual system
of chartering financial institutions should be maintained and strength-
ened wherever possible . . . .
. . . .
There is agreement within the Administration, with no appreciable
dissent elsewhere, that the dual banking system and other elements
of checks and balances in the overall system must be maintained.
Throughout American history no single government authority has ever
been entrusted with regulatory authority over all American banks.
Such an unprecedented concentration of regulatory power in the
hands, ultimately, of a single individual or board could have a variety
of deleterious effects, including a significant erosion of the dual
banking system and a possible increased risk of unanticipated supervi-
sory problems affecting all banks.143 
In two recent speeches federal bank regulators have echoed the
findings of the 1984 Task Group. In October 2002 Comptroller of the
Currency John D. Hawke, Jr., acknowledged that the dual banking
system has been viewed as “a safeguard against the dangers of
regulatory hegemony and abuse—and as an incentive to regulatory
143
 Bush Task Group Report on Regulation of Financial Services: Blueprint for
Reform (Part 1): Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Com. on Gov’t
Operations, 99th Cong., 43–44, 46 (1984) [hereinafter Hearings], reprinted in Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No. 150, Part II (Nov. 16, 1984). 
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responsiveness and efficiency.”144 In May 2003 FRB Governor Susan
S. Bies praised “the remarkable strength of the dual banking system,”
and she further described the benefits that the dual banking system
produced in comparison with the consolidated financial systems of
other nations:
The diversity and flexibility of our banking system are unique.
Bankers can make charter choices on the basis of their business needs
and particular circumstances . . . . Our system provides a rich menu
of choices to the marketplace, encouraging financial institutions to
innovate and respond dynamically to the changing needs of depositors
and borrowers. Under the dual banking system states have fostered
innovations that likely would not have occurred as rapidly—if at all—
had only federal regulation existed. The dual banking system also
helps to safeguard against regulatory excesses.
In short, this structure has been critical in producing a banking
system that is the most innovative, responsive, and flexible in the
world. U.S. banks have developed those characteristics to survive in
a market economy that is subject to rapid change and periodic stress.
Our banking system is thus better able to finance growth and serve
customer needs and has demonstrated its ability to rebound from crises
that have, from time to time, devastated more rigid [foreign] sys-
tems.145 
My own research supports Governor Bies’s conclusions. In previous
articles, I presented evidence showing that the dual banking system
has fostered a decentralized, competitive, and innovative banking
system comprised of large multistate banking organizations, midsized
regional organizations, and thousands of community banks. In contrast
to the highly concentrated banking systems of Canada, Europe, and
the United Kingdom, the diverse U.S. banking industry has provided
demonstrably better services at lower cost to consumers and small
businesses. Moreover, U.S. banks have been world leaders in creating
innovative financial products and have consistently outperformed their
144
 John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks at a Session on
Banking Supervision with the People’s Bank of China (Oct. 14, 2002), quoted in OCC
News Release NR 2002-80 (Oct. 15, 2002), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/
release/2002-80.txt. 
145
 Susan S. Bies, Federal Reserve Board Governor, Remarks Before the Confer-
ence of State Bank Supervisors (May 30, 2003), at http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/speeches/2003/20030530/default.htm; see also Whiting, supra note 142,
at 13 (stating that “the dual banking system has allowed the flourishing of the safest
and most stable of all banking systems in the world” and “has encouraged excellence
in regulation”). 
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British, Canadian, and European rivals. In my view, the unique
regulatory structure created by the dual banking system has been an
important factor behind the superior performance of the U.S. banking
industry in both domestic and global financial markets.146 
Moreover, a recent study by FRB staff economists suggests that the
dual banking system produces important macroeconomic benefits.147
Based on banking and economic data from forty-nine nations, this
study found that countries with stronger community bank sectors
experienced faster growth in their gross domestic product, higher
employment by SMEs, and increased availability of bank credit.148
My own research indicates that (i) the dual banking system has
provided a favorable regulatory environment that allows community
banks to flourish in the United States and (ii) community banks have
played an indispensable role in providing personalized services to
consumers and longer-term relationship loans to SMEs.149 In my view,
146
 See generally Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1153–59,
1177–81; Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 49, at 967–77, 1015–24, 1038–48,
1051–66, 1071–72; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 139, at 250–72, 293–300,
440–44.  
For recent reports indicating that the highly consolidated banking systems of Canada
and the United Kingdom provide inferior service and charge excessive fees to smaller,
bank-dependent firms, see Canadian Fed’n of Indep. Bus., Banking on Competition:
Results of CFIB Banking Survey (Oct. 2003), at 3, available at http://www.cfib.ca/
research/reports/Banking_report_2003.pdf (stating that “there is not a single Big Five
bank that seems to be taking a leadership role in serving the [small and medium-sized
enterprise (“SME”)] sector”); id. at 18 (stating that “the major banks have not yet
demonstrated that they are able to serve the SME market,” and “[t]here is currently
insufficient competition in the [Canadian] banking industry”); Patrick Tracey, UK
Officials Order Bank Price Controls, Cite Poor Treatment of Small Businesses, 71
Banking Rep. (BNA) 499 (Mar. 18, 2002) (reporting that the U.K. government had
imposed price controls on the “big four clearing banks” after a report concluded that
those banks (i) controlled more than eighty-five percent of all small-business accounts,
(ii) earned “excessive profits” from SMEs, and (iii) engaged in several practices that
“restrict or distort competition and operate against the public interest”). 
147
 See Allen N. Berger et al., Further Evidence on the Link between Finance and
Growth: An International Analysis of Community Banking and Economic Perfor-
mance, J. FIN. SERV. RES. (2004) (forthcoming) (FRB, Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser.
Working Paper 2003-47, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/
200347). 
148
 See id. 
149
 See Wilmarth, Dual Banking System, supra note 49, at 1152–57; Wilmarth, Too
Big to Fail, supra note 49, at 961–64, 969–77, 1038–48; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.,
Too Good to Be True? The Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN.
J. L., BUS. & FIN. 1, 2–5, 12–14, 31–41; Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 139,
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the disappearance of a vibrant dual banking system would likely
undermine the competitive health of our community banking system
and impair the overall performance of our national economy.
In addition to preserving the state banking system, Congress has
promoted competition and innovation in the U.S. banking industry by
dividing bank supervisory responsibilities at the federal level among
the FDIC, FRB, and OCC. This decentralized structure permits banks
to select among three federal regulators, in addition to their choice
between federal and state charters. By maintaining this structure,
which promotes rivalry (and flexibility) among regulators, Congress
has prevented the emergence of a single federal “super regulator” that
could dominate the U.S. banking industry by agency fiat. Several
commentators have concluded that this allocation of federal supervi-
sory responsibility among three agencies helped to preserve the
competitive dynamic that operates between federal and state regulators
under the dual banking system.150 
at 254–72, 293–99. The previously-cited FRB staff study noted “a significant amount
of research” indicating that smaller, community-based banks enjoy important
“advantages” over large banks in the area of “relationship lending to informationally
opaque SMEs in developed nations.” Berger et al., supra note 147, § 1.1; see also
Jeffrey W. Gunther & Robert R. Moore, Small Banks’ Competitors Loom Large, S.W.
ECON. (Fed. Res. Bank of Dallas, TX), Jan./Feb. 2004, at 1, 11–12 (stating that banks
with assets of less than $1 billion accounted for 37% of total bank lending to small
businesses in 2003, despite holding only thirteen percent of the U.S. banking industry’s
total assets; in addition, small banks devoted 19% of their assets to small business
loans while banks larger than $25 billion devoted only 3.5% of their assets to such
loans). 
150
 The OCC regulates all national banks, while the FRB regulates state banks that
are members of the FRS and the FDIC supervises state nonmember banks. See, e.g.,
BROWN, supra note 110, at 18–22, 60–66; Scott, supra note 123, at 1–2, 6–9, 20–23,
30–36, 39–40, 43–48; Whiting, supra note 142; Wilmarth, Dual Banking System,
supra note 49, at 1159–66, 1239–40; see also Richard J. Rosen, Is Three a Crowd?
Competition Among Regulators in Banking, 35 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 969,
996 (2003) (finding that the allocation of supervisory responsibility among the FDIC,
FRB, and OCC improves the performance of banks by allowing them to change their
business strategies more easily, because each bank can switch to a regulator who is
more willing (and better suited) to approve and monitor the bank’s chosen new
strategy).  
In contrast to the United States, the United Kingdom and Japan have each recently
created a unified national agency with comprehensive authority to regulate all
providers of financial services. For discussions of the potential advantages and pitfalls
of such a “super regulator,” see, for example, Eilis Ferran, Examining the United
Kingdom’s Experience in Adopting the Single Financial Regulator Model, 28 BROOK.
J. INT’L L. 257, 277–307 (2003); Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative
Analysis of Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United
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3. Congress Has Endorsed the General Application of
State Laws to National Banks as an Important
Mechanism for Preserving the Dual Banking System
In accordance with its general policy of maintaining a competitive
balance in the dual banking system, Congress has deferred to state
law in two ways. First, Congress expressly incorporated state-law
standards into several federal statutes, thereby establishing state law
as the governing rule for national banks in a number of important
areas.151 Second, through statutory silence Congress permits state laws
to govern other aspects of the operations of national banks except in
situations where a state law creates an irreconcilable conflict with
federal law. For example, in its 1896 decision in McClellan the
Supreme Court declared:
[T]he purpose and object of Congress in enacting the national bank
law was to leave [national] banks as to their contracts in general under
the operation of the state law, and thereby invest them as Federal
agencies with local strength, whilst, at the same time, preserving them
from undue state interference wherever Congress within the limits of
its constitutional authority has expressly so directed, or wherever such
state interference frustrates the lawful purpose of Congress or impairs
the efficiency of the [national] banks to discharge the duties imposed
upon them by the law of the United States.152 
In Atherton, decided a century after McClellan, the Supreme Court
observed that Congress never overruled the Court’s view that “feder-
ally chartered banks are subject to state law.”153 Similarly, in National
Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 377–96, 405–10 (2003); Heidi M.
Schooner & Michael Taylor, United Kingdom and United States Responses to the
Regulatory Challenges of Modern Financial Markets, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 317, 331–44
(2003). 
151
 For example, Congress has expressly incorporated state law as the governing
standard (in whole or in part) for the following transactions involving national banks:
conversions of state banks into national banks, 12 U.S.C. § 35 (2000); intrastate
branching, id. § 36(c); interstate de novo branching, id. § 36(g); accepting deposits
from state and local governments, id. § 90; fiduciary activities, id. § 92a; conversions
of national banks into state banks, or mergers or consolidations between national banks
and state banks in which the surviving banks will have state charters, id. § 214c;
acquisitions of state banks by consolidation, id. § 215(d); and acquisitions of state
banks by merger, id. § 215a(d). See Scott, supra note 123, at 37. 
152
 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 359 (1896). 
153
 Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 222 (1997); see also Scott, supra note 123,
at 16–17 (stating that “Congress has said nothing explicit . . . about most operations
of national banks,” and “courts have created only limited federal governing rules,
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State Bank v. Long154 the Third Circuit noted that Congress followed
a general policy of supporting the application of state laws to national
banks:
Whatever may be the history of federal-state relations in other
fields, regulation of banking has been one of dual control since the
passage of the first National Bank Act in 1863. . . . There is little
doubt that in the exercise of its commerce power Congress could
regulate national banks to the exclusion of state control. And unques-
tionably, as in other businesses, federal presence in the banking field
has grown in recent times. But congressional support remains for dual
regulation. In only a few instances has Congress explicitly preempted
state regulation of national banks. More commonly, it has been left
to the courts to delineate the proper boundaries of state and federal
supervision.155 
Quoting McClellan and Luckett, the Third Circuit pointed out in
Long that the “judicial test [for preemption] has been a tolerant
one.”156 Based on this “tolerant” standard, the Third Circuit held that
national banks must comply with a New Jersey statute, which prohib-
ited all banks from engaging in geographic discrimination in their
home mortgage lending (“redlining”).157 The court noted that Con-
gress passed three statutes—the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the
Community Reinvestment Act, and the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act—designed to encourage fair lending by banks, and the court
observed that those statutes “[do] not expressly prohibit redlining.”158
In addition, the court found that Congress had not granted to the states
leaving most banking operations to be controlled by state law”); Testimony of Reed
H. Albig, Chairman, Fed. Legislative Comm., Indep. Bankers Ass’n of America, May
18, 1966, in 1966 Senate Hearings, supra note 133, at 157, 161 (explaining that
Congress and the courts have supported the general application of state law to national
banks in order “to achieve competitive equality between National and State banks
competing in the same State. This delicate accommodation is necessary to prevent
banks in one system from overwhelming banks in the other system”). 
154
 630 F.2d 981 (3d Cir. 1980). 
155
 Id. at 985 (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank,
33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 822 (2000); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d
503, 520 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Best v. U.S. Nat’l
Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 560–61 (Or. 1987). 
156
 Long, 630 F.2d at 985–86. 
157
 Id. at 982, 986–87. 
158
 Id. at 984. 
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any express authority to enact anti-redlining legislation.159 Neverthe-
less, the court rejected a preemption claim raised by two national
banks, and the court held that national banks must adhere to New
Jersey’s anti-redlining law.160 In doing so, the court declared: “[W]e
reject the plaintiffs’ argument that once Congress legislates on a matter
in the banking field, specific authorization must be given before
supplementary state laws may take effect.”161 Three subsequent court
decisions similarly held that federal banking laws do not preempt the
states from requiring all banks, including national banks, to refrain
from imposing unreasonable, unconscionable, or bad faith service
charges on their customers.162 
Congress strongly reaffirmed its support for the general application
of state laws to national banks when it passed the Riegle-Neal Act
in 1994.163 The conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act endorsed
the longstanding congressional policy of “maintaining the balance of
Federal and State law under the dual banking system” and explained
that the application of state laws to national banks is an essential
element of that policy:
States have a strong interest in the activities and operations of
depository institutions doing business within their jurisdictions,
regardless of the type of charter an institution holds. In particular,
States have a legitimate interest in protecting the rights of their
consumers, businesses, and communities. Federal banking agencies,
through their opinion letters and interpretive rules on preemption is-
sues, play an important role in maintaining the balance of Federal and
State law under the dual banking system. Congress does not intend
that the [Riegle-Neal Act] alter this balance and thereby weaken States’
authority to protect the interests of their consumers, businesses, or
communities.
159
 Id. at 988. 
160
 Id. at 982. 
161
 Id. at 987. 
162
 See Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047–49, 1058
(S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.2d 1358 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
822 (2000) (discussing unreasonable or unconscionable charges); Perdue v. Crocker
Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 516–25 (Cal. 1985) (discussing unconscionable fees),
appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank, 739 P.2d 554,
560–63 (Or. 1987) (discussing fees established in bad faith). 
163
 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12
U.S.C., 31 U.S.C.). 
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Under well-established judicial principles, national banks are
subject to State law in many significant respects. . . . Courts gener-
ally use a rule of construction that avoids finding a conflict between
the Federal and State law where possible. The [Riegle-Neal Act] does
not change these judicially established principles.164 
The Riegle-Neal Act requires interstate branches of national banks
to comply with nondiscriminatory host state laws in four broadly-
defined areas (viz., community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair
lending, and intrastate branching) except in situations where federal
law preempts the application of such laws to national banks.165
Members of Congress emphasized that this mandate for compliance
with host state laws was an important component of the Riegle-Neal
Act’s general purpose of maintaining the vitality of the dual banking
system.166 
The Riegle-Neal Act also requires each federal banking agency to
comply with notice-and-comment requirements whenever it intends
164
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53 (Conf. Rep.) (1994) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, at 2074. 
165
 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 § 102(b),
108 Stat. 2349 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(f) (2000)). The “home state”
of a national bank is the state in which its main office is located. A “host state” is
any state, other than the home state, in which the national bank maintains a branch.
12 U.S.C. § 36(g)(3)(B)–(C). 
166
 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. H6775 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1994) (remarks of Rep.
Neal, explaining that the Riegle-Neal Act “respects States’ rights by . . . ensur[ing]
that certain State laws will continue to apply to interstate branches of national banks”);
id. at H6777 (remarks of Rep. Roukema, stating that “[t]he dual banking system and
States’ rights are preserved in that the [Riegle-Neal] Act . . . preserves the States’
ability to apply State laws regarding intrastate branching, fair lending and consumer
protection”); id. at H6780 (remarks of Rep. Castle, declaring that “[w]e have indeed
protected the duel [sic] banking system which is so important to the United States”);
id. at H6781 (remarks of Rep. Vento, stating that the Riegle-Neal Act “maintains
a positive role for the States” and “applies State consumer protection, fair lending,
intrastate branching, and community reinvestment laws to branches of out-of-State
banks, unless pre-empted or upon a determination of discriminatory effect by the
[OCC]”); id. at H6782 (remarks of Rep. LaFalce, explaining that “[t]his legislation
fully recognizes the crucial role States play in regulating financial institutions within
their borders and particularly in protecting their consumers”); id. at S12,784 (daily
ed. Sept. 13, 1994) (remarks of Sen. Ford, explaining that the Riegle-Neal Act “has
been carefully structured in a manner which protects important States’ rights under
our dual banking system”); id. at S12,787 (remarks of Sen. Dodd, stating that the
Riegle-Neal Act “strikes the proper balance between creating a more efficient national
banking system and protecting States’ rights and the dual banking system . . . [by]
requiring branches to abide by applicable State laws”). 
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to issue an opinion letter or interpretive rule that would preempt the
application to national banks of state laws affecting one or more of
the designated four areas.167 The House-Senate conferees on the
Riegle-Neal Act instructed the federal agencies that they should not
issue rulings that preempt state laws in the four designated areas unless
“the legal basis is compelling and the Federal policy interest is
clear.”168 The conferees specifically criticized two OCC interpretive
rulings asserting that state laws did not apply to the deposit-taking
activities of national banks. The conferees declared that those OCC
rulings were “inappropriately aggressive, resulting in preemption of
State law in situations where the federal interest did not warrant that
result.”169 In response to the conferees’ criticism, as discussed below,
the OCC rescinded an interpretive rule that purported to preempt all
state laws affecting the ability of national banks to impose service
charges on their depositors.170 
Consistent with Congress’s policy of supporting the general applica-
tion of state laws to national banks, most courts until recently applied
a presumption in favor of applying state laws to the activities of
national banks. Based on this presumption, the courts required national
banks to comply with state laws unless preemption was consistent with
167
 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 § 114,
108 Stat. 2366 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 43(a)) (requiring a federal banking agency
to publish a notice in the Federal Register and solicit comments from the public
whenever the agency intends to issue an opinion letter or interpretive rule that would
preempt a state law dealing with community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair
lending, or intrastate branching). 
168
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 55 (Conf. Rep.) (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2076; see also id. at 53, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2074 (containing a
similar admonition). 
169
 Id. at 53–54, reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2074–75 (criticizing (i) OCC
Interpretive Letter No. 572, which stated that national banks could disregard a New
Jersey statute requiring all banks to offer lifeline checking accounts, and (ii) 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.8000, which declared that all state laws regulating service charges on deposit
accounts were inapplicable to national banks).  
Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins suggest that, by discussing the new requirements for
issuing agency preemption determinations under 12 U.S.C. § 43(a), House Report 651
“underscored the OCC’s authority to make preemption decisions.” Cayne & Perkins,
supra note 2, at 396. This suggestion, however, fails to account for the very significant
fact that the Riegle-Neal conferees rejected both of the OCC’s preemption rulings
that were addressed in the conference report. As a consequence, the conference report
must be viewed as a repudiation of the OCC’s preemption theories contained in those
rulings. 
170
 See infra notes 370–76 and accompanying text (discussing the OCC’s rescission
of § 7.8000 in 1996). 
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“the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”171 Similarly, in two
cases the Supreme Court declared the general application of state laws
to the activities of national banks is “the rule,” while preemption is
“the exception”:
[T]he rule [is] the operation of general state laws upon the dealings
and contracts of national banks, [while] the exception [is] the cessation
of operation of such laws whenever they expressly conflict with the
laws of the United States or frustrate the purpose for which national
banks were created, or impair their efficiency to discharge the duties
imposed upon them by the laws of the United States.172 
In 1995 the OCC issued an interpretive letter that was consistent
with this judicial presumption, as well as the views expressed in 1994
by the House-Senate conferees on the Riegle-Neal Act.173 In OCC
Interpretive Letter Number 674 (“OCC IL 674”) OCC Chief Counsel
Julie Williams determined that the NBA did not preempt a Texas
statute and a rule regulating the naming of bank branches and the use
of branch names in advertising.174 The Texas provisions barred bank
branches located in Texas from using any branch name or branch
advertising that tended to portray the branch as a separately chartered
bank.175 This prohibition was designed to prevent deceptive advertis-
ing that might lead customers to view a branch office as a separate
bank which could offer additional federal deposit insurance cover-
age.176 The OCC Chief Counsel concluded that Texas had authority
to protect consumers by prohibiting all banks, including national
171
 Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985 (3d Cir. 1980); accord, e.g., Video
Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.2d
1358 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 822 (2000); Peatros v. Bank
of Am. NT&SA, 990 P.2d 539, 542–43 (Cal. 2000); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank,
702 P.2d 503, 519–23 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
172
 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896) (emphasis added); accord
First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 656 (1924) (emphasis added).
For Supreme Court decisions that have applied a similar presumption against
preemption in other areas of traditional state regulation, see, e.g., Medtronic, Inc. v.
Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475, 484–85 (1996); N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 654–56 (1995); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516–18 (1992). 
173
 See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 674 (June 9, 1995), available at 1995 OCC
Ltr. LEXIS 73. 
174
 Id. at **12–13. 
175
 Id. at *14. 
176
 See id. 
271OCC RULES THREATEN DUAL BANKING & CONSUMER PROTECTION2004]
 0047 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 179    172/188 
banks, from using deceptive marketing techniques.177 In addition,
based on several of the court decisions reviewed above, the OCC Chief
Counsel agreed that the following general principles governed the
application of state laws to national banks. First, “[u]nder the dual
banking system, all banks, including national banks, are subject to
the laws of the state in which they are located unless those state laws
are preempted by federal law or regulation.”178 Second:
Banking is the subject of comprehensive regulation at both the federal
and state level and the valid exercise of concurrent powers is the
general rule unless the state law is preempted. State law applicable
to national banks will generally be presumed valid unless it conflicts
with federal law, frustrates the purpose for which national banks were
created, or impairs their efficiency to discharge the duties imposed
upon them by federal law.179 
In concluding that the NBA did not preempt the Texas provisions,
OCC IL 674 determined that the Texas statute and rule did not conflict
with any federal statute, were not “unduly burdensome” to national
banks, and did not “impair[] their ability to discharge the duties
imposed by federal law.”180 Thus, OCC IL 674 indicated that the OCC
agreed with the judicially-created and congressionally-recognized
preemption standards discussed above, including the presumption in
favor of applying state laws to national banks.181 
4. Congress Has Withheld From the OCC Any
Independent Power to Preempt State Laws
In addition to its general policy of allowing state laws to apply to
national banks, Congress has withheld from the OCC any independent
power to override state laws. Under § 93a182 the OCC has authority
to issue regulations “to carry out the responsibilities of the office.”183
177
 Id. at **12–13. The OCC’s Chief Counsel noted that the Texas statute and rule
treated all banks equally. Given those circumstances, she stated: “The national banking
laws do not prevent state measures aimed at preventing misleading advertising, as
long as the state regulations do not put national banks at a competitive disadvantage
relative to state financial institutions.” Id. at *13. 
178
 Id. at *8 (emphasis added) (citing Waite, Davis, and Luckett). 
179
 Id. at **8–9 (emphasis added) (citing Long). 
180
 Id. at *12. 
181
 Id. 
182
 12 U.S.C. § 93a (2000). 
183
 Id. 
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However, as indicated by its limited terms, § 93a does not authorize
the OCC to expand the statutory powers or immunities of national
banks by preempting state law.184 When § 93a was enacted in 1980,
Congress made clear that the OCC’s rulemaking authority thereunder:
is only available to carry out the responsibilities of the [OCC] and
carries with it no new authority to confer on national banks powers
which they do not have under existing substantive law. To give
national banks authority under this rulemaking provision that they do
not possess under existing substantive law would not be carrying out
the responsibilities of the [OCC] since only Congress can define those
responsibilities so as to confer powers on national banks.185 
After reviewing the terms and legislative history of § 93a, a federal
appeals court held in 1983 that (i) § 93a “grants no new substantive
powers to banks” and (ii) § 93a does not allow the OCC to preempt
state laws by “authoriz[ing] activities that run afoul of federal laws
governing the activities of national banks.”186 
Until recently the OCC apparently understood that § 93a does not
permit the OCC to expand, by unilateral, preemptive action, the
congressionally-authorized powers or immunities of national banks.187
In his speech of February 12, 2002, Comptroller Hawke acknowledged
that “the OCC has no self-executing power to preempt state law.”188
Comptroller Hawke noted that the OCC “has on many occasions
expressed opinions about the preemptive effect of federal law.”189
However, the narrow scope of the OCC’s rulemaking power under
§ 93a makes clear that the OCC’s “opinions” do not carry any
independent preemptive force.190 
184
 Id. 
185
 126 CONG. REC. S6902 (1980) (remarks of Sen. Proxmire, Senate floor manager
for the 1980 legislation); see also H.R. REP. NO. 96-842, at 83 (Conf. Rep.) (1980),
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 313 (stating that § 93a “carries no authority to
permit otherwise impermissible activities of national banks with specific reference
to the provisions of the McFadden Act and the Glass-Steagall Act”); 126 CONG. REC.
H6971 (1980) (identical statement by Rep. St. Germain, House floor manager for
the 1980 legislation). 
186
 Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710 F.2d 878, 885 (D.C.
Cir. 1983) (emphasis in original). 
187
 See Comptroller Hawke Speech on Feb. 12, 2002, supra note 35, at 7. 
188
 Id. 
189
 Id. (emphasis added). 
190
 See 12 U.S.C. § 93a. 
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C. The OCC’s Rules Threaten to Destroy the Dual Banking
System
1. The OCC’s Rules Are Designed to Convince Large,
Multistate Banks to Operate under National Charters
Notwithstanding the OCC’s apparent understanding of judicial
precedents and congressional policy in 1995 when it issued OCC IL
674, the OCC’s new rules create a regime of de facto field preemption
for national banks.191 Under this new regime, state laws may only
“provide a framework for a national bank’s ability to exercise powers
granted under Federal law; they [may] not obstruct or condition a
national bank’s exercise of those powers.”192 In other words, state
laws apply only if they are helpful to national banks; all state laws
placing limitations or “conditions” on the business of national banks
are preempted.
In his speech of February 12, 2002, Comptroller Hawke revealed
the policy considerations that have evidently caused the OCC to
change its view of preemption since 1995.193 In that speech Mr.
Hawke declared that “national banks’ immunity from many state laws
is a significant benefit of the national charter—a benefit that the OCC
has fought hard over the years to preserve.”194 He further claimed
that “[t]he ability of national banks to conduct a multistate business
subject to a single uniform set of federal laws, under the supervision
of a single regulator, free from visitorial powers of various state
authorities, is a major advantage of the national charter.”195 Similarly,
when the OCC proposed its preemption rules, the OCC declared its
desire to promote “a ‘complete’ national banking system, free from
state control, and subject to uniform, national standards.”196 
191
 See supra Part II; supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text (discussing OCC
IL 674). 
192
 OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1895; see also OCC Docket,
supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1912 (declaring that non-preempted state laws “typically
do not regulate the manner or content of the business of banking authorized for national
banks, but rather establish the legal infrastructure that makes practicable the conduct
of that business”). 
193
 Comptroller Hawke Speech on Feb. 12, 2002, supra note 35, at 4. 
194
 Id. 
195
 Id. 
196
 OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,129. Mr. Cayne and Ms.
Perkins suggest that my description of the OCC’s regulations reflects “a fundamental
misunderstanding of the actual nature of the OCC’s new rules.” Cayne & Perkins,
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In short, the OCC evidently concluded that an aggressive preemp-
tion campaign—promising freedom from state regulation—is a “sig-
nificant benefit” and “major advantage” that will persuade large,
multistate banks to operate under national charters. In a newspaper
article published in early 2002, two reporters described Mr. Hawke’s
views on preemption as follows: “[Mr. Hawke] doesn’t apologize for
using the OCC’s power to override state and local laws designed to
protect consumers. Enjoying this aid provides an incentive for banks
to sign up with the OCC, he says. ‘It is one of the advantages of a
national charter, and I’m not the least bit ashamed to promote it.’ ”197
The same article noted that AmSouth, a large state-chartered bank
headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, rejected Mr. Hawke’s per-
sonal appeal to convert to a national charter when AmSouth acquired
a Tennessee national bank in 1999.198 Mr. Hawke also reportedly said
that “the potential loss of regulatory market share [to the state banking
system] ‘was a matter of concern to us.’ ”199 This newspaper account
provides further evidence of the competition between federal and state
regulators for bank charters that has long characterized the dual
supra note 2, at 366. Yet they agree with the OCC’s claim that national banks must
be allowed to “function free from state impediments to their federally authorized
activities.” Id. at 394. In addition, they do not seriously contest my description of
the OCC’s rules as “a regime of de facto field preemption.” Id. at 408; see also id.
at 410 (stating that “[w]hether the OCC’s new rules can be characterized as
establishing de facto field preemption or not is really a question of semantics”).
Instead, their only real point of disagreement with me is their belief that “[t]o the
extent that the OCC has established such a ‘regime,’ it has done so based on its plenary
power to regulate national banks.” Id. at 408. 
197
 Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator Often Helps
Banks Fighting Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (quoting Mr. Hawke
in part). Banking industry commentators agree that preemption is the most significant
incentive currently offered by the OCC to induce banks to choose a national bank
charter. As a prominent attorney in Washington, D.C. recently stated, “The main
reason for a national charter right now is preemption, because the [annual] assessments
are greater for national banks . . . . Why would you want a national charter but for
the preemption authority?” Todd Davenport, Why the OCC May Tread Lightly on
Georgia Law, AM. BANKER, Apr. 9, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Davenport, OCC and
Georgia Law] (quoting Ronald Glancz); see also Cantor, supra note 26 (quoting
another prominent Washington attorney, Gilbert Schwartz, who suggested the OCC’s
proposed preemption rules were designed to “enhanc[e] the value of the [national
bank] franchise tremendously to retain national banks who may be thinking of shifting
to state charters” because of “cost advantages” enjoyed by state banks). 
198
 Bravin & Beckett, supra note 197, at A1. 
199
 Id. (quoting Mr. Hawke). 
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banking system.200 However, instead of pursuing the traditional
regulatory strategies of innovation, responsiveness, and cost efficiency,
the OCC has evidently chosen preemption by agency fiat as its primary
competitive weapon against the state banking system.
Many of the largest national banks supported the OCC’s preemption
rules, and the OCC’s preemption initiatives are widely viewed by
commentators as serving the interests of big, multistate national
banks.201 The OCC has a strong incentive to persuade major banks
to retain or convert to national charters because (i) the OCC’s budget
is almost entirely funded by fees paid by national banks and (ii) the
biggest national banks pay the largest proportionate fee assessments
to the OCC.202 By proposing a regime of de facto field preemption
for national banks, the OCC is clearly encouraging large multistate
banks to select national charters for the purpose of avoiding the
200
 See discussion supra Part III.B. 
201
 See Todd Davenport, Are States, OCC Near a Preemption Showdown?, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 5, 2003, at 1 (reporting that “[t]o nobody’s surprise, large national
banking companies such as Bank of America, Wells Fargo & Co., Wachovia Corp.,
Bank One Corp., and National City Corp. wrote long comment letters” in support
of the OCC’s preemption proposals); Sapsford, supra note 26, at C1 (stating that the
OCC’s preemption of the GFLA, discussed supra note 27, “will be welcomed by
nationally chartered banks regulated by the OCC, which include big banks like Wells
Fargo & Co., Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc.’s Citibank”); see also New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Whose Side are They On? The Federal
Government’s Effort to Curtail State Enforcement of Predatory Lending and Other
Consumer Protection Laws, Lecture Delivered at Georgetown University 7 (Feb. 24,
2004) [hereinafter 2004 Georgetown Lecture by Spitzer], available at http://
www.oag.state.ny.us/press/statements/georgetown_university.html (stating that “when
the [national] banks ran to the OCC for protection from state predatory lending laws,
they found a regulator that already was embarked on a mission to preempt nearly
all state consumer protection laws and provide immunity from state attorneys general
for the banks they regulate”). 
202
 In 2002, annual fee assessments and fees for corporate applications paid by
national banks covered nearly ninety-seven percent of the OCC’s annual budget of
$413 million. See Speech by Comptroller Hawke on Oct. 14, 2002, supra note 144,
at 6. In the same year, the largest national bank, Bank of America, paid an annual
fee assessment of $40 million, thereby covering about one-tenth of the OCC’s annual
budget. See Bravin & Beckett, supra note 197. National banks pay assessments to
the OCC based on their asset size. The highest marginal assessment rate is currently
paid by national banks with assets of more than $40 billion. See 12 C.F.R. § 8.2(a)
(2003); see also Blackwell, supra note 140 (stating that “[w]hether a bank company
adopts a state or national charter makes a big difference to the regulators, because
their budgets are linked to exam fees”). 
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application of state laws, except for those helpful state laws that
“support[] the ability of national banks . . . to do business.”203 
As the Supreme Court observed in Walker Bank204 in response to
a similar OCC effort to evade state law, “[i]t is a strange argument
that permits one to pick and choose what portion of the law binds
him.”205 The OCC’s attempt to provide national banks with a blanket
203
 OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1896; see R. Christian Bruce,
Outlook 2004: Bank Regulation, 82 Banking Rep. (BNA) 172, 175 (2004) (citing
the prediction of Oliver Ireland, a prominent Washington, D.C. attorney, that “the
[OCC’s] preemption rules will add to the attraction of the national bank charter,”
and “[t]here won’t be as much interest in federal savings banks and federal thrifts,
because now [national banks] have the same amount of preemption”).  
The OCC’s current preemption campaign is, in part, a reaction to the OCC’s failure
to win its earlier battle with the FRB over the question of which agency should control
the permissible range of bank powers. During the 1990s the OCC argued that national
banks should be allowed to engage in securities, insurance, and other nontraditional
activities through direct subsidiaries, supervised by the OCC. In response, the FRB
contended that banking organizations should be required to conduct nontraditional
activities through holding company subsidiaries regulated by the FRB. In enacting
GLBA, Congress largely sided with the FRB. GLBA permits financial subsidiaries
of national banks to engage in activities that the FRB has determined to be financial
in nature for financial holding companies or incidental to such financial activities.
However, financial subsidiaries of national banks may not engage in (i) insurance and
annuities underwriting, (ii) insurance company portfolio investments, (iii) merchant
banking (until 2004, at the earliest, and then only with the joint approval of the FRB
and the Treasury Secretary), and (iv) real estate development and investment. In
addition, the FRB has the right to veto any attempt by the Treasury Secretary to expand
the list of activities permissible for financial subsidiaries of national banks. To add
insult to injury, Congress gave FDIC-insured state banks an equivalent (and perhaps
even more favorable) authority to conduct nontraditional activities through direct
subsidiaries. Thus, the OCC failed in its attempt to gain a major competitive edge
for national banks by obtaining sole authority to approve broader powers for their
direct subsidiaries. See GLBA, §§ 121(a), (d), 122, 113 Stat. 1373, 1380, 1381 (1999)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24a, 1831w, 1843 note (2000)); JONATHAN R. MACEY ET
AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 495–507 (3d ed. 2001); PATRICIA A. MCCOY,
BANKING LAW MANUAL § 4.02 at 4-9, 4-16, 4-17 (2d ed. 2003); id. § 4.06 at 4-65,
4-66, 4-70 through 4-78. That defeat impelled the OCC to redouble its preemption
efforts so that it could create a different type of competitive advantage for national
banks over their state-chartered rivals. 
204
 First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252 (1966).
205
 Id. at 261. In Walker Bank, the OCC argued that 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) permitted
national banks to establish branches by every method as long as the relevant state
allowed its banks to establish branches by at least one method. Thus, the OCC claimed
that it could permit a Utah national bank to establish new branches even though Utah
limited branching and allowed its state banks to open branches only by acquiring
existing banks. The Supreme Court held that the OCC’s “pick and choose” theory
violated the terms of § 36(c) as well as the congressional policy of “competitive
equality” incorporated therein. Id. at 253–55, 259–62. 
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exemption from state laws—except for laws the OCC likes—is plainly
inconsistent with the congressional policy of maintaining a competitive
balance in the dual banking system, which the Supreme Court
identified in Walker Bank and Lewis.206 As the Third Circuit noted
in Long, each decision preempting the application of state laws to
national banks creates an incentive for state banks to convert to
national charters, thereby weakening the state banking system. Accord-
ingly, in situations where Congress has not established an explicit
federal standard to govern the business conducted by national banks,
the Third Circuit concluded:
it is reasonable to assume that Congress preferred to give the states
an opportunity to develop local solutions for local problems, at least
in the first instance. Moreover, if state chartered institutions were
alone [left subject to state law, as a result of preemption], they would
be encouraged to circumvent state law by applying for national bank
charters, a development not particularly desired by Congress.207 
Similarly, in Commercial Security Bank the district court pointed out
that the dual banking system depends on the maintenance of a
competitive balance between national and state banks because a
significant advantage gained by either system would lead to large-scale
conversions by banks belonging to the other system.208 
The OCC’s preemption rules pose a serious threat to the state
banking system. As of mid-2003 nearly half of the 100 largest U.S.
banks held state charters, as did a majority of U.S. banks with interstate
branches.209 Unless the OCC’s preemption rules are overturned by
206
 See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s
reference in Walker Bank and Lewis to the congressional “policy of equalization”
underlying the dual banking system). Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins accuse me of being
“specious” in contending that the OCC’s rules create a “blanket exemption from state
laws” for national banks. Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 373. However, they
overlook my important qualifier, stated above—viz., “except for laws the OCC likes.”
As demonstrated elsewhere, the OCC’s rules permit state laws to apply to national
banks only if the OCC determines that such laws are “incidental” in the sense of
promoting and being favorable to the ability of national banks to conduct their
business. See supra notes 20–22, 31–32, 192, 203, infra notes 281–82, 360–62, and
accompanying text. 
207
 Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 987 (3d Cir. 1980). 
208
 See text accompanying note 132 supra (quoting Commercial Sec. Bank v. Saxon,
236 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1964). 
209
 See Gee Remarks, supra note 135, at 4 (reporting that, as of June 30, 2003,
44 of the nation’s largest 100 banks, and fifty-six percent of all U.S. banks with
interstate branches, held state charters). 
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either Congress or the courts, larger state-chartered banks will have
strong incentives to convert to national charters so that they can match
the ability of multistate national banks to operate without regard to
restrictive state laws.210 I believe that, within the relatively near future,
the OCC’s preemption rules are likely to induce most of the larger
state-chartered banks with interstate branches to migrate to the national
banking system.
Assuming that the OCC’s new preemption regime reduces the
membership of the state banking system to a group composed primar-
ily of smaller community-oriented banks, it will be very difficult for
state banking departments to attract and retain highly-qualified super-
visory personnel and to finance the administrative costs of bank
oversight. Under the same assumption, the U.S. banking system will
no longer have any meaningful duality because virtually all large banks
will hold national charters and most small banks will hold state
charters. Given those circumstances, the hypothetical ability of a large
bank to convert from a national charter to a state charter would no
longer provide a strong incentive for the OCC to maintain flexible,
innovative, or cost-effective policies. In addition, the remaining state
regulators would no longer be able to function as significant laborato-
ries for innovation by larger banks. Thus, most of the current benefits
of the dual banking system described in Part III.B.2 are jeopardized
by the OCC’s preemption rules.211 
210
 Under 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j), host state laws do not apply to local branches of
an out-of-state state bank if such laws are inapplicable to national banks. Thus, under
§ 1831a(j), multistate state-chartered banks can invoke the OCC’s preemption rules
to obtain immunity from host state laws, but only with respect to business conducted
at their out-of-state branches. Section 1831a(j) does not immunize multistate state-
chartered banks from the application of either home state laws or host state laws with
respect to activities conducted by their home state branches, their non-branch offices,
and their subsidiaries. In contrast, as described supra in Part II, the OCC’s preemption
rules purport to override all restrictive state laws with respect to all offices and
operating subsidiaries of national banks. 
211
 See, e.g., Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail, supra note 49, at 1071–72. In commenting
on a preliminary draft of this article, Heidi Schooner pointed out that state officials
could respond to the OCC’s preemption rules by granting equivalent immunities to
state banks under state parity statutes. A recent survey found that forty-eight states
have adopted laws allowing state banks to exercise powers granted to national banks
under federal law. In forty-three of those states, parity laws permit state banks to
engage in federally-authorized activities even if such activities are affirmatively
prohibited by state law. In forty states, however, state bank regulators must give their
approval (or withhold their disapproval) before state banks can exercise a federally-
authorized power based on a parity statute. See John J. Schroeder, “Duel” Banking
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2. The OTS’s Adoption of Similar Preemption Rules
Destroyed the Significance of the State-Chartered
Thrift System
My pessimistic predictions about the likely impact of the OCC’s
new regime are supported by a review of the contrasting trajectories
of the banking and thrift industries over the past three decades. At
the end of 1975 state-chartered banks and state-chartered savings
associations each held about forty percent of the assets of their
respective industries. At the same time state-chartered banks held
about two-thirds of all commercial bank charters and state-chartered
savings associations held about half of all thrift charters.212 By mid-
2003 state-chartered banks had maintained (and perhaps even slightly
improved) their position, as they held almost three-quarters of all
commercial bank charters and forty-four percent of total banking
assets.213 In sharp contrast, by mid-2003 state-chartered savings
associations held only thirteen percent of all savings association
charters and less than three percent of all deposits held by savings
associations.214 
System? State Bank Parity Laws: An Examination of Regulatory Practice, Constitu-
tional Issues, and Philosophical Questions, 36 IND. L. REV. 197, 202–07 (2003). 
Thus, state bank regulators might attempt to retain the loyalty of state banks by
using parity statutes to give them immunities from state law that are comparable to
the preemption regime created by the OCC’s new rules. However, such an attempt
would not succeed unless virtually all state regulators agreed to cooperate in
establishing a uniform nationwide immunity scheme that is as “seamless” as the OCC’s
preemption regime. In addition, the creation of a nationwide scheme based on state
parity laws could itself lead to the “demise of the dual banking system.” Id. at 221.
As explained in Part III.B.1, a principal justification for the dual banking system is
the record of innovation that has been produced by differences in regulatory
approaches among state and federal officials. Accordingly, “[t]he more the state
regulators and state banking codes become homogenized [and similar to federal
banking regulation], the less justification there is for the continuation of the dual
banking system.” Id. In sum, the OCC’s preemption rules present a formidable threat
to the dual banking system however the states choose to respond. 
212
 See Scott, supra note 123, at 3 nn.11–13, 4 nn.15–16. 
213
 See Gee Remarks, supra note 135, at 3. Of the 445 new banks that were orga-
nized between January 1, 2000, and June 30, 2003, 345 (or seventy-eight percent)
were chartered as state banks. Id. at 4; see also FDIC, Summary of Deposits, National
Totals by Charter Class as of June 30, 2003, at http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/
sodSumReport.asp?barItem  3&sInfoAsOf  2003 [hereinafter FDIC Summary of
Deposits] (showing that, as of June 30, 2003, 2,048 national banks held $2.3 trillion
of deposits, while 5,783 state banks held $1.95 trillion of deposits). 
214
 See FDIC Summary of Deposits, supra note 213 (showing that, as of June 30,
2003, 798 federal savings associations held $597 billion of deposits, while 122 state
savings associations held only $18 billion of deposits). 
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What accounts for the drastic shrinkage of the state-chartered thrift
industry from 1975 to 2003, compared with the successful performance
of the state-chartered banking system during the same period? Some
observers might point to the thrift debacle that occurred during 1980–
1994. However, statistics for thrift failures during that period do not
indicate any strong linkage between the thrift disaster and the severe
decline in the relative position of state-chartered savings associations
compared to federally-chartered thrifts. Between 1980 and 1994
federally-chartered savings associations accounted for a substantial
majority of all thrift failures, measured in terms of both number of
charters and total assets held by failed institutions in the federal and
state systems.215 By comparison, during the same period federally-
chartered banks accounted for slightly less than half of the charters,
but a substantial majority of the assets, held by all failed banks.216
Thus, in the thrift and banking industries, federally-chartered institu-
tions experienced a mortality rate roughly proportionate to their share
of each industry’s charters and assets at the end of 1975. In other
words, federally-chartered institutions in each industry appeared to
suffer at least as much as state-chartered institutions from the financial
crises of 1980–1994.217 Based on these statistics, the thrift debacle
does not appear to explain the virtual disappearance of the state-
chartered thrift system.
It might also be argued that the OTS gained a degree of supervisory
authority over state savings associations in 1989; this authority may
have encouraged state savings associations to convert to federal
charters in order to reduce the regulatory duplication created by
215
 See FDIC, Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience, 1980–1994,
at 830–31 (1998) (Chart C.39) (showing that (i) of the 1,295 savings associations that
failed during 1980–1994, 747 (or 57.5%) were federally-chartered thrifts and (ii) of
the $621 billion of assets held by savings associations that failed during the same
period, $339.6 billion (or 54.7%) belonged to federally-chartered thrifts). 
216
 Id. at 829 (Chart C.38) (showing that (i) of the 1,617 banks that failed during
1980–1994, 741 (or 45.8%) banks held federal charters from the OCC or the OTS
and (ii) of the $302.6 billion of assets held by banks that failed during the same period,
$176.5 billion (or 58.3%) belonged to banks that held federal charters from the OCC
or OTS). 
217
 Federally-chartered savings associations held half of all savings association char-
ters and sixty percent of all thrift assets at the end of 1975, while accounting for
fifty-seven percent of the thrift failures and fifty-five percent of total failed thrift assets
during 1980–1994. Federally-chartered banks held about one-third of all bank charters
and fifty-eight percent of all bank assets at the end of 1975, while accounting for
forty-six percent of all bank failures and fifty-eight percent of total failed bank assets
during 1980–1994. See supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text. 
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combined federal and state oversight. However, the OTS shares
supervisory responsibility for state savings associations with the FDIC,
and the FDIC (or the FRB, in the case of state banks that are FRS
members) exercises comparable safety-and-soundness authority over
state banks.218 In addition, the OTS’s current supervisory powers over
state savings associations are similar to the authorities that were
exercised prior to 1989 by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, a sub-agency of the former Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (“FHLBB”).219 Accordingly, it is difficult to identify any
dramatic change in regulatory structure that would account for the
disappearance of most state savings associations, particularly in light
of the continued viability of state banks also subject to dual state and
federal oversight.
The most likely reason for the disintegration of the state-chartered
thrift system is the aggressive preemption campaign that the FHLBB
began in the late 1970s and the OTS continued after assuming the
FHLBB’s functions in 1989. For example, in 1982 the Supreme Court
upheld a regulation adopted by the FHLBB in 1976 that preempted
all state laws restricting the ability of federal savings associations to
include due-on-sale clauses in their mortgages.220 The Supreme Court
concluded that, under the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933
(“HOLA”),221 “Congress invested the [FHLBB] with broad authority
to regulate federal savings and loans so as to effect [HOLA’s]
218
 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 101-54(I), at 426–27 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 222–23. While Congress in 1989 did not find it “practical for the
structure of savings association regulation to mirror the structure of bank regulation,”
Congress did use “the commercial bank regulatory structure [as] a useful model in
its deliberations.” Id. at 426, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 222. In addition to
the similarity in regulatory structures for state banks and state savings associations,
the federal restrictions on their permissible activities are also comparable. An FDIC-
insured state bank may not engage as principal in any activity that is not permissible
for national banks, and an FDIC-insured state savings association may not engage
as principal in any activity that is not permissible for federally-chartered thrifts, unless
the FDIC determines that the activity in question would not present a significant risk
to the appropriate deposit insurance fund. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831a(a)(1), 1831e(a)
(2000). 
219
 See H.R. Rep. No. 101-54(I), 426–27, 439–40 (1989), reprinted in 1989
U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 222–23, 235–36. Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1462a(e) (2000) and § 1463
with §§ 1730b, 1730c, 1730f, 1730g, 1730h (1988). 
220
 See Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 146–47, 170
(1982). 
221
 Act of June 13, 1933, ch. 64, 48 Stat. 128 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1461–1470 (2000)). 
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purposes, and plainly indicated that the [FHLBB] need not feel bound
by existing state law.”222 The Court expressly declined to consider
whether HOLA empowered the FHLBB to preempt the application
of all state laws to federal savings associations.223 However, the
Court’s expansive description of the FHLBB’s authority under HOLA
undoubtedly encouraged the FHLBB (and its successor, the OTS) to
pursue an aggressive preemption agenda.224 
Also in 1982, a federal district court upheld another FHLBB
regulation, which permitted federal savings associations to establish
interstate branches without regard to state law by acquiring failed or
failing thrifts in other states.225 A decade later the same district court
rejected a challenge to an OTS rule, which abolished all geographic
restrictions on branching by federal savings associations and thereby
made it possible for such institutions to establish nationwide branching
networks.226 
In 1983 the FHLBB issued § 545.2 of its regulations.227 As
presently in force, § 545.2 asserts that the OTS has “plenary and
222
 de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 162. Section 5(a) of HOLA currently authorizes the
OTS (and previously authorized the FHLBB) to issue regulations “to provide for the
organization, incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of . . . Federal
savings associations . . . giving primary consideration to the best practices of thrift
institutions in the United States.” 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a). In de la Cuesta, the Supreme
Court observed that “[i]t would have been difficult for Congress to give the [FHLBB]
a broader mandate.” 458 U.S. at 161 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted);
see also id. at 160–61 (stating that “Congress gave the [FHLBB] plenary authority
to issue regulations governing federal savings and loans . . . [and] Congress plainly
envisioned that federal savings and loans would be governed by what the [FHLBB]—
not any particular State—deemed to be the ‘best practices’ [of thrift institutions]”).
223
 See id. at 159 n.14 (stating that “[b]ecause we find an actual conflict between
federal and state law, we need not decide whether the HOLA or the [FHLBB’s]
regulations occupy the field of due-on-sale law or the entire field of federal savings
and loan regulation”); id. at 167 (similarly stating that “[a]lthough the [FHLBB’s]
power to promulgate regulations exempting federal savings and loans from the
requirements of state law may not be boundless, in this case we need not explore
the outer limits of the [FHLBB’s] discretion”); see also id. at 171 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that “the authority of the [FHLBB] to pre-empt state laws is not
limitless”). 
224
 As discussed infra at notes 389–96 and accompanying text, the courts have
held that HOLA does not incorporate a congressional policy of deference to state
law in a manner similar to the NBA. 
225
 See Indep. Bankers Ass’n of Am. v. FHLBB, 557 F. Supp. 23, 30 (D.D.C. 1982).
226
 See Conf. of State Bank Supervisors v. OTS, 792 F. Supp. 837, 847 (D.D.C.
1992). 
227
 12 C.F.R. § 545.2 (2003); see Matthew M. Neumeier & Danielle J. Szukala,
283OCC RULES THREATEN DUAL BANKING & CONSUMER PROTECTION2004]
 0059 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 217    223/241 
exclusive authority . . . to regulate all aspects of the operations of
Federal savings associations,” and that the OTS’s regulations are
“preemptive of any state law purporting to address the subject of the
operations of a Federal savings association.”228 In 1996 the OTS
adopted regulations governing the lending powers of federal savings
associations. Section 560.2 of those regulations declares that the “OTS
hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for federal
savings associations.”229 In the following year the OTS adopted
similar rules governing the deposit-taking activities of federal savings
associations. Section 557.11(b) of those regulations proclaims that the
“OTS hereby occupies the entire field of federal savings associations
deposit-related regulations.”230 As described in Part II, the substantive
scope of preemption asserted in the OCC’s new preemption rules is
essentially the same as the breadth of preemption declared in the
OTS’s regulations.231 
Since the Supreme Court left the issue undecided in de la Cuesta,
lower federal courts and state courts have divided on the question of
whether HOLA and the agency regulations adopted thereunder create
a comprehensive field preemption regime barring all state regulation
of the activities of federal savings associations.232 However, the courts
Recent Trends in Federal Preemption of State Law Claims Under the Federal Home
Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, 119 BANKING L.J. 621, 623 (2002) (discussing the adoption
of § 545.2). 
228
 12 C.F.R. § 545.2. 
229
 Id. § 560.2(a). For the OTS’s notice of final rulemaking that promulgated its
lending regulations, see 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951 (Sept. 30, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590). 
230
 12 C.F.R. § 557.11(b). For the OTS’s notice of final rulemaking that adopted
its deposit-related rules, see 62 Fed. Reg. 54,759 (Oct. 22, 1997) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§§ 506, 545, 556, 557, 561, 563, 563g). 
231
 See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text (comparing the OCC’s rules with
the OTS’s regulations). 
232
 For decisions declaring that HOLA and the regulations adopted thereunder create
a rule of field preemption, which precludes all state regulation of federal savings
associations, see, for example, Bank of America v. City and County of San Francisco,
309 F.3d 551, 558–60 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069 (2003); Wisconsin
League of Financial Institutions, Ltd. v. Galecki, 707 F. Supp. 401, 404 (D. Wis.
1989). For contrasting decisions holding that state laws apply to federal savings
associations unless they conflict with HOLA or an authorized agency regulation, see,
for example, Flanagan v. Germania, F.A., 872 F.2d 231, 233–34 (8th Cir. 1989),
Hussey-Head v. World Savings & Loan Ass’n, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 177–79 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003), Gibson v. World Savings & Loan Ass’n, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 24–31
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002), and Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 832 A.2d 812, 820–24
(Md. 2003). 
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have generally agreed that §§ 545.2, 557.11, and 560.2 of the OTS’s
rules are valid and preempt the states from regulating matters directly
related to the deposit-taking and lending activities of federal savings
associations.233 Like the OCC’s new rules, the OTS’s regulations
assert a broad scope of preemption by declaring that state laws of
general applicability, such as contract and tort laws, are preempted
if such laws have more than an “incidental” effect on the deposit-
taking or lending activities of federal savings associations.234 Some
courts have agreed with the OTS’s position and, therefore, have
preempted state contract and tort laws that had more than the permitted
“incidental” effect on the operations of federal savings associations.235
In contrast, two courts recently held that the OTS’s regulations do not
preempt state law obligations voluntarily assumed by a federal savings
association under the terms of a contract.236 
While the outer boundaries of the OTS’s preemption authority are
still being debated, there appears to be a general consensus that the
OTS’s regulations create a regime of selective field preemption that
precludes the states from regulating federal savings associations in the
following three areas: (i) the establishment of branch offices or other
233
 See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 560 (9th Cir. 2002)
(holding that §§ 545.2, 557.11 and 560.2 preempted local ordinances that prohibited
federal savings associations from charging fees for transactions at their ATMs); Lopez
v. Washington Mut. Bank, 302 F.3d 900, 906–07 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 24344 (holding that § 557.11 preempted a state law that barred
federal savings associations from exercising the right of setoff against Social Security
payments deposited in their customers’ checking accounts); Haehl v. Washington Mut.
Bank, 277 F. Supp. 2d 933, 938–43 (S.D. Ind. 2003) (holding that § 560.2 preempted
the application to federal savings associations of state laws limiting loan-related fees);
Moskowitz v. Washington Mut. Bank, 768 N.E.2d 262, 264–66 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)
(same); Lopez v. World Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42, 45–54 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2003) (same, and also affirming the OTS’s statutory authority to adopt § 560.2).
234
 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 557.13, 560.2(c) (2003); OTS Op. Chief Counsel, Mar. 10,
1999, reprinted in [1999 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83-301
(declaring that California statutes prohibiting unfair business practices and deceptive
advertising were preempted to the extent that courts were applying those statutes to
restrict the ability of federal savings associations to advertise their services, to engage
in “forced placement” of hazard insurance to protect borrowers’ collateral, and to
assess loan-related fees). 
235
 See, e.g., Haehl, 277 F. Supp. 2d at 942–43 (concluding that tort law claims
were preempted); Moskowitz, 768 N.E.2d at 264–66 (holding that contract and tort
law claims were preempted). 
236
 See Gibson v. World Sav. & Loan, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 19, 27–31 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002); Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, 832 A.2d 812, 824–33 (Md. 2003). 
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facilities,237 (ii) lending activities, and (iii) deposit-taking activi-
ties.238 Without question, the OTS’s regulations have a broad preemp-
tive impact because geographic expansion, lending, and deposit-taking
are matters of primary concern for virtually all depository institu-
tions.239 The OTS has aggressively asserted its preemption authority
in these areas. For example, in 2003 the OTS issued preemption
opinions declaring that federally-chartered thrifts were exempt from
predatory lending laws enacted by Georgia, New York, New Jersey,
and New Mexico.240 
Commentators have cited the OTS’s grant of unrestricted nation-
wide branching privileges and the OTS’s aggressive preemption of
state laws as major advantages that federal thrifts enjoyed over national
and state banks during the past several years.241 In early 2004 J.P.
Morgan Chase (“Chase”), the largest state-chartered bank in the nation,
obtained regulatory permission to establish a new federal savings bank.
This new subsidiary will operate all of Chase’s consumer credit offices
located outside of Chase’s home market in the tri-state area surround-
ing New York City. Chase emphasized that its new federal savings
237
 See authorities cited supra notes 225–26. 
238
 See authorities cited supra note 233; see also Wells, 832 A.2d at 820–22. 
239
 For discussions of the central importance of geographic expansion, lending, and
deposit-taking in the banking industry, see, for example, Wilmarth, Too Big to Fail,
supra note 49, at 960–66, 972–77, and Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 139,
at 227–72. 
240
 See Liz Moyer, Chase Seeks FSB Charter, Hints at New Markets, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 11, 2003, at 1. For the most recent of the OTS’s opinions barring the application
of state predatory lending laws to federal thrifts, see OTS Op. Chief Counsel No.
P-2003-6, Sept. 2, 2003 (declaring that federal law preempts the New Mexico Home
Loan Protection Act). For a discussion of other recent OTS opinion letters that
similarly declared that federal savings associations were exempt from a variety of
state consumer protection laws related to lending practices, see Neumeier & Szukala,
supra note 227, at 625–27, 630–31. 
241
 See Ira L. Tannenbaum, Federal Thrift Charter Popularity Continues, 18 BANK-
ING POL’Y REP. No. 3, Feb. 1, 1999, at 1, 16 (noting that OTS rules enable federal
savings associations to conduct “interstate activities” based on a “preemption of state
laws . . . [that] is broader than the scope of preemption applicable to the activities
of national banks”); A Unified Federal Charter for Banks and Savings Associations:
A Staff Study, 10 FDIC BANKING REV. No. 1, at 1, 3–4 (1997) (stating that “[t]he
federal thrift charter confers the broadest geographic expansion authority of any federal
insured depository institutions charter,” while national and state banks continue to
be subject to restrictions on the establishment of de novo interstate branches under
the Riegle-Neal Act); Gregory J. Lyons, A Low-Profile Charter That Offers More
Bang for the Buck, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 2003, at 17A (reporting that “the OTS
has been very aggressive in preempting state laws” for federal thrifts, and such
institutions “can easily branch on a nationwide basis”). 
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bank will be able to “operate federally regulated businesses under a
single national standard and have greater flexibility in opening
branches in select markets across the country.”242 
As discussed in Part II, the OCC’s new preemption rules seek to
provide national banks with the same sweeping immunity from state
laws that federal savings associations are granted under the OTS’s
rules.243 Chase’s decision to move its national consumer lending
business into a federal thrift charter, which one critic described as
“purely a legal move to preempt state laws,”244 strongly indicates that
the OCC’s rules are likely to persuade most of the largest state-
chartered banks to convert to national charters. As discussed previ-
ously, the migration of large state banks to the national banking system
would greatly weaken the state banking system and would destroy the
competitive equilibrium that currently exists within the dual banking
system.245 Such a drastic outcome should not occur without Con-
gress’s explicit authorization.
D. The OCC’s Preemption Rules and Recent Lower Court
Decisions Are Contrary to Longstanding Judicial
Precedents and Congressional Policy Regarding the
Application of State Laws to National Banks
1. In Recent Years, the OCC and Large National Banks
Have Used a Coordinated Litigation Strategy to
Preempt State Consumer Protection Laws
As explained above, judicial precedents and federal legislation reject
any notion that federal law “occupies the field” with regard to the
242
 Moyer, supra note 240 (quoting statement issued by a Chase representative);
see also Damian Paletta, In Brief: JPM Chase Gets Final Approval for Thrift, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 2, 2004, at 20 (reporting that Chase’s new federal savings bank “is
meant to serve a national market . . . [and] will include 302 consumer-lending offices
[established by Chase] outside the tri-state New York region, New Jersey and
Connecticut”). 
243
 See supra notes 19–32 and accompanying text. 
244
 Moyer, supra note 240 (quoting Matthew Lee, executive director of Inner City
Press/Community on the Move). 
245
 See supra notes 193–211 and accompanying text. Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins
claim that my “dire predictions” regarding the threat posed by the OCC’s rules to
the dual banking system lack “any credible foundation.” Cayne & Perkins, supra note
2, at 372. However, they do not consider the virtual collapse of the state-chartered
thrift system that occurred after 1975, and they do not offer any explanation that would
challenge my thesis that the FHLBB’s and OTS’s preemption rules were the most
likely cause of that collapse. 
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business operations of national banks.246 The Supreme Court has
consistently held that state laws apply to national banks unless such
laws conflict with the express statutory powers of national banks,
discriminate against national banks, or place an undue burden on the
operations of national banks.247 The House-Senate conferees on the
Riegle-Neal Act endorsed this long-established judicial presumption
in favor of applying state law to the activities of national banks.248
Contrary to these judicial and legislative authorities, the OCC
claimed in the preamble to its visitorial powers rule that “there is no
presumption against preemption in the national bank context.”249 As
support for this assertion, the OCC cited the Ninth Circuit’s recent
decision in Bank of America.250 In Bank of America the Ninth Circuit
held that “the presumption against preemption of state law is inapplica-
ble” in the course of deciding that national banks did not have to
comply with local ordinances prohibiting surcharges on persons using
bank ATMs.251 The Ninth Circuit contended that its refusal to apply
a presumption in favor of state law was consistent with the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Locke.252 
However, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Locke was clearly mis-
placed. In Locke, the Supreme Court declined to apply “an ‘assump-
tion’ of nonpre-emption” in striking down state laws that imposed
restrictions on oil tankers operating in navigable waterways.253 The
Supreme Court emphasized in Locke that the challenged state laws
sought to regulate “national and international maritime com-
merce”—an area in which Congress had shown a clear desire to
establish “a uniformity of regulation.”254 By contrast, in Atherton,
after reviewing the long history of state regulation of national banks,
the Supreme Court held that federal policy did not require any
“uniformity” of regulatory treatment for federally-chartered banks.
246
 See supra Parts III.A and III.B. 
247
 See supra Part III.A (discussing Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, Waite, McClellan, St.
Louis, Lewis, Luckett, Barnett, and Atherton). 
248
 See supra notes 163–69 and accompanying text. 
249
 OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1896. 
250
 Id. at 1896–97, 1896 n.11 (citing and quoting Bank of Am. v. San Francisco,
309 F.3d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
251
 Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 559. 
252
 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (cited in Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558). 
253
 Id. at 108. 
254
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Accordingly, the Court refused in Atherton to adopt a federal common-
law rule for federally-chartered banks that would override state-law
standards governing the fiduciary duties of bank directors.255 
The Ninth Circuit’s refusal to apply a presumption against preemp-
tion in Bank of America was clearly inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s holding in Atherton. The Ninth Circuit also ignored other
Supreme Court decisions and the explicit instructions of the Riegle-
Neal conferees, all of which support the presumptive application of
state laws to national banks.256 
Unfortunately, Bank of America is not an isolated example. Notwith-
standing the OCC’s clear departure from established principles govern-
ing the dual banking system, the OCC has been successful during the
past six years in persuading federal appellate and district courts to issue
decisions preempting state consumer protection laws. The OCC and
its national bank allies have generally followed a three-step strategy
in these cases. First, the OCC has issued interpretive rules and opinion
letters that aggressively fill in “gaps” where the National Bank Act
is silent regarding the extent of national bank powers. For example,
the OCC adopted a wide array of interpretive rules defining the
“incidental powers” of national banks under 12 U.S.C. § 24(Sev-
enth).257 As support for its authority to specify the “incidental powers”
of national banks, the OCC relied on NationsBank of North Carolina
v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co (“VALIC”).258 In VALIC the Supreme
Court held that the OCC’s opinion is entitled to “controlling weight”
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.259 whenever the OCC makes a “reasonable” determination that
a particular activity falls within the “incidental powers” of national
banks under § 24(Seventh).260 
255
 See Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 219–26 (1997). 
256
 See supra notes 38–46, 72–80, 86–106, 152–53, 163–69, 172 and accompanying
text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, Waite v.
Dowley, Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, McClellan v. Chipman, First Nat’l
Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, Lewis v. Fid. & Deposit Co., Anderson Nat’l Bank
v. Luckett, and Atherton v. FDIC, and the House-Senate conference report on the
Riegle-Neal Act). 
257
 For example, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 7 (2003), and especially the preemption rulings
contained in 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4000–7.4006. 
258
 513 U.S. 251 (1995). 
259
 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
260
 See VALIC, 513 U.S. at 256–60. Chevron sets forth a two-step test for determin-
ing whether the courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of its statutory
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The deference granted to the OCC by the Supreme Court in VALIC
has encouraged lower courts in subsequent cases to accept the OCC’s
interpretations of the “incidental powers” of national banks. Accord-
ingly, as the second prong of its preemption strategy, the OCC has
used its “incidental powers” rulings to create conflicts with state law
in areas where federal statutes are silent regarding the authority of
national banks. For example, § 24(Seventh) of the NBA and other
federal statutes do not specifically empower national banks to impose
service fees on their customers.261 Nevertheless, the OCC issued broad
interpretive rulings declaring that national banks have the “incidental
power” to charge service fees in accordance with their business
judgment and without regard to limitations imposed by state law.262
The OCC issued similar preemptive rulings in other areas related to
consumer banking services based on its liberal interpretations of the
“incidental powers” of national banks.263 
mandate. Under step one, the court must ask “whether Congress has directly spoken
to the precise question at issue.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. If so, the court “must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress” and must “reject
administrative constructions that are contrary to clear congressional intent.” Id. at 843,
843 n.9. If, however, the governing statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue,” step two of Chevron requires the court to defer to any “reasonable
interpretation” made by the agency. Id. at 843–44. In reviewing the OCC’s opinions
regarding the “incidental powers” of national banks under § 24(Seventh), the courts
have generally deferred to the OCC under step two of Chevron unless another federal
statute clearly indicates that the OCC lacks authority to approve the activity in
question. Compare, e.g., VALIC, 513 U.S. at 256–60 (deferring to the OCC’s
interpretation of § 24(Seventh)), and Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551,
563 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069 (2003), with Indep. Ins. Agents
of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643–45 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (refusing to defer
to the OCC’s interpretation of § 24(Seventh) because the insurance activity approved
by the OCC was barred by the clear terms of 12 U.S.C. § 92), and Am. Land Title
Ass’n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 154–57 (2d Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 508 U.S.
971 (1993). 
261
 See, e.g., Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1049, 1058
(S.D. Fla. 1998) aff’d, 205 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 531 U.S.
822 (2000); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 521–24 (Cal. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
262
 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank of Tex. v. James, 321 F.3d 488, 492–93 (5th Cir.
2003) (citing an interpretive rule and opinion letters issued by the OCC stating that
national banks have authority to charge check-cashing fees); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d
at 562–63 (citing interpretive rules and opinion letters issued by the OCC, declaring
that national banks have authority to impose surcharges on transactions by non-
depositors at their ATMs). 
263
 See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1165 (E.D. Cal.
2003) (citing OCC interpretive rules providing that (i) national banks may establish
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As the third step in its litigation strategy, the OCC has frequently
filed amicus briefs to support preemption claims asserted by national
banks in judicial proceedings. In turn, the national banks appearing
as parties in those cases have argued that the courts must defer to the
OCC’s interpretation of the NBA. In several recent cases, federal
appellate and district courts deferred to the OCC’s view that state
consumer protection laws were preempted by reason of “conflicts”
with the “incidental powers” of national banks as defined by the OCC
in its interpretive rulings and amicus briefs.264 In three of those
decisions, the courts deferred to the OCC’s preemption claims, based
on the OCC’s interpretation of § 24(Seventh), even though other
federal statutes applied to the financial transactions at issue and
expressly authorized the states to enact more restrictive laws regulating
those transactions.265 
operating subsidiaries to engage in mortgage lending and (ii) such operating subsidia-
ries are immune from state regulation because they are subject to the “exclusive
‘visitorial’ power” of the OCC); Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d
1000, 1015–16 (E.D. Cal. 2002) (citing two OCC opinion letters declaring that state
laws were preempted because (i) in one case, the relevant state law imposed “burdens”
that would “increase a bank’s operating costs and substantively hamper the bank’s
marketing activities” for insurance sales and (ii) in another case, the pertinent state
law “frustrated [national banks’] ability to conduct their [motor vehicle] leasing
businesses in an economically efficient manner”). 
264
 See James, 324 F.3d at 492–95 (citing VALIC and deferring to the OCC’s view—
expressed in interpretive rules, opinion letters and an amicus brief—that (i) national
banks have the “incidental power” to charge check-cashing fees and (ii) federal law
therefore preempted a Texas statute prohibiting financial institutions from charging
fees for cashing “on us” checks); Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 557–64 (citing VALIC
and deferring to the OCC’s similarly-expressed position that (i) national banks have
the “incidental power” to charge fees for transactions at their ATMs and (ii) federal
law therefore preempted two California municipal ordinances prohibiting financial
institutions from imposing ATM surcharges on non-depositors); Bank One, Utah v.
Guttau, 190 F.3d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1999) (deferring to the OCC’s similarly-expressed
view that an Iowa statute regulating ATMs was preempted as to national banks because
the statute imposed a “significant burden” on the ability of national banks to offer
services at their ATMs), cert. denied sub nom. Foster v. Bank One, Utah, 529 U.S.
1087 (2000); Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1165–70 (deferring to the OCC’s similarly-
expressed claim that California’s authority to regulate an operating subsidiary of a
national bank was preempted by reason of (i) the national bank’s “incidental power”
to establish the subsidiary and (ii) the OCC’s “exclusive visitorial power” over the
subsidiary); Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1013–16 (deferring to the OCC’s similarly-
expressed position that a California statute requiring certain disclosures to credit card
customers was preempted as to national banks because the statute imposed “significant
costs on national bank lending”). 
265
 See Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 563–66 (deferring to the OCC’s view that (i) the
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Thus, the OCC and national banks have used a coordinated litigation
strategy to expand the preemptive reach of the NBA. In James the
Fifth Circuit seemed to recognize that the OCC has an inherent conflict
of interest whenever it issues a preemptive ruling regarding the
“incidental powers” of national banks.266 The court noted that the
beneficiaries of the OCC’s preemptive rulings are the “regulated
industry”—the same national banks that fund the OCC’s budget.267
Nevertheless, even though the NBA is silent regarding the authority
of national banks to charge service fees, the Fifth Circuit felt powerless
to second-guess the OCC’s claim that its interpretive rulings on service
fees preempted state law.268 The court concluded that VALIC and
Chevron mandated deference to the OCC’s position:
[W]hile divining the intent of Congress with respect to a point of
policy not statutorily addressed is possibly aspirational under the best
of circumstances, and particularly so where, as here, congressional
purpose must be inferred from a vague and expansive delegation of
authority to an administrative agency, we think it plain that the OCC
has been delegated the authority to determine, with a considerable
discretionary birth [sic], whether and which fees the national banks
may assess. . . .
[I]n exercising the discretion committed it by Congress, an agency
necessarily, and perhaps even inadvertently, sweeps into its legislative
reach significant policy decisions outside its area of specific commit-
ment. . . . Here, the constituency positively affected by the OCC’s
position is concentrated, organized and well-funded, and also happens
to be the regulated industry. In contrast, the constituency which is
“incidental power” of national banks to charge fees for ATM transactions preempted
the anti-surcharge ordinances adopted by two California municipalities and (ii) the
challenged ordinances could not be justified under the federal Electronic Funds
Transfer Act (“EFTA”), even though the EFTA expressly allows states to adopt laws
governing electronic funds transactions that are more restrictive than the federal
standards established under the EFTA); Guttau, 190 F.3d at 850–51 (similarly
deferring to the OCC’s position that the challenged Iowa statute could not be justified
under the EFTA); Lockyer, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 1008–09, 1013–15 (deferring to the
OCC’s view that California’s credit card disclosure law conflicted with “national
banks’ general powers under the NBA,” even though the federal Truth in Lending
Act (“TILA”) expressly allows states to adopt laws governing the disclosure of credit
terms that are more restrictive than the federal standards established under TILA).
266
 James, 321 F.3d at 488. 
267
 Id. at 494; see also 2004 Georgetown Lecture by Spitzer, supra note 201, at
7 (observing that the “OCC’s entire operating budget” is “funded directly by the
entities that it oversees”); supra notes 159–61 and accompanying text. 
268
 James, 321 F.3d at 493–95. 
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adversely affected by the [OCC’s] decision, though vast, is diffuse,
unorganized, and definitionally ill-funded. It may be that these
competing interests could be better balanced . . . by a national
Congress whose commitments are diverse and universal, or even by
the people as they are represented in the state legislatures, than by
a solitary institution whose focus is a single industry. However, our
review here is limited to discerning whether Congress intended to
delegate this question to the OCC, not whether we think such a delega-
tion wise.
. . . .
. . . We conclude . . . that the OCC interpretation is not a clearly
erroneous interpretation, and the district court properly deferred to
it.269 
2. In View of the OCC’s Self-Interest in Preempting State
Law to Attract Large Banks to Its Regulated
Constituency, the Courts Should Not Give Chevron
Deference to the OCC’s Preemption Rulings
As shown in the preceding section, recent federal appellate and
district court decisions have upheld the OCC’s preemption rulings in
reliance on the deference given to the OCC by the Supreme Court
in VALIC. In granting such deference, those recent decisions have
overlooked two important points. First, in VALIC the central issue was
whether the OCC’s opinion letter was consistent with federal statutes
limiting the powers of national banks.270 The OCC’s ruling did not
contain a preemptive determination and was not offered as a justifica-
tion for overriding state law. Accordingly, VALIC simply did not
address the question of whether an OCC ruling should receive Chevron
deference when the ruling either contains, or is used to support, a
preemption claim. Second, and more generally, the Supreme Court
has never ruled definitively on the question of whether a federal
agency is entitled to Chevron deference when it issues a preemption
determination. Two recent decisions of the Supreme Court suggest that
the Court might adopt the view that a federal agency’s claim of
authority to preempt state law should be reviewed de novo by the
judiciary, without giving Chevron deference to the agency’s interpreta-
tion of its statutory mandate.271 
269
 Id. (citing, inter alia, VALIC and Chevron). 
270
 See Nationsbank of N.C. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 256–64
(1995). 
271
 In Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), 517 U.S. 734 (1996), the Court upheld the
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(Text continued on page 295)
validity of an OCC interpretive regulation that defined the term “interest” for purposes
of 12 U.S.C. § 85. The petitioner argued that the OCC’s regulation should not be
given Chevron deference because the effect of the regulation was to preempt state
laws restricting the amount of late fees charged for overdue payments on loans.
According to the petitioner, “the ‘presumption against . . . pre-emption’ announced
in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992), in effect trumps
Chevron, and requires a court to make its own interpretation of § 85 that will avoid
(to the extent possible) pre-emption of state law.” Smiley, 517 U.S. at 743–44
(describing petitioner’s argument). The Court assumed, without deciding, that “the
question of whether a statute is pre-emptive . . . must always be decided de novo
by the courts.” Id. at 744 (emphasis in original). The Court, held, however, that this
assumed principle was not applicable in Smiley, because (i) the Court had declared
in a previous case that § 85 preempted state law and (ii) the OCC’s regulation only
defined the “meaning” of a term used in § 85 and therefore “does not . . . deal with
pre-emption, and hence does not bring into play the considerations petitioner raises.”
Id.  
In summarily dismissing the petitioner’s Chevron argument, the Court in Smiley
overlooked the rather obvious fact that the OCC’s regulation adopted a very broad
definition of “interest,” thereby increasing the effective scope of preemption under
§ 85. The OCC’s definition of “interest” included not only conventional “numerical
periodic fees,” but also a variety of lump-sum fees that are not based on time or rate-
based considerations, such as late fees, over-the-limit fees, and bounced check charges.
See id. at 740. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the Court reserved judgment on
the petitioner’s claim that agency regulations containing preemptive interpretations
of statutes should not be given Chevron deference and should instead be reviewed
de novo by the courts.  
In New York v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 535 U.S. 1 (2002), the
State of New York challenged a FERC regulation that preempted state law by its
own terms. New York argued that the Supreme Court should apply a “presumption
against pre-emption” in determining whether FERC had statutory authority to adopt
such a regulation. The Court rejected New York’s arguments in the following terms:
[A] federal agency may pre-empt state law only when and if it is acting within
the scope of its congressionally delegated authority[,] . . . [for] an agency
literally has no power to act, let alone pre-empt the validly enacted legislation
of a sovereign State, unless and until Congress confers power upon it.” . . .
Such a case does not involve a “presumption against pre-emption,” as New
York argues, but rather requires us to be certain that Congress has conferred
authority on the agency. . . . In other words, we must interpret the statute
to determine whether Congress has given FERC the power to act as it has,
and we do so without any presumption one way or the other.  
Id. at 18 (citations omitted and emphasis added).  
In New York v. FERC, the majority opinion written by Justice Stevens (the author
of Chevron) did not refer to Chevron in the course of deciding whether FERC had
statutory authority to adopt the preemptive regulation at issue. See id. at 18–25. In
contrast, the Supreme Court agreed with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that
Chevron deference should be given to the agency’s decision to refrain from exercising
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At least one federal appeals court held that federal agency preemp-
tion determinations should not receive Chevron deference, while
another court of appeals reserved judgment on that issue.272 One
reason why preemption determinations are poor candidates for Chev-
ron deference is that they “involve matters of law—an area more
within the expertise of the courts than within the expertise of the
[agency].”273 A second reason is that an agency typically enlarges
the scope of its jurisdiction and effective power when it issues
preemption determinations. The Supreme Court has “never resolved
the question of whether there should be a ‘scope of jurisdiction’
exception to Chevron deference.”274 However, some commentators
all of its potential authority under the governing statute. See id. at 15–16, 26–28. Thus,
two aspects of New York v. FERC indicate that questions about the scope of an
agency’s statutory authority to adopt preemptive rules should be decided de novo by
the court, without giving Chevron deference to the agency’s interpretation of the
governing statute. First, as noted above, the Court stated that the question of whether
FERC had statutory authority to adopt preemptive regulations should be decided
“without any presumption one way or the other.” Id. at 18. Second, the Court did
not rely on Chevron in affirming the FERC’s authority to preempt state law, but the
Court did cite Chevron in upholding the agency’s discretionary decision not to exercise
all of its available authority. 
272
 See Colo. Pub. Utilities Comm’n v. Harmon, 951 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir.
1991) (denying Chevron deference to a federal agency’s preemption determination);
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 93 F.3d 890, 892, 894 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(reserving judgment on the issue). 
273
 Harmon, 951 F.2d at 1579; see also Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Sec’y of Labor,
153 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 1998) (refusing to grant Chevron deference to a federal
agency’s decision on “a question of pure statutory construction” and citing Harmon
in support of that conclusion). 
274
 Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J.
833, 844 (2001). In Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487
U.S. 354 (1988), the Supreme Court held that an order issued by FERC preempted
a conflicting decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Justice Brennan (joined by
Justices Marshall and Blackmun) argued in dissent that the Supreme Court should
not defer to “an agency’s interpretation of a statute designed to confine the scope
of its jurisdiction.” Id. at 387 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan contended
that “the normal reasons for agency deference” do not apply in such a case, because
(i) the statutory “policies in favor of limiting the agency’s jurisdiction . . . may indeed
conflict . . . with the agency’s institutional interests in expanding its own power”
and (ii) “we cannot presume that Congress implicitly intended an agency to fill ‘gaps’
in a statute confining the agency’s jurisdiction, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44, since
by its nature such a statute manifests an unwillingness to give the agency freedom
to define the scope of its own power.” Id. In response, Justice Scalia argued in his
concurring opinion that “giving deference to an administrative interpretation of its
statutory jurisdiction or authority is both necessary and appropriate.” Id. at 381 (Scalia,
J., concurring). Justice Scalia maintained that Justice Brennan’s proposed jurisdiction-
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believe that Chevron deference should not be given to an agency
interpretation that expands the boundaries of the agency’s mandate,
because “agencies have no comparative advantage in reading statutes
and . . . agency self-interest may cloud its judgment.”275 
The same concerns about “agency self-interest” and “agency ag-
grandizement”276 are clearly at stake when the OCC issues interpretive
rulings or substantive regulations that purport to preempt state law.
Public policy does not favor granting Chevron deference to such
rulings because—as shown in this article and a recent speech by New
York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer—(i) the OCC forcefully pro-
claims the benefits of preemption for its regulated national bank
constituents (especially large, multistate national banks), (ii) those
constituents publicly applaud the OCC’s efforts to preempt state law,
(iii) the same constituents provide virtually all of the funding for the
OCC’s operations, (iv) in recent years the OCC and some of its largest
constituents have actively pursued a carefully coordinated litigation
strategy designed to obtain court decisions preempting state law, (v) a
successful outcome of the OCC’s various preemption initiatives will
likely enlarge the OCC’s constituency and thereby expand the OCC’s
budget and prestige, and (vi) the OCC’s preemption claims greatly
expand the sphere of its “exclusive” regulatory control to include
based exception to Chevron deference was unworkable because “no discernible line”
could be drawn between an agency’s alleged violation of its jurisdictional limits and
an agency’s allegedly improper application of its recognized authority. Id.  
The majority opinion in Missisippi Power & Light, written by Justice Stevens (the
author of Chevron), did not address the agency deference issue debated by Justices
Brennan and Scalia or even mention Chevron. Thus, as with his subsequent majority
opinion in New York v. FERC (discussed supra note 271), one can infer from Justice
Stevens’s silence that he did not believe that Chevron deference should be given to
an agency order or rule that seeks to preempt state law of its own force. 
275
 Ernest Gellhorn & Paul Verkuil, Controlling Chevron-Based Delegations, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 989, 1009 (1999); see also Timothy K. Armstrong, Chevron
Deference and Agency Self-Interest, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y NO. 2 (Spring
2004) (forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract  46742 (arguing that
agency interpretations of statutes that implicate “agency self-interest”—either by
advancing the agency’s financial interests or by expanding the scope of its regulatory
powers—should not receive Chevron deference and should be reviewed de novo by
the courts); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 274, at 910–14 (contending that “agency
interpretations that affect the scope of their delegated power” should be subject to
a “step zero” inquiry; under this approach, an agency would not receive Chevron
deference unless the “step zero” inquiry revealed that Congress intended the agency
to be the “primary interpreter” of the scope of its jurisdiction). 
276
 Gellhorn & Verkuil, supra note 275, at 994. 
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state-chartered corporations that are subsidiaries of national banks.277
The misgivings voiced by the Fifth Circuit in James278 should have
caused that court to deny the OCC’s claim for Chevron deference.
The decisions in James and other recent cases might well have been
different if the courts had subjected the OCC’s preemptive rulings to
a searching, de novo review that carefully considered whether the
OCC’s interpretations of the NBA were truly consistent with the
judicial precedents and congressional policies discussed in Parts III.A
and III.B.
During 2003 and early 2004 more than forty members of Congress
publicly challenged the OCC’s authority to implement its preemption
initiatives.279 While these public statements by members of Congress
277
 See Armstrong, supra note 275 (contending that “agency self-interest” is impli-
cated and should preclude the availability of deference under Chevron whenever an
agency’s interpretation of a statute is shown to further “the agency’s financial self-
interest” or “to aggrandize regulatory power in the agency” by “expand[ing] the
agency’s regulatory sphere”); 2004 Georgetown Lecture by Spitzer, supra note 201,
at 6–13 (describing the OCC’s powerful incentives for issuing aggressive preemption
rulings and otherwise shielding its regulated constituents from state enforcement
efforts); supra notes 19–32, 191–203, 257–67 and accompanying text and infra Parts
III.G and III.H.2 (same). 
278
 See James, 321 F.3d at 493–94; see also supra notes 266–69 and accompanying
text. 
279
 See Todd Davenport, In Brief: Dems: Proposed Rules Beyond OCC’s Scope,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 2003, at 3 (reporting that the ten Democratic members of
the Senate Banking Committee sent a letter to the OCC (i) declaring that “[t]he OCC
now appears to be ignoring both the Supreme Court and Congress by pursuing a
preemption agenda that would override any state law that has any impact on a national
bank” and also stating that “[t]he OCC’s actions and proposals would dramatically
alter established preemption standards and would radically affect state-federal relations
and consumer protection in the areas of banking”; and (ii) asking the OCC “to defer
any further rulemaking on preemption of state laws at this time”); Davenport, OCC
and Georgia Law, supra note 197 (reporting that sixteen members of the House
Financial Services Committee had written to the OCC, warning that the OCC’s
preemption initiatives “could result in Congress having to act . . . to curb the OCC’s
preemption authority”); National Banks: Kelly Seeks Delay on OCC Preemption Rules;
Agency Will ‘Stay the Course,’ Williams Says, 82 Banking Rep. (BNA) 191 (Feb.
2, 2004) (reporting that, during a House subcommittee oversight hearing, several
members criticized the OCC’s preemption and visitorial powers rules and only one
member defended the OCC); House Subcommittee Scrutinizes OCC Preemption Rule,
CSBS EXAMINER, Jan. 30, 2004, at 1, available at http://www.csbs.org (same); Karen
L. Werner, Preemption: Frank, House Democrats Urge OCC to Delay Effective Date
of Rulemaking, 82 Banking Rep. (BNA) 283 (Feb. 16, 2004) (reporting that twenty-
three members of the House Financial Services Committee had called upon the OCC
to defer any final implementation of its preemption and visitorial powers rules);
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do not have binding legal force, they support my view that the OCC’s
preemption rules fall outside the boundaries of the agency’s statutory
authority.
E. The OCC Does Not Have Authority to Provide National
Banks with a General Exemption from State Laws in the
Area of Real Estate Lending
1. Section 371(a) Does Not Authorize the OCC’s Real
Estate Lending Rule
As amended in January 2004, 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) preempts all state
laws that “obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to
fully exercise its Federally authorized real estate lending powers
. . . .”280 Amended § 34.4(b) allows a narrow subset of state laws
to apply to national banks, but only to the extent that such laws have
an “incidental” effect on the real estate lending activities of national
banks.281 The OCC explained that state laws will be deemed “inciden-
tal” if they “do not attempt to regulate the manner or content of
national banks’ real estate lending, but . . . instead form the legal
infrastructure that makes it practicable to exercise a permissible
Federal power.”282 In other words, only those state laws that promote
the ability of national banks to make real estate loans will remain
applicable under § 34.4.
Michelle Heller, Mixed Views on Impact of Panel’s Preemption Vote, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 27, 2004, at 3 (reporting that the House Financial Services Committee adopted,
by a 34-28 vote, a budget-related resolution “to chastise the [OCC] for issuing [its
rules] without congressional authorization and without increasing the agency’s
enforcement personnel or budget”). The budget-related resolution of the House
Financial Services Committee is set forth in VIEWS AND ESTIMATES OF THE COMM.
ON FIN. SERV. ON MATTERS TO BE SET FORTH IN THE CONCURRENT RES. ON THE
BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, 108th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print, Feb. 25, 2004)
[hereinafter 2004 House Fin. Serv. Comm. Budget Res.], at 15–16; see also id. at
25–26 (committee’s record vote of 34-28 on the resolution); id. at 39 (“Additional
Views” of six committee members who stated that they would have voted “no” if
they had been present for the committee’s vote on the resolution). 
280
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1917 (text of 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)
(2003)). 
281
 Id. (text of 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) specifying that state laws dealing with contracts,
torts, criminal law, homestead laws, rights to collect debts, acquisition and transfer
of real property, taxation, and zoning apply to national banks, but only if they have
a permissible “incidental” effect). 
282
 Id. at 1912. 
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As described in Part II, amended § 34.4 adopts essentially the same
preemption standard for real estate lending by national banks that the
OTS established for lending by federally-chartered thrifts. Unlike the
OTS’s rule, § 34.4 does not explicitly “occupy the field” of real estate
lending by national banks, but in practical effect it does so in
everything but name.283 
Prior to its recent amendments to § 34.4, the OCC never asserted
a blanket preemption of state laws in the area of real estate lending.
The previous version of § 34.4(a) preempted state laws only in five
specific areas related to real estate loans—viz., loan-to-value ratios,
amortization schedules, maturity rules, aggregate lending limits, and
leaseholds used as loan collateral.284 With respect to all other state
regulations affecting real estate loans, the previous version of § 34.4(b)
stated that the OCC would address preemption issues on a case-by-case
basis in accordance with “recognized principles of Federal preemp-
tion.”285 
The OCC’s recent amendments to § 34.4 plainly exceed the agen-
cy’s rulemaking authority with respect to real estate loans under 12
U.S.C. § 371(a).286 Section 371(a) provides that national banks may
make real estate loans “subject to section 1828(o) of this title and such
restrictions and requirements as the Comptroller of the Currency may
prescribe by regulation or order.”287 Pursuant to § 1828(o), the federal
banking agencies adopted “uniform standards” governing real estate
loans made by all FDIC-insured institutions, taking into consideration
(i) the risk of such loans to the deposit insurance funds, (ii) “the need
for safe and sound operation of insured depository institutions,” and
(iii) “the availability of credit.”288 Section 1828(o)(4) provides that
283
 Compare id. at 1917 (text of 12 C.F.R. § 34.4) with 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2003).
See supra notes 19–32 and accompanying text. 
284
 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a). 
285
 Id. § 34.4(b). 
286
 The OCC claimed that its amendments to § 34.4 fall within its rulemaking power
under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2000). See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 1909–10. 
287
 12 U.S.C. § 371(a). 
288
 See id. § 1828(o)(2)(a). For the uniform interagency standards on real estate
lending adopted pursuant to § 1828(o), see 12 C.F.R. § 34.62(a)–(d), pt. 34 subpt.
D app. A (text of real estate lending standards for national banks as adopted by the
OCC pursuant to § 1828(o)); Real Estate Lending Standards, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890
(Dec. 31, 1992) (notice of final interagency standards on real estate lending adopted
by federal banking agencies pursuant to § 1828(o)). 
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these uniform standards cannot be changed unless they are “uniformly
amended by the appropriate Federal banking agencies, acting in
concert.”289 
Thus, § 1828(o) expressly limits the rulemaking authority granted
to the OCC under § 371(a). Section 1828(o) does not include any
statement of a congressional intent to “occupy the field” of real estate
lending by FDIC-insured depository institutions. Instead, § 1828(o)
indicates a congressional purpose to ensure that all FDIC-insured
institutions—including national and state banks—have an equal com-
petitive opportunity to make real estate loans based on the same
“uniform standards,” which cannot be altered unless they are “uni-
formly amended” by all federal banking agencies. Significantly, the
uniform interagency standards established under § 1828(o) require
each FDIC-insured institution to adopt lending policies that take into
account “[c]ompliance with all real estate related laws and regula-
tions,” a phrase that on its face includes applicable state laws.290 Thus,
the uniform interagency standards do not allow the OCC to issue
regulations under § 371(a) that provide national banks with a general
exemption from state laws related to real estate transactions.
Prior to 1991, § 371(a) authorized national banks to make real estate
loans “subject to such terms, conditions, and limitations as may be
prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency by order, rule, or
regulation.”291 In 1982 Congress amended § 371(a) by repealing
statutory provisions that previously specified maximum loan-to-value
(“LTV”) ratios, amortization requirements, maturity requirements,
aggregate lending limits, and leasehold collateral requirements for real
estate loans made by national banks. In place of these statutory
requirements, the 1982 amendment to § 371(a) gave the OCC sole
discretion to determine the “terms, conditions, and limitations” that
would govern real estate lending by national banks.292 In 1983 the
289
 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o)(4) (emphasis added). 
290
 See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 34 subpt. D app. A (OCC uniform standards for national
banks, under the heading “Loan Portfolio Management Considerations”) (emphasis
added). 
291
 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (1988). 
292
 Act of Oct. 15, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 403(a), 96 Stat. 1469, 1510 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371(a)); S. REP. NO. 97-536, at 27, 60 (1982), reprinted
in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3054, 3080, 3113; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed.
Reg. 10,068, 10,068–69 (proposed Mar. 10, 1983) (OCC notice of proposed
rulemaking, explaining the quantitative restrictions on real estate lending that were
removed by Congress in 1982). 
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OCC issued new real estate lending rules, which removed all quantita-
tive restrictions on real estate lending and allowed national bank
managers to exercise business judgment in setting the terms of their
real estate loans.293 
In 1991 Congress adopted § 1828(o) and amended § 371(a) to
require national banks to comply with the uniform interagency
standards mandated by § 1828(o).294 In contrast to the broad authority
granted to the OCC in 1982, the current language of § 371(a) makes
clear that (i) the uniform interagency standards approved under
§ 1828(o) establish the primary guidelines for real estate lending by
national banks and (ii) the OCC has authority to prescribe, by regula-
tion or order, only such additional “restrictions and requirements” as
are consistent with the uniform standards mandated by § 1828(o).
Thus, the OCC’s rulemaking authority under § 371(a) is currently far
more circumscribed than it was prior to 1991.
In 1992, when the federal banking agencies adopted the uniform
standards required by § 1828(o), the agencies recognized that (i) the
“flexible approach” adopted by the OCC in its 1983 rules allowed
national banks to make “imprudent” real estate loans and
(ii) widespread defaults on those loans inflicted massive losses on both
national banks and the deposit insurance fund in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The agencies explained that the new uniform standards
would impose prudential requirements on national banks for the
purpose of preventing any recurrence of the “abusive” lending prac-
tices that occurred under the OCC’s permissive 1983 rules.295 
293
 See Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698 (Sept. 9, 1983) (rulemaking notice contain-
ing the real estate lending regulations adopted by the OCC in 1983). 
294
 Act of Dec. 19, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 304, 105 Stat. 2354 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(o), 371(a)). 
295
 In the preamble to the notice of final rulemaking for the uniform standards,
the federal banking agencies stated: “The legislative history of [§ 1828(o)] indicates
that Congress wanted to curtail abusive real estate lending practices in order to reduce
risk to the deposit insurance funds and enhance the safety and soundness of insured
depository institutions.” Final Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,890, pt. II(A) (Dec. 31, 1992).
Previously, when the OCC requested comments on the uniform standards as
originally proposed, the OCC explained the reasons for Congress’s decision to require
the new standards:  
Prior to 1982, national bank real estate lending was governed by statutory
and regulatory requirements relating to five aspects of lending activity: Loan-
to-value (LTV) ratios, amortization requirements, maturity requirements,
aggregate limits, and leasehold requirements. The Garn-St. Germain Deposi-
tory Institutions Act of 1982 removed statutory restrictions on real estate
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The original version of 12 C.F.R. § 34.4—which deals with the issue
of preemption in the context of real estate lending—was adopted by
the OCC as part of its 1983 rules.296 The preamble to the 1983 rules
stated that the OCC was removing quantitative restrictions on national
bank real estate loans in five areas where Congress removed statutory
restraints—viz., limits on LTV ratios, amortization requirements,
maturity requirements, aggregate lending limits, and leasehold collat-
eral requirements.297 The preamble also explained that § 34.4(a)
would preempt state laws in the same five areas because the applica-
tion of state laws in those areas would “conflict . . . with Congressio-
nal intent” by “imposing, on national banks, restrictions similar to
those eliminated.”298 The OCC emphasized that preemption created
by the 1983 version of § 34.4 would have only a “limited scope”:
The [OCC] is preempting, at this time, only those state laws that
govern those areas in which federal limitations and restrictions are
eliminated. This is to precluce [sic] any conflict of state law with
lending by national banks. The OCC was given authority [under amended
§ 371(a)] to impose conditions and limitations by regulation or order.  
In 1983, the OCC rescinded the existing regulations on real estate lending,
including loan-to-value ratios. . . . [I]t was felt that prudent lending and the
safety and soundness of the national banks were better served by a flexible
approach that allowed institutions to tailor their policies to differences in
market conditions and management philosophies, rather than strict quantitative
standards applied uniformly to all institutions. As the OCC stated at the time,
“Decisions concerning the forms and terms of national bank lending are
properly the responsibility of each bank’s directorate and management.”  
. . . .  
In subsequent years, some institutions made imprudent real estate-related
loans that required little or no equity investment on the part of the borrower,
with costly consequences to financial institutions, the real estate industry, and
the federal bank and thrift insurance funds. The proposed regulation [adopting
uniform standards as required by Congress under § 1828(o)], which would
limit LTV ratios for real estate lending, is intended to insure that this problem
does not recur.  
Proposed Rule, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,911 pt. II(A) (Aug. 17, 1992). For discussions of
(i) the high-risk real estate loans made possible by the OCC’s 1983 rules and (ii) the
huge loan losses and bank failures that followed, see, for example, 1 FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES: LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 9–10, 137–62, 291–
378 (1997); L. WILLIAM SEIDMAN, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE GREAT S&L
DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS 138–64 (1993). 
296
 Final Rule, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,698, 40,701–02 (Sept. 9, 1983). 
297
 Id. at 40,698–700. 
298
 Id. 
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Congressional intent and the intent of the [OCC] in removing the
regulatory restrictions. The final rule clarifies the limited scope of the
preemption. Aside from the specific preemption of state law as to the
restrictions discussed, the relationship between state and federal law
in regard to real estate loans as it existed prior to the amendment
of 12 U.S.C. 371 is expected to remain unchanged.299 
Thus, the OCC’s 1983 rules recognized that Congress had not
expressed any intent to bar the states from regulating real estate loans
made by national banks with respect to matters falling outside the five
designated areas. The OCC adopted its 1983 rules shortly after a
federal appeals court issued its decision in CSBS v. Conover.300 In
that case, the court upheld OCC regulations preempting state laws that
limited the ability of national banks to make adjustable-rate mortgage
loans. The decision in Conover was based entirely on principles of
conflict preemption and did not indicate that the OCC could authorize
a blanket preemption of state laws with respect to real estate lending
under § 371(a).301 Thus, the “limited scope” of the preemption
announced in the OCC’s 1983 rules was consistent with the court’s
reliance on conflict preemption principles in Conover.
Similarly, when the OCC amended § 34.4 in 1996, the OCC
declared that its amendment “summarize[d] the OCC’s general ap-
proach to questions of Federal preemption of State laws governing
real estate lending” while emphasizing that this clarification “[did] not
expand the scope of State law preemption beyond what appear[ed]
in the [former] rule.302 Thus, from 1983 through 1996 the OCC
followed a consistent approach that disclaimed any intent to “occupy
the field” of real estate lending and instead preempted state laws only
in five specific areas.
When Congress passed the Riegle-Neal Act in 1994, it clearly
understood that the OCC did not have authority to bar the states from
regulating real estate loans made by national banks. As discussed
above, the conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act endorsed “well-
established judicial principles” favoring the application of state laws
299
 Id. at 40,700 (emphasis added). 
300
 710 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
301
 See id. at 883 (stating that “it was undisputed that the [state] banking laws conflict
with the Comptroller’s regulations,” and observing that “state laws are generally
applicable to national banks only to the extent that they do not conflict with federal
law, whether statutory or administrative”). 
302
 Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,353, 35,354 (proposed
July 7, 1995). 
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to the activities of national banks.303 The conference report declared
that “States have a legitimate interest in protecting the rights of their
consumers, businesses and communities,” and it also expressed a
strong “Congressional concern” with respect to federal agency actions
preempting state laws in the following four areas: community reinvest-
ment, consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment of intrastate
branches.304 The Riegle-Neal Act included provisions that
(i) generally require local branches of out-of-state national banks to
comply with nondiscriminatory host state laws in the four designated
areas and (ii) require the OCC to publish a notice and solicit comments
from the public whenever the OCC intends to issue a ruling declaring
that state laws are preempted in any of the same four areas.305 
Because the Riegle-Neal Act endorsed the general application of
state laws to national banks in the areas of community reinvestment,
consumer protection, and fair lending, Congress obviously did not
intend for the OCC to issue regulations that preempt all state laws
placing “conditions” on real estate loans made by national banks.
Congress’s understanding regarding the presumptive application of
state laws to the real estate lending activities of national banks was
based on the judicial precedents discussed in Parts III.A and III.B.3.306
Congress’s understanding was also consistent with the OCC’s dis-
claimer of any intent to preempt state laws except in five specific areas
when it adopted its real estate lending regulation in 1983.
In the preamble to its new preemption rules, the OCC argued that
state lending laws should be generally preempted because “[m]arkets
for credit (both consumer and commercial) . . . are now national, if
not international, in scope” and “the elimination of legal and other
barriers to interstate banking . . . has led a number of banking
303
 See supra note 164 and accompanying text (quoting the conference report in
the Riegle-Neal Act). 
304
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53–54 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074–75. 
305
 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(f), 43(a) (2000); see also supra notes 165–68 and accompany-
ing text (discussing §§ 36(f) and 43(a)). 
306
 See, e.g., McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 356–61 (1896) (holding that
national banks must comply with a state law that prohibited banks from accepting
preferential transfers of real estate made by insolvent debtors); Nat’l State Bank v.
Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985–87 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that national banks must make
home mortgage loans in compliance with a state anti-redlining statute); see also supra
notes 171–72 and accompanying text (citing additional court decisions upholding the
presumptive application of state laws to national banks). 
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organizations to operate . . . on a multi-state or nationwide basis.”307
According to the OCC, these developments made it imperative for the
OCC to “enable national banks to operate to the full extent of their
powers under Federal law, without interference from inconsistent state
laws, consistent with the national character of the national banking
system.”308 The OCC’s argument is untenable because it contravenes
the clear intent of Congress when it adopted the Riegle-Neal Act. As
discussed above, the Riegle-Neal Act generally requires out-of-state
branches of national banks to comply with host state laws in four
designated areas (including three areas that are directly related to
lending). In addition, the conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act
declared that Congress’s approval of nationwide bank acquisitions and
nationwide branching would not change “judicially established princi-
ples” that supported the general application of state laws to national
banks.309 Thus, in 1994 Congress mandated that state laws would
continue to apply to lending activities of national banks in multistate
markets. The OCC cannot override Congress’s policy judgment on
this matter.310 
Courts generally presume that Congress is aware of relevant judicial
decisions and administrative rulings when it enacts legislation.311 In
the case of the Riegle-Neal Act, this presumption of congressional
knowledge is specifically confirmed by the conference report, which
endorsed “well-established judicial principles” favoring the application
of state laws to national banks.312 In a similar case where a federal
agency consistently followed a policy of exercising only limited
regulatory powers over a designated field and where Congress ap-
proved the agency’s policy, the Supreme Court held that the agency
could not thereafter abandon that policy and seek to enlarge its
307
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1907, 1908. 
308
 Id. at 1908. 
309
 See supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text. 
310
 See Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1986)
(holding that the FRB’s “rulemaking power is limited to adopting regulations to carry
into effect the will of Congress as expressed in the statute”; consequently, the FRB
could not rely on its view of the “plain purpose” of the Bank Holding Company Act
(“BHCA”) to justify rules that exceeded the FRB’s authority under the “plain
language” of the BHCA). 
311
 E.g., Lindahl v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 470 U.S. 768, 782–83, 782 n.15 (1985);
Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580–82 (1978). 
312
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2068, 2074; see also supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting
the conference report). 
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regulatory jurisdiction.313 In view of the OCC’s decisions in 1983 and
1996 not to mandate a blanket preemption of state laws in the area
of real estate lending and Congress’s agreement with that policy in
1994, the OCC’s recent amendments to 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 clearly
exceed the agency’s authority under § 371(a).
2. The OCC Has No Authority to Preempt
Nondiscriminatory State Laws That Are Reasonably
Designed to Prevent Abusive and Unsound Lending
Practices
The OCC declared in 2003 that Georgia’s predatory lending law
was completely preempted with respect to national banks.314 Amended
§ 34.4 is designed to override similar state predatory lending laws
based on the OCC’s view that such laws impose burdensome “condi-
tions” on national banks.315 Notwithstanding its eagerness to preempt
state predatory lending laws, to date the OCC has issued only one
mandatory regulation to deal with the problem of predatory lending.316
That rule, contained in amended § 34.3(b), prohibits national banks
from making real estate loans “based predominantly on the bank’s
realization of the foreclosure or liquidation value of the borrower’s
collateral, without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay the loan
according to its terms.”317 
Even this single compulsory rule is weaker than it first appears. The
OCC explained that the rule does not prevent a national bank from
determining “a borrower’s ability to repay” based on the borrower’s
“net worth, [and] other relevant financial resources.”318 Thus, a
313
 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143–61 (2000)
(holding that the FDA lacked authority to adopt rules regulating cigarettes as a device
for dispensing nicotine, because (i) prior to adopting the challenged rules, the FDA
had repeatedly disclaimed any authority to regulate cigarettes as drugs; and
(ii) Congress had followed a consistent policy of allowing cigarettes to be sold without
FDA regulation, subject to (a) labeling requirements and other public warnings about
the health hazards of smoking, and (b) restrictions on marketing and advertising). 
314
 See supra note 26 (discussing the OCC’s preemption of the GFLA in OCC
Docket 03-17). 
315
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1908, 1913 (expressing
concerns that “state and local anti-predatory lending laws” were having a “detrimental
effect” on national banks, and indicating that such laws “are not applicable to national
banks’ operations” under the OCC’s new preemption rules). 
316
 Id. at 1917. 
317
 Id. (text of amended 12 C.F.R. § 34.3(b)). 
318
 Id. at 1911. 
[Vol. 23: 225ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW306
 0082 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 269    314/348 
national bank can make a loan that (i) the bank does not expect to
be paid from the borrower’s available income and (ii) the bank expects
to collect by levying against the borrower’s financial resources and
other personal property (including savings accounts, retirement ac-
counts, automobiles and household furnishings), as long as the bank
does not depend “predominantly” on the expected foreclosure or
liquidation value of the borrower’s collateral. Thus, the OCC’s rule
does not prohibit real estate loans that (i) provide a clear opportunity
for abusive lending practices with regard to retired persons and other
persons living on limited incomes and (ii) potentially place the
borrower’s home at risk, as long as the lending bank relies on
additional financial resources and personal property of the borrower
that are not pledged as collateral for the loan.
The OCC also adopted a rule prohibiting national banks from
engaging in “unfair or deceptive trade practices within the meaning
of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act”319 and regulations
adopted thereunder by the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”).320
However, the OCC greatly weakened the effect of this rule by
declaring that, “we lack the authority . . . to specify by regulation
that particular practices, such as loan ‘flipping’ or ‘equity stripping’
are unfair or deceptive . . . . [T]he OCC does not have rulemaking
authority to define specific practices as unfair or deceptive under
section 5.”321 While disclaiming any authority to identify specific
predatory lending practices as “unfair or deceptive” under the FTC
Act, the OCC did not even consider whether it has a comparable
authority to designate such abuses as “unsafe or unsound practices”
for purposes of its enforcement powers under 12 U.S.C. § 1818.
As a consequence of its decision to refrain from issuing mandatory
rules, except for § 34.3(b), the OCC’s standards for combating
predatory lending are primarily contained in two advisory letters the
agency issued in 2003.322 Those advisory letters merely provide
“supervisory guidance” to national banks and do not impose any
mandatory restrictions or requirements that would qualify as “regula-
tion[s] or order[s]” within the scope of the OCC’s rulemaking authority
319
 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2000). 
320
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1917 (text of amended 12
C.F.R. § 34.3(c)). 
321
 Id. at 1911 n.55. 
322
 See id. at 1913 (citing OCC Advisory Letter 2003-2, Feb. 21, 2003 [hereinafter
OCC AL 2003-2]; OCC Advisory Letter 2003-3, Feb. 21, 2003 [hereinafter OCC
AL 2003-3]). 
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under 12 U.S.C. § 371(a).323 The “supervisory guidance” in the OCC’s
advisory letters only provides “advice on how national banks should
avoid engaging in [predatory lending] practices.”324 The precatory and
non-compulsory nature of the OCC’s advisory letters is made clear
by the agency’s statement that it “encourages national banks to adopt
policies and procedures to address, and in practice to avoid, engaging
in loan practices that may be abusive, unfair or deceptive.”325 
Federal officials recognize that the explosive growth in subprime
mortgage loans over the past decade has led to a significant increase
in predatory lending abuses.326 Subprime mortgage originations “grew
by a factor of seven over the 1994–2002 period” and reached $241
billion in 2002, representing almost one-tenth of the total home
mortgage market.327 Regulators and industry analysts agree that
predatory lending practices occur most frequently in the subprime
lending market. Those predatory lending practices include: (i) loan
flipping (i.e., frequent refinancing of high-cost home loans); (ii) equity
stripping (i.e., the loss of equity resulting from repeated refinancing
323
 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (requiring real estate loans by national banks to comply
with “such restrictions and requirements as the [OCC] may prescribe by regulation
or order”) (emphasis added); see also 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE §§ 6.3, 8.1 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining that federal agency “rules” and
“orders” have legally binding effect, in contrast to non-binding statements of policy).
324
 OCC AL 2003-2, supra note 322, at 1, 2 (emphasis added). 
325
 Id. at 9 (emphasis added); see also OCC AL 2003-3, supra note 322, at 2 (stat-
ing that “this advisory letter provides specific recommendations for accomplishing
these objectives”) (emphasis added). 
326
 See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, CURB-
ING PREDATORY HOME LENDING, 2–9, 17–22, 73–78, 89–100 (June 2000) [hereinafter
HUD-TREASURY REPORT], available at http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18; see
also U.S. GEN. ACCT’G OFF., CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING, Jan. 2004, GAO-
04-280 [hereinafter GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT], available at http://
www.gao.gov, at 21–22 (stating that “federal officials and consumer advocates have
expressed concerns that the overall growth in subprime lending and home equity
lending in general has been accompanied by a corresponding increase in predatory
lending”). 
327
 Speech by Governor Edward M. Gramlich, An Update on the Predatory Lending
Issue, at 1–2 (Oct. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Gramlich Predatory Lending Speech],
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov (under the heading “Speeches by Federal
Reserve Board members”); see also Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale
of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV.
1255, 1273–79 (2002) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy, Three Markets] (discussing
factors that have encouraged the rapid growth in subprime lending); Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 139, at 388–98 (same). 
[Vol. 23: 225ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW308
 0084 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 275    324/358 
that requires the borrower to pay high fees and closing costs);
(iii) asset-based lending (i.e., the extension of credit based primarily
on the residual value of the borrower’s home and other personal assets
without regard to the borrower’s income); (iv) excessive fees and
penalty charges; (v) high-pressure sales tactics accompanied by inade-
quate or misleading disclosures; and (vi) aggressive foreclosure poli-
cies.328 
The OCC has condemned “abusive” lending practices that “take
unfair advantage of borrowers, . . . have a detrimental impact on
communities,” or “involve unfair and deceptive conduct.”329 The
OCC’s recent advisory letters warn national banks that they should
follow policies that avoid the risks of making loans with “features or
circumstances that have been associated with abusive lending prac-
tices, including the following: . . . [s]ingle-premium credit life
insurance or other products; . . . [f]inancing points, fees, penalties,
and other charges; [and i]nterest rate increases upon default.”330 The
advisory letters point out that these “abusive lending practices” have
often been used to accomplish predatory lending strategies such as
loan flipping and equity stripping.331 In addition, the OCC’s advisory
letters admonish national banks about the risks of making loans with
“features or circumstances that have been associated with abusive
328
 See Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 327, at 1280–86, 1293–94,
1297–98; Gramlich Predatory Lending Speech, supra note 327, at 2–3; GAO
PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 326, at 18–22, 99–102; HUD-TREASURY
REPORT, supra note 326, at 2–9, 17–22, 73–78, 89–100. The chair of the Coalition
for Fair and Affordable Lending, a trade association of mortgage lenders, recently
acknowledged that:  
Unfair and abusive practices do occur in the nonprime mortgage market, and
they must be stopped. Many such abuses, typically referred to as “predatory
lending,” involve fraud and other conduct already prohibited by law. Tougher
enforcement is clearly needed, as are better financial education and counseling
programs. However, other questionable practices are not adequately regulated,
and new legislative safeguards are needed.  
Steve Nadon, Comment: Stopping Predators Without Hindering Legitimate Lending,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 3, 2003, at 30. 
329
 OCC AL 2003-2, supra note 322, at 1. In the preamble to its final preemption
rules, the OCC acknowledged that “predatory and abusive lending practices are
inconsistent with national objectives of encouraging home ownership and community
revitalization, and can be devastating to individuals, families and communities.” OCC
Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913. 
330
 Id. at 8; see also OCC AL 2003-3, supra note 322, at 7. 
331
 See OCC AL 2003-2, supra note 322, at 2-6; OCC AL 2003-3, supra note
322, at 2-5. 
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lending practices, including the following: . . . [n]egative amortiza-
tion; [b]alloon payments in short-term transactions; [p]repayment
penalties that are not limited to the early years of a loan; [f]inancing
points, fees, penalties, and other charges; [and i]nterest rate increases
upon default.”332 The advisory letters also acknowledge that many
borrowers do not receive adequate disclosures and do not possess
enough sophistication to understand the risks inherent in home loans
that carry high interest rates and costly fee structures.333 
Thus, the OCC’s advisory letters expressly acknowledge the threat
that predatory lending poses to consumers, especially lower-income
borrowers who do not possess a high degree of sophistication in
financial matters. Nevertheless, the OCC has declined to adopt
mandatory regulations to prevent predatory lending except for a single
rule that bars national banks from making real estate loans based
“predominantly” on the expected foreclosure or liquidation value of
the borrowers’ collateral.334 
Since the OCC has largely declined to adopt mandatory standards
to stop predatory lending, the OCC cannot point to any actual conflict
between its precatory “supervisory guidance” and state predatory
lending laws that do impose binding rules. Accordingly, the OCC has
no reasonable basis under § 371(a) to preempt state laws that apply
evenhandedly to all real estate lenders and are reasonably calculated
to prevent the same types of predatory lending practices the OCC itself
has condemned.335 Indeed, two recent studies conclude that North
332
 OCC AL 2003-2, supra note 322, at 8; see also OCC AL 2003-3, supra note
322, at 7. 
333
 See OCC AL 2003-2, supra note 322, at 2-8; OCC AL 2003-3, supra note
322, at 2-5; see also HUD-TREASURY REPORT, supra note 326, at 2–9, 17–22, 62–68,
73–78, 89–100. The HUD-Treasury Report found that prospective borrowers consider-
ing subprime, high-cost home loans would benefit greatly from “pre-transaction
counseling,” because “[t]estimony . . . from borrowers who received abusive loans
revealed that, in almost every case, the borrower did not understand all the terms
of the loan.” Id. at 57–62 (quoting at 60). However, some analysts have questioned
the potential effectiveness of pre-transaction counseling, given the complex terms of
most subprime loans and the relative lack of sophistication of many subprime
borrowers. See Engel & McCoy, Three Markets, supra note 327, at 1285–86, 1309–11;
GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 326, at 13–14, 94–98. 
334
 See supra notes 317–25 and accompanying text. 
335
 See infra notes 337–42, 403–05 and accompanying text (citing federal statutes
and cases that affirm the states’ authority to enact laws prohibiting mortgage lenders
from engaging in predatory lending and other unconscionable lending practices); see
also GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 326, at 58–67 (reporting that
as of Jan. 9, 2004, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia had adopted laws
addressing predatory lending practices). 
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Carolina’s predatory lending statute, enacted in 1999, has been
effective in reducing the incidence of abusive subprime lending
practices in that state.336 
Two federal statutes support the application of state predatory
lending laws to national banks. As the OCC recognizes, national banks
engaging in abusive practices associated with high-cost home loans
are likely to violate the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
(“HOEPA”)337 and section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
(“FTC Act”).338 Significantly, both HOEPA and section 5 of the FTC
Act permit the states to enact their own laws to prevent predatory
lending practices. HOEPA preserves the right of each state to enact
supplemental laws governing fees, charges, and other terms of home
mortgages as long as such laws do not conflict with HOEPA’s
provisions.339 Similarly, the courts have held that section 5 of the FTC
336
 See Richard Cowden, Researchers Find North Carolina Law Has Reduced Cer-
tain Lending Practices, 80 Banking Rep. 892 (BNA) (June 2, 2003) (reporting on
Walter R. Davis’s oral presentation of a study that concluded that North Carolina’s
statute reduced the frequency of “subprime lending practices that have been criticized
as constituting predatory lending”); Gramlich Predatory Lending Speech, supra note
326, at 5 (discussing results of the same study and a second recent study, both of
which concluded that North Carolina’s statute (i) has resulted in “a reduced presence
of [subprime] credit with abusive terms” and (ii) “has been effective in deterring
lenders who use predatory practices”). The OCC has criticized certain aspects of the
data used in the first study. See OCC Docket 03-17, supra note 26, 68 Fed. Reg.
at 46,271 n.26 (discussing study co-authored by Walter R. Davis, Roberto G. Quercia,
and Michael A. Stegman). 
337
 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325,
§§ 151–158, 108 Stat. 2160, 2190 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
338
 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2000). The OCC has admonished national banks that they must
comply with HOEPA and section 5 of the FTC Act. See OCC Docket 04-04, supra
note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1917 (text of amended 12 C.F.R. § 34.3(c)); OCC AL 2003-2,
supra note 321, at 4–6; OCC AL 2003-3, supra note 321, at 4–5. 
339
 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b). As Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins point out, the Seventh
Circuit has held that HOEPA’s “savings clause” for state regulation (contained in
15 U.S.C. § 1610(b)) does not prevent state laws from being subject to potential
preemption under the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, 12 U.S.C.
§§ 3801–3806 (“AMTPA”). See Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 402–03 (citing
Ill. Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers v. Office of Banks and Real Estate, 308 F.3d 762
(7th Cir. 2002)). However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision does not foreclose the
significance of HOEPA in defining the scope of the OCC’s authority to preempt state
laws under the NBA. In Illinois Ass’n of Mortgage Brokers, the Seventh Circuit
pointed out that AMTPA authorizes non-federally chartered housing creditors to enter
into “alternative mortgage transactions” in accordance with “applicable” regulations
of the OTS, “notwithstanding any State constitution, law, or regulation.” 308 F.3d
at 766 (quoting 12 U.S.C. §§ 3802(1), 3803(c)). As the Seventh Circuit observed,
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Act does not “occupy the field of consumer protection.”340 Therefore,
the states may enact supplemental consumer protection laws—
including protections in the area of home mortgage lending—as long
as those laws do not conflict with the regulations of the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) under section 5.341 HOEPA and section 5 of
the FTC Act provide additional evidence that (i) the OCC does not
have authority to preempt state laws that are reasonably designed to
prevent banks from engaging in predatory lending and (ii) the uniform
real estate lending standards under 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o) incorporate
applicable state laws when they instruct FDIC-insured institutions to
act in “[c]ompliance with all real estate related laws and regula-
tions.”342 
In § 1828(o) Congress instructed the federal banking agencies to
adopt uniform standards for real estate lending that take account of
(i) “the risk [that real estate loans present] to the deposit insurance
funds” and (ii) “the need for safe and sound operation of insured
depository institutions.”343 Subprime lending has proven to be a very
risky business. Subprime loans entail a much higher risk of default,
and subprime lending is frequently combined with hazardous securit-
ization techniques. The four most costly bank failures since 1997—
resulting in total losses to the FDIC of $1.7 billion—involved
“Nothing could be clearer . . . . § 3803(c) is as express as a preemption clause gets.”
Id. In contrast to AMTPA’s unambiguous grant of preemptive rulemaking power to
the OTS, the NBA does not give any comparable authority to the OCC. As shown
above in Parts III.B.4 and III.E.1, the OCC does not have power under 12 U.S.C.
§§ 93a and 371(a) to adopt rules giving national banks a general immunity from state
regulation. In fact, the OCC’s rulemaking power under § 371(a) with respect to real
estate loans is expressly limited by the uniform interagency standards established under
12 U.S.C. § 1828(o). As previously noted, those interagency standards require national
banks to observe “all real estate related laws and regulations,” a phrase that on its
face incorporates HOEPA (including HOEPA’s savings clause for state regulation
contained in 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b)). See supra notes 286–95 and accompanying text.
340
 Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 989–91 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986). 
341
 See, e.g., id. at 990; United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d
192, 200–04 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that section 5 of the FTC Act did not preempt
a Massachusetts regulation prohibiting unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable practices
in mortgage lending). 
342
 See 12 C.F.R. pt. 34 subpt. D app. A; see also supra note 290 and accompanying
text (quoting the foregoing provision of the interagency uniform standards on real
estate lending); supra notes 286–95 and accompanying text (describing the limits
imposed by § 1828(o) on the OCC’s rulemaking authority under § 371(a)). 
343
 12 U.S.C. § 1828(o)(2)(A)(i), (ii). 
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institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and securitization.344
Federal agencies chartered three of the four failed institutions—First
National Bank of Keystone and Nextbank were chartered by the OCC
and Superior Bank, FSB was chartered by the OTS.345 After reviewing
the four failures, government officials determined that subprime
lending and securitization present a high degree of risk to federal
deposit insurance funds.346 Officials also concluded that federal
supervision of the four failed banks was inadequate and, in each case,
did not identify the risk of failure in a timely manner.347 
344
 For discussions of the failures of all four banks, see FDIC, Off. Inspector Gen.,
The Failure of BestBank, Boulder, Colorado, Audit Rep. No. 99-005, Jan. 22, 1999
[hereinafter FDIC-OIG BestBank Report], available at http://www.fdic.gov/oig/a-
rep99/99-005.html; FDIC, Off. Inspector Gen., Issues Related to the Failure of
Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois, Audit Rep. 02-005 (Feb. 6, 2002) [hereinafter
FDIC-OIG Superior Bank Report], available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reports02/02-
005-508.shtml; U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., Bank Regulation: Analysis of the Failure of
Superior Bank, FSB, Hinsdale, Illinois, GAO-02-419T (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter
GAO Superior Bank Report], available at http://www.gao.gov; U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Off.
Inspector Gen., Material Loss Review of The First National Bank of Keystone, OIG-
00-067, Mar. 10, 2000 [hereinafter Treasury-OIG Keystone Report], available at http:/
/www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/Lessons_Learned/Loss_Reviews.html; U.S. Treas.
Dep’t, Material Loss Review of Superior Bank, FSB, OIG-02-040, Feb. 6, 2002
[hereinafter Treasury Superior Bank Report], available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/
conferences/Lessons_Learned/Loss_Reviews.html; U.S. Treas. Dep’t, Material Loss
Review of Nextbank, OIG-03-024, Nov. 26, 2002 [hereinafter Treasury Nextbank
Report], available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/Lessons_Learned/
Loss_Reviews.htm.  
A recent FDIC staff study concluded that the FDIC suffered $1.7 billion of estimated
losses as a result of these four bank failures. Those losses accounted for eighty percent
of the FDIC’s total losses from bank failures occurring during 1997–2002. See Richard
Salmon et al., Costs Associated with Bank Failures, Oct. 10, 2003, at 1, 7 (tbl. 3),
9–12, available at http://www.swgsb.org/fdic/fdic3.pdf (staff study of thirty-four bank
failures occurring during 1997–2002, prepared by the FDIC’s Division of Resolutions
and Receiverships). 
345
 See FDIC-OIG Superior Bank Report, supra note 344; GAO Superior Bank
Report, supra note 344; Treasury-OIG Keystone Report, supra note 344; Treasury
Superior Bank Report, supra note 344; Treasury Nextbank Report, supra note 344.
The fourth major failure of a bank that was heavily involved in subprime lending
was BestBank, a Colorado state-chartered, FDIC-insured bank that failed in 1998.
See FDIC-OIG BestBank Report, supra note 344. 
346
 FDIC-OIG BestBank Report, supra note 344; FDIC-OIG Superior Bank Report,
supra note 344; GAO Superior Bank Report, supra note 344; Treasury-OIG Keystone
Report, supra note 344; Treasury Superior Bank Report, supra note 344; Treasury
Nextbank Report, supra note 344. 
347
 FDIC-OIG BestBank Report, supra note 344; FDIC-OIG Superior Bank Report,
supra note 344; GAO Superior Bank Report, supra note 344; Treasury-OIG Keystone
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An institution engaging in predatory lending is likely to confront
a significantly higher risk of litigation, defaults, and losses from its
subprime loans. For example, many borrowers who obtained subprime
mortgage loans from Superior Bank subsequently filed lawsuits
alleging predatory lending practices.348 Superior Bank’s failure was
due in part to high rates of delinquency and default on its subprime
loans.349 Accordingly, state predatory lending laws benefit the bank-
ing system by (i) discouraging subprime loans involving excessive
default risks and (ii) advancing the congressional purposes of protect-
ing the deposit insurance funds and promoting safe and sound lending,
as mandated by § 1828(o)(2)(A). The OCC has no authority under
§ 371(a) to override state laws whose application to national banks
is consistent with § 1828(o).350 
In the preamble to its recent preemption rules, the OCC stated that
“we have no reason to believe that [predatory lending] practices are
occurring in the national banking system to any significant degree.”351
The accuracy of that statement is open to serious question. Currently,
most of the largest subprime mortgage lenders are nonbank affiliates
of major bank holding companies.352 Citigroup became the largest
subprime lender in the nation when it acquired Associates First Capital
in 2000, and Citigroup agreed to acquire another large subprime
lending unit in November 2003.353 Allegations of illegal or abusive
Report, supra note 344; Treasury Superior Bank Report, supra note 344; Treasury
Nextbank Report, supra note 344. 
348
 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The CRA Implications of Preda-
tory Lending, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1571, 1576 (2002) [hereinafter Engel & McCoy,
CRA Implications]. 
349
 See FDIC-OIG Superior Bank Report, supra note 344, at 12–18, 54–67. 
350
 See supra notes 287–90, 294–95 and accompanying text. 
351
 OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1914. Despite this statement,
the OCC reported that since June 2000 it had taken enforcement actions against several
national banks “to address unfair or deceptive [lending] practices and consumer harm.”
Id. 
352
 In 2000 eight of the ten largest subprime mortgage lenders were nonbank affili-
ates of bank holding companies. The eight parent holding companies included Bank
of America Corp., Citigroup, Inc., First Union Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co., which
had very large national bank subsidiaries. Engel & McCoy, CRA Implications, supra
note 348, at 1585, 1585 n.69. During 2001 Bank of America was the largest issuer
and underwriter of securities backed by pools of subprime mortgage loans. Richard
Cowden, Fair Lending: Secondary Mortgage Market Said to Hold Key to Support
Predatory Lending Practices, 78 Banking Rep. (BNA) 718 (Apr. 22, 2002). 
353
 See Wilmarth, Transformation, supra note 139, at 393, 402 (discussing Citig-
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subprime lending practices have been filed against Bank of America,
Bank One, Chase, Citibank, Fleet Bank, National City Bank, and Wells
Fargo or against their affiliates.354 In 2002, Citigroup paid $240
million to settle claims of predatory lending filed against Associates
First Capital by the FTC and consumers.355 Two years earlier,
Providian National Bank, a large credit card bank, paid $300 million
to settle allegations of predatory lending conduct.356 The foregoing
evidence indicates that (i) national banks are engaged to a very
significant degree, both directly and through their affiliates, in making
and securitizing subprime loans, and (ii) a number of those subprime
lending programs have produced serious allegations of abusive lending
practices.
roup’s acquisition of Associates); Mitchell Pacelle, Citigroup Spends $1.25 Billion
to Enlarge Subprime Presence, WALL ST. J., Nov. 25, 2003, at C12 (reporting that
Citigroup had agreed to acquire Washington Mutual’s consumer finance unit, for
which “much of the business is classified as subprime”). Citigroup’s aggressive
expansion into subprime consumer lending appears to be part of a broader trend among
major banks. For example, HSBC, the world’s second-largest bank, which has a
substantial presence in the United States, agreed to acquire Household International,
a major subprime consumer finance company, in late 2002. Erik Portanger et al.,
Buying American: HSBC to Acquire Lender in Big Bet on U.S. Economy, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 15, 2002, at A1. 
354
 See Engel & McCoy, CRA Implications, supra note 348, at 189–91 (discussing
allegations against FleetBoston (“Fleet”) and Citigroup); Engel & McCoy, Three
Markets, supra note 327, at 1296 (discussing allegations against a subsidiary of
Citigroup); GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT, supra note 326, at 37–38, 106 (app.
I) (describing FTC enforcement actions against Citigroup as successor to Associates
and against Fleet); Comments of the National Consumer Law Center et al. to the OCC,
filed in OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1 [hereinafter NCLC Comments], available
at http://www.nclc.org/initiatives, pt. II.A. (listing more than twenty court cases filed
against national banks or their affiliates, alleging “illegal or predatory lending
activities”); Congressional Review of OCC Preemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Oversight and Investigations, 108th Cong. 13-18 (2004) (testimony of Diana L.
Taylor, N.Y. Superintendent of Banks) [hereinafter Testimony of Diana L. Taylor]
(describing allegations of abusive or predatory lending practices filed against Fleet
and several other national banks or their affiliates). 
355
 See Rob Blackwell, Citi Execs on FTC Settlement: It’s Not About Golden State,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 20, 2002, at 1 (reporting that Citigroup had paid (i) $215 million
to settle predatory lending claims filed by the FTC against Associates, arising out
of loans made by Associates prior to its acquisition by Citigroup, and (ii) an additional
$25 million to settle similar claims asserted in a class-action lawsuit). 
356
 See Michele Heller, Providian’s $300M Pact with Regulators Is One for the
Books, AM. BANKER, June 29, 2000, at 4; Nicholas Kulish, Providian to Pay at Least
$300 Million To Settle Allegations on Card Operations, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2000,
at B12. 
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The states have acted vigorously in enforcing predatory lending
laws. State officials participated in the predatory lending investigations
that produced large settlements with Providian and First Alliance.357
State officials also obtained a settlement requiring Household Interna-
tional to pay nearly $500 million, the largest settlement ever secured
in a consumer-lending investigation.358 During 2003, state bank
supervisory agencies performed more than 20,000 investigations in
response to consumer complaints about abusive lending practices, and
those investigations produced more than 4,000 enforcement actions.359
The foregoing state enforcement efforts indicate that the states are
taking reasonable and effective measures to stop predatory lending.
Unfortunately, as discussed below in Part III.H.2, the OCC’s preemp-
tion and visitorial powers rules seriously impair the ability of state
officials to protect consumers against abusive lending practices
occurring at national banks and their operating subsidiaries.
F. The OCC Has No Authority to Implement a General
Preemption of State Laws with Regard to the Deposits,
Loans, and Operations of National Banks
Sections 7.4007 to 7.4009 of the OCC’s rules broadly preempt the
application of state laws to national banks in the areas of (i) accepting
deposits, (ii) making loans that are not secured by real estate, and
357
 Kulish, supra note 356, at B12 (reporting that the San Francisco district attor-
ney’s office and Connecticut’s attorney general took part in the investigations and
settlements related to Providian’s allegedly unfair and deceptive practices); Paul
Beckett, First Alliance Agrees To Large Settlement on Predatory Loans, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A6 (reporting that First Alliance Mortgage agreed to pay $60
million in a settlement with the FTC and several states). A former senior executive
in the credit card industry recently stated that “[a] California prosecutor . . .
embarrassed the OCC into taking action against Providian [National] Bank for
telemarketing and pricing practices that bordered on the criminal. For a decade
Providian had been well known in the [credit] card industry as the poster child of
abusive consumer practices, but apparently not to the OCC.” Duncan A. MacDonald,
Letters to the Editor, Comptroller Has Duty to Clean Up Card Pricing Mess, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 21, 2003, at 17 (letter from former general counsel of Citigroup’s
European and North American credit card businesses). 
358
 See Paul Beckett & Joseph T. Hallinan, Household May Pay $500 Million Over
‘Predatory’ Loan Practices, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2002, at A1 (reporting that
Household agreed to pay almost $500 million to settle predatory lending claims
presented by more than a dozen states); Portanger et al., supra note 353, at A10
(discussing Household settlement); see also GAO PREDATORY LENDING REPORT,
supra note 326, at 10, 62–63, 106–07 (app. I) (describing enforcement actions taken
by state officials to combat predatory lending). 
359
 See 2004 House Fin. Serv. Comm. Budget Res., supra note 279, at 16. 
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(iii) engaging in other activities authorized under federal law. In these
three areas, national banks are now subject only to a narrow subset
of state laws that “incidentally affect” their operations.360 Even this
subset of state laws will not be deemed “incidental” and will be
preempted if they “regulate the manner or content of the business of
banking authorized for national banks.”361 Thus, only helpful state
laws that “establish the legal infrastructure that makes practicable the
conduct of [the banking] business” will apply to national banks in the
areas of deposit-taking, unsecured lending and other “activities.”362
The OCC claims that, under 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(Seventh) and 93a, it
has power to adopt preemptive rules comparable to the OTS’s
regulations that override state laws.363 However, as shown below, the
OCC clearly lacks authority under those statutes to adopt §§ 7.4007
through 7.4009.
1. Sections 24(Seventh) and 93a Do Not Empower the
OCC to Adopt §§ 7.4007–7.4009
As shown in Parts III.A and III.B.3, state laws apply to the contracts
and dealings of national banks, including their deposit-taking and
lending activities, unless such laws discriminate against national banks
or create an impermissible conflict with federal law. In Luckett, for
example, the Supreme Court declared:
This Court has often pointed out that national banks are subject
to state laws, unless those laws infringe the national banking laws
or impose an undue burden on the performance of the banks’ functions
. . . . Thus, the mere fact that the depositor’s account is in a national
bank does not render it immune to attachment by the creditors of the
depositor, as authorized by state law. . . .
As we have seen, a bank account is a chose in action of the depositor
against the bank, which the latter is obligated to pay in accordance
with the terms of the deposit. It is a part of the mass of property within
the state whose transfer and devolution is subject to state control
360
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1916–17 (text of 12
C.F.R. §§ 7.4007–7.4009). State laws that could be deemed “incidental” would include
those dealing with contracts, torts, criminal law, rights to collect debts, acquisition
and transfer of property, taxation, and zoning. Id. (text of 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c),
7.4008(d), 7.4009(c)(2)). 
361
 Id. at 1913. 
362
 Id. 
363
 Id. at 1907, 1914; OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,129
n.91. 
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. . . . It has never been suggested that non-discriminatory laws of
this type are so burdensome as to be inapplicable to the accounts of
depositors in national banks.364 
Similarly, in McClellan the Supreme Court held that national banks
must comply with a Massachusetts statute that barred creditors from
accepting preferential transfers of property from insolvent debtors.365
The Court upheld the state law because (i) there was “no express
conflict” between the state statute and federal law and (ii) “[n]o
function of [national] banks is destroyed or hampered by allowing the
banks to take real estate, provided only they do so under the same
conditions and restrictions to which all other citizens of the State are
subjected.”366 
Two courts specifically rejected the notion that § 24(Seventh) of
the NBA mandates a general preemption of state laws affecting the
deposit-taking activities of national banks. In Perdue, for example,
the California Supreme Court held:
There is no comprehensive federal statutory scheme governing the
taking of deposits. There is one relevant statute, section 24 of the
[NBA], and that merely authorizes banks to accept deposits. Section
24 may by implication also authorize banks to charge for deposit-
related services as an incidental power necessary to carry on the
business of receiving deposits, but such implied authority does not
constitute a regulatory scheme so comprehensive as to displace state
law.367 
As the decision in Perdue also noted, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down state laws affecting the deposits of national banks only in cases
where such laws discriminated against, or otherwise significantly
interfered with, the ability of national banks to accept deposits.368 
364
 Anderson Nat’l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 248 (1944) (citations omitted);
see supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text (discussing Luckett). 
365
 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347 (1896). 
366
 Id. at 358. 
367
 Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 521 (Cal. 1985), appeal dismissed,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986); accord Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1049 (S.D. Fla. 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 822 (2000). 
368
 See Perdue, 702 P.2d at 521–22 (discussing Franklin National Bank v. New
York, 347 U.S. 373, 374 (1954), and First National Bank of San Jose v. California,
262 U.S. 366 (1923)). 
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The conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act demonstrates Con-
gress’s clear understanding that the OCC does not have authority to
implement any broad-scale preemption of state laws. As discussed in
Part III.B.3, the conference report endorsed “well-established judicial
principles” holding that (i) “national banks are subject to State law
in many significant respects” and (ii) a “rule of construction” should
be used that “avoids finding a conflict between the Federal and State
law where possible.”369 The conference report also criticized two
interpretive rulings in which the OCC asserted that state laws did not
apply to the deposit-taking activities of national banks. The conference
report declared that these rulings were “inappropriately aggressive,
resulting in preemption of State law in situations where the federal
interest did not warrant that result.”370 
In response to the criticism of the Riegle-Neal conferees, the OCC
rescinded an interpretive rule (former 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000) that pur-
ported to preempt all state laws affecting deposit account service
charges assessed by national banks.371 In the 1996 rulemaking notice
that rescinded § 7.8000, the OCC acknowledged the finding of the
Riegle-Neal conferees that:
the OCC had applied preemption principles in an overly broad manner
with respect to state laws that prohibit, limit, or restrict deposit account
service charges imposed by a national bank. In addition, the confer-
ence report cited [Perdue], which held that § 7.8000 is not a valid
finding of Federal preemption, in part, because Congress had not
established a comprehensive Federal statutory scheme governing the
taking of deposits.372 
As the OCC conceded, the court in Perdue held that § 7.8000 was
“not a reasonable interpretation of the controlling [federal] stat-
utes.”373 In fact, the court declared that the OCC’s blanket claim of
369
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-651, at 53 (1994) (Conf. Rep.) (emphasis added), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074. 
370
 Id. at 53–54. 
371
 In place of the rescinded rule the OCC adopted 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2003),
under which the OCC decides preemption issues in the area of service charges “on
a case-by-case basis” in accordance with “preemption principles derived from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States and judicial precedent.” Interpretive Rulings,
61 Fed. Reg. 4849, 4859 (1996) (announcing the rescission of former § 7.8000 and
the adoption of § 7.4002). 
372
 Interpretive Rulings, 61 Fed. Reg. at 4859. 
373
 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 523. 
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preemption in § 7.8000 represented “legislation of far-reaching charac-
ter and effect, of a type never considered by Congress, which would
radically alter the respective roles of the states and the [OCC] in the
regulation of bank-depositor contracts.”374 The court concluded that
the OCC had no authority “to construe very general language in [12
U.S.C. § ] 24 to achieve a specific purpose not within the contempla-
tion of Congress.”375 
In response to the conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act and
the decision in Perdue, the OCC admitted in 1996 that it did not have
authority under the NBA to mandate a general preemption of state
laws in the area of deposit account service charges. This admission
confirms that the OCC lacked authority to adopt § 7.4007 because that
rule has a far broader preemptive scope than rescinded § 7.8000. The
rescinded rule applied only to deposit account service charges, while
§ 7.4007 creates a rule of de facto field preemption for all other matters
related to the deposit-taking activities of national banks.376 
Similarly, the Kentucky, McClellan, and Long decisions preclude
the OCC from adopting proposed §§ 7.4008 and 7.4009. In Kentucky
the Supreme Court declared that:
[national banks] are governed in their daily course of business far more
by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts are
governed and construed by state laws. Their acquisition and transfer
of property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be
sued for debts, are all based on state law.377 
In McClellan the Supreme Court observed that “in the broadest sense,
any limitation by a State on the making of contracts is a restraint upon
the power of a national bank [doing business] in the State.”378
However, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that national
banks “are entirely removed, as to all their contracts, from any and
every control by the state law.”379 Instead, the Court declared that
374
 Id. 
375
 Id. at 523 n.41. 
376
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1916 n.4 (text of 12
C.F.R. § 7.4007(b)(2)(vii) n.4, clarifying that “[s]tate laws purporting to regulate
national bank fees and charges are addressed in 12 CFR 7.4002” and are not governed
by § 7.4007). 
377
 Nat’l Bank v. Kentucky, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 362 (1869), quoted in McClellan
v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896). 
378
 McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 358 (1896). 
379
 Id. at 359. 
[Vol. 23: 225ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING & FINANCIAL LAW320
 0096 VERSACOMP (4.2  ) – COMPOSE2 (4.43) 05/23/04 (14:09) 
J:\VRS\DAT\80132\ART2.GML --- r80132.sty --- POST 307    375/414 
it was “long since settled” in National Bank v. Kentucky and other
decisions that:
the purpose and object of Congress in enacting the national bank law
was to leave [national] banks as to their contracts in general under
the operation of the state law, and thereby invest them as Federal
agencies with local strength, whilst, at the same time, preserving them
from undue state interference wherever Congress . . . has expressly
so directed, or wherever such state interference frustrates the lawful
purpose of Congress or impairs the efficiency of the banks to discharge
the duties imposed upon them by the law of the United States.380
In Long the Third Circuit held, in accordance with Kentucky and
McClellan, that state laws apply to the lending activities and other
operations of national banks unless there is an irreconcilable conflict
with federal law.381 In view of these decisions and the specific
admonitions of the conference report on the Riegle-Neal Act, the OCC
had no authority to adopt de facto field preemption rules contained
in §§ 7.4008 and 7.4009.
As shown in Part III.B.4, § 93a does not give the OCC any
independent authority to adopt rules that would expand the congressio-
nally-authorized powers and immunities of national banks by preempt-
ing state laws. Indeed, Comptroller Hawke acknowledged that the
OCC has no “self-executing power to preempt state law.”382 Accord-
ingly, § 93a does not provide any justification for the blanket preemp-
tion rules contained in §§ 7.4007 through 7.4009.
2. The OCC Does Not Possess a Preemptive Rulemaking
Power Similar to the OTS’s Authority under 12 U.S.C.
§ 1464(a)
The OCC is also wrong in asserting that it enjoys a preemptive
rulemaking power equivalent to that of the OTS.383 Under section 5(a)
of HOLA, the OTS is authorized “to provide for the organization,
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation” of federal
savings associations, “giving primary consideration to the best prac-
tices of thrift institutions in the United States.”384 As previously
380
 Id. at 358–59. 
381
 Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 985–87 (3d Cir. 1980). 
382
 Comptroller Hawke Speech on Feb. 12, 2002, supra note 35, at 4. 
383
 See supra notes 5, 27–29 and accompanying text (discussing the OCC’s claim
that its authority to adopt preemptive rules is equal to that of the OTS). 
384
 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (2000). 
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discussed, the Supreme Court held in Fidelity Federal Savings and
Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta385 that section 5(a) conferred upon the
OTS’s predecessor agency “plenary authority to issue regulations
governing federal savings and loans,” an authority that “expressly
contemplated . . . the [agency’s] promulgation of regulations super-
seding state law.”386 
The NBA does not give the OCC any “plenary” power to adopt
preemptive rules comparable to the authority possessed by the OTS
under section 5(a) of HOLA. The only sources of rulemaking authority
cited by the OCC in adopting its preemption rules are §§ 371(a) and
93a.387 As demonstrated in Part III.E.1, the OCC has only limited
power to promulgate rules for real estate lending under § 371(a), and
the OCC’s power in that area is expressly subject to the uniform
interagency standards established under § 1828(o). Those uniform
standards require national banks to comply with “all real estate related
laws and regulations,” a phrase that on its face includes applicable
state laws.388 As shown in Part III.B.4, § 93a does not allow the OCC
to expand the powers or immunities of national banks by adopting
rules that preempt state laws unless the OCC can show an independent
statutory mandate for its action that exists outside § 93a.
The courts have not resolved the question of whether the OTS
possesses unlimited “field preemption” authority under section 5(a).389
Whatever the precise scope of the OTS’s authority under HOLA, the
courts have consistently held that the OTS’s ability to preempt state
laws is far greater than any comparable power possessed by the OCC
under the NBA. For example, in People v. Coast Federal Savings &
Loan Ass’n390 the district court held that HOLA authorized the OTS’s
predecessor to issue “comprehensive rules and regulations concerning
the powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan associa-
tion from its cradle to its corporate grave.”391 The court also declared
that the preemptive reach of HOLA is far greater than that of the NBA:
385
 458 U.S. 141 (1982). 
386
 Id. at 160, 162; see also supra notes 220–24 and accompanying text (discussing
de la Cuesta). 
387
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 at 1905, 1907, 1908–10.
388
 See supra notes 287–95 and accompanying text (analyzing the OCC’s limited
authority to issue rules for real estate lending under § 371). 
389
 See supra notes 223, 232–36 and accompanying text. 
390
 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951). 
391
 Id. at 316. 
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[A] building and loan association organized under [HOLA] is not a
national bank and the powers and duties of the two materially differ.
As to national banks, Congress expressly left open a field for state
regulation and the application of state laws; but as to federal savings
and loan associations, Congress made plenary, preemptive delegation
to the [OTS’s predecessor] to organize, incorporate, supervise and
regulate, leaving no room for state supervision.392 
This statement in Coast Federal is significant because subsequent
court decisions have quoted Coast Federal’s “cradle-to-grave” meta-
phor in describing the expansive authority held by the OTS and its
predecessor.393 
Similarly, in North Arlington National Bank v. Kearny Federal
Savings & Loan Ass’n,394 the court held that the NBA could not be
used as an “analogy” in discussing the authority granted to the OTS’s
predecessor under HOLA, because of “the historical reasons back of
the establishment of national banks and the altogether different type
of administrative control exercised over them.”395 Two other federal
appeals court decisions establish the same clear distinction between
the broad preemptive authority of the OTS and the much more
circumscribed power of the OCC.396 In light of the foregoing judicial
392
 Id. at 319 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added). 
393
 E.g., Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 145 (1982)
(quoting People v. Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Cal. 1951));
Conference of Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1260 (9th Cir. 1979)
(same), aff’d mem., 445 U.S. 921 (1980); Bank of Am. v. San Francisco, 309 F.3d
551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1069 (2003). 
394
 187 F.2d 564 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951). 
395
 Id. at 567 (emphasis added). 
396
 See Bank of Am., 309 F.3d at 558–59 (stating that “regulation of federal savings
associations by the OTS has been so ‘pervasive as to leave no room for state regulatory
control,’ ” while, in contrast, “states retain some power to regulate national banks”);
Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 989 (3d Cir. 1980) (stating that “federal
regulation of federal savings and loan associations . . . is distinct from the supervision
of national banks by the [OCC] and . . . federal savings and loan associations do
not have the lengthy history of dual regulation that characterizes the national banking
system”).  
Notwithstanding the judicial authorities discussed in this Part III.F.2, Mr. Cayne
and Ms. Perkins contend that the OCC’s preemptive rulemaking authority is “similarly
broad” to that of the OTS. Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 397. This argument
fails to recognize the crucial differences between the statutory grants of power made
by Congress to the OTS and those made to the OCC. As discussed above, section
5(a) of HOLA authorizes the OTS to adopt rules providing for the “operation” and
“regulation” of federal savings associations in accordance with what the OTS
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authorities, the OCC cannot defend its preemption rules by referring
to the OTS’s rulemaking power under HOLA.
G. The OCC’s Attempt to Bar States From Regulating
Operating Subsidiaries of National Banks Is Unlawful
1. The OCC’s Proposal Violates Fundamental Principles
of Financial Regulation and Corporate Governance
The OCC’s new preemption and visitorial powers rules, working
in tandem with § 7.4006 of its existing rules, give operating subsidia-
ries of national banks a blanket immunity from state laws that impose
licensing, examination, and other regulatory requirements on providers
of financial services.397 The OCC’s new regime for operating sub-
sidiaries is clearly unlawful because it disregards the unquestioned
primacy of the states in regulating state-chartered corporations, as well
as the states’ traditional role in supervising financial institutions. The
courts have repeatedly upheld the authority of each state to (i) exercise
comprehensive supervision over the corporations it charters,
(ii) regulate corporations chartered by other states that transact busi-
ness within its borders, and (iii) regulate entities that offer financial
services to its residents. Regarding locally-chartered companies, the
Supreme Court held in 1987 that:
No principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established
than a State’s authority to regulate domestic corporations.
. . . .
determines to be the “best practices of thrift institutions in the United States.” 12
U.S.C. § 1464(a) (2000); see also supra notes 221–22, 385–86 and accompanying
text. In de la Cuesta, the Supreme Court placed great weight on this “best practices”
language in deciding that the OTS’s predecessor agency had “broad authority” to
“promulgat[e] . . . regulations superseding state law.” 458 U.S. at 161–62. In
contrast, there is no comparable provision in the NBA that allows the OCC to define
the “best practices” of national banks or to preempt state laws that the OCC believes
are in conflict with those “best practices.” As shown in Parts III.B.4 and III.E.1, the
OCC possesses only narrow grants of rulemaking power under 12 U.S.C. §§ 93a and
371(a). 
397
 See supra notes 1–13, 19–32 and accompanying text. The OCC’s preemption
and visitorial powers rules did not make any changes to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. The OCC
explained that, by virtue of the existing provisions of § 7.4006, the new preemption
and visitorial powers rules for national banks would apply automatically to their
operating subsidiaries. See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1905,
1913; OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900. 
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. . . [S]tate regulation of corporate governance is regulation of
entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law.
. . . .
It is thus an accepted part of the business landscape in this country
for States to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to
define the rights that are acquired by purchasing their shares.398 
Almost a century earlier the Court declared that “the powers of
corporations . . . are such and such only, as are conferred upon them
by the acts of the legislatures of the several States under which they
are organized.”399 
Regarding corporations chartered by other states, the Supreme Court
affirmed that each state “is legitimately concerned with safeguarding
the interests of its own people in business dealings with corporations
not of its own chartering but who do business within its borders.”400
The Court therefore upheld the authority of states to license and
regulate foreign corporations in accordance with the following
guidelines:
In the absence of applicable federal regulation, a State may impose
non-discriminatory regulations on those engaged in foreign commerce
‘for the purpose of insuring the public safety and convenience; . . .
a license fee no larger in amount than is reasonably required to defray
the expense of administering the regulations may be demanded.’401
Courts have also emphasized the longstanding policy of Congress to
refrain from adopting a “federal corporate law” that would “overturn
or at least impinge severely on the tradition of state regulation of
corporate law.”402 
In the area of financial services, courts have affirmed the authority
of each state to regulate banks and nonbank corporations for the
legitimate purpose of protecting the state’s economy and its citizens
398
 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89, 91 (1987) (citing, inter
alia, Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819)). 
399
 Or. Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U.S. 1, 20 (1889). 
400
 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 208 (1944). 
401
 Id. at 211–12 (quoting Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163, 169 (1928)). 
402
 Business Roundtable v. SEC, 990 F.2d 406, 412 (D.C. Cir. 1990); accord Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) (“Absent a clear indication of
congressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of the law
of corporations that deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established
state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.”). 
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from threats posed by unsound or fraudulent providers. In Lewis v.
BT Investment Managers, Inc.,403 the Supreme Court said:
We readily accept the submission that, both as a matter of history
and as a matter of present commercial reality, banking and related
financial activities are of profound local concern. . . . [S]ound
financial institutions and honest financial practices are essential to the
health of any State’s economy and to the well-being of its people.
Thus, it is not surprising that ever since the early days of our Republic,
the States have chartered banks and have actively regulated their
activities.404 
The Court also explained that 12 U.S.C. § 1846 “does reserve to the
States a general power to enact regulations” applicable to bank holding
companies and their subsidiaries, provided such “state legislation . . .
operates within the boundaries marked by the Commerce Clause.”405
In the field of mortgage lending, federal and state courts have upheld
the authority of states to enforce laws designed to prevent lenders from
engaging in fraud, predatory lending, redlining, and other unconsciona-
ble practices.406 Three recent decisions applied a presumption against
preemption in determining that the Alternative Mortgage Transaction
Parity Act (“AMTPA”)407 does not preempt the application of many
state laws to “alternative mortgage transactions”408 entered into by
403
 447 U.S. 27 (1980). 
404
 Id. at 38; accord Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors, 472 U.S. 159,
177–78 (1985); see also Old Stone Bank v. Michaelson, 439 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.R.I.
1977) (“It has long been recognized that a state may regulate banking to protect the
public welfare in the exercise of its police power.”). 
405
 BT Investment Managers, 447 U.S. at 448–49. Under 12 U.S.C. § 1846(a), the
Bank Holding Company Act reserves to each state the authority to regulate
“companies, banks, bank holding companies, and subsidiaries thereof.” In BT
Investment, the Supreme Court noted that the challenged Florida law was not
preempted by any federal statute. 447 U.S. at 35. The Court struck down the law
because it discriminated against investment advisory firms owned by out-of-state
banking organizations, thereby violating the Commerce Clause. Id. at 31–32, 35–37,
42–44. 
406
 E.g., Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630 F.2d 981, 986–87 (3d Cir. 1980); United
Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200–04 (D. Mass. 1998); In
re Maxwell v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., 281 B.R. 101, 123–31 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002);
Solomon v. Gilmore, 731 A.2d 280, 283–89, 292–93 (Conn. 1999). 
407
 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3806 (2000). 
408
 AMTPA defines “alternative mortgage transactions” to include residential mort-
gage loans other than “traditional fixed-rate, fixed-term transactions.” 12 U.S.C.
§ 3802(1). Thus, mortgage loans with adjustable interest rates, balloon payment
requirements or untraditional amortization terms (e.g., reverse equity mortgages) are
treated as alternative mortgage transactions for purposes of AMTPA. 
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state-chartered mortgage lenders. All three decisions recognized that
real estate transactions and consumer protection are areas traditionally
regulated by the states.409 In view of the foregoing judicial precedents
and congressional mandates, the OCC’s attempt to bar the states from
regulating operating subsidiaries of national banks is demonstrably at
odds with fundamental principles of federalism inherent in our systems
of corporate law and financial regulation.
The OCC asserts that four federal statutes—12 U.S.C. §§ 484,
36(f)(1)(B), 24(Seventh), and 24a—give the OCC “exclusive visitorial
authority over national banks and their operating subsidiaries except
where Federal law provides otherwise.”410 Based on this claim of
“exclusive” authority, the OCC maintains that “States are precluded
from examining or requiring information from national banks or their
operating subsidiaries or otherwise seeking to exercise visitorial
powers with respect to national banks or their operating subsidia-
ries.”411 As demonstrated below, however, none of the four statutes
supports the OCC’s claim.
409
 Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. OTS, 271 F. Supp. 2d 264, 271–73 (D.D.C.
2003) (holding that AMTPA did not preempt state laws restricting late fees and
prepayment penalties); Black v. Fin. Freedom Senior Funding Corp., 112 Cal. Rptr.
2d 445, 452–53, 456 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that AMTPA did not preempt
state laws prohibiting elder abuse, unfair business practices, fraudulent concealment
and negligent misrepresentation), cert. denied sub nom. ULLICO, Inc. v. Black, 536
U.S. 959 (2002); Glukowsky v. Equity One, Inc., 821 A.2d 485, 500, 507–10 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (holding that AMTPA did not preempt state laws
prohibiting prepayment penalties); see also Ansley v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., 340
F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying defendant’s motion to remove a state court lawsuit
in which plaintiff’s claims were based on alleged violations of California laws limiting
prepayment penalties; court held that AMTPA “did not completely preempt all
California laws relating to alternative mortgage transactions,” id. at 864, and therefore
plaintiff’s lawsuit could not be removed to federal court). 
410
 OCC Interpretive Letter No. 957 from Julie L Williams, First Senior Deputy
Comptroller and Chief Counsel, to Thomas A. Plant, Senior Vice President and
Assistant General Counsel, National City Corp., at 2 (Jan. 27, 2003) [hereinafter OCC
IL 957] (emphasis added); see also OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg.
at 1900–01. 
411
 OCC IL 957, supra note 410, at 2. 
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2. Sections 484 and 36(f) Do Not Preempt the States’
Authority to Enforce State Laws Against National
Banks and Their Operating Subsidiaries
a. Sections 484 and 36(f) Permit State Officials to Sue in
Federal and State Courts to Enforce State Laws
Against National Banks
Section 484(a) provides:
No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as
authorized by Federal law, vested in the courts of justice or such as
shall be, or shall have been exercised or directed by Congress or by
either House thereof or by any committee of Congress or of either
House duly authorized.
The text of § 484(a) “does not contain an explicit grant of exclusive
regulatory or visitorial power over national banks to the OCC.”412
In addition, other provisions of federal law make clear that the OCC
does not enjoy exclusive visitorial powers over national banks. For
example, the FDIC has authority to make special examinations of
national banks, and the FDIC may terminate a national bank’s deposit
insurance.413 The FDIC can take additional enforcement actions
against a national bank if the OCC fails to respond after receiving
the FDIC’s request for such measures.414 Similarly, the Federal
Reserve Board can require national banks that are subsidiaries of bank
holding companies to furnish reports and submit to special examina-
tions.415 
412
 First Union Nat’l Bank v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d 132, 144 (D. Conn. 1999)
(emphasis added); see also id. at 137 (providing that “the OCC is not explicitly
referenced in Section 484”). The exercise of “visitorial powers” involves “the act of
a superior or superintending officer, who visits a corporation to examine into its
manner of conducting its business, and enforce an observance of its laws and
regulations.” Id. at 144 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F.
737, 740 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1881), appeal dismissed, 106 U.S. 523 (1883)); see also
Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148, 159 (1905) (describing visitorial powers as being
“a public right, existing in the State for the purpose of examining into the conduct
of the corporation with a view to keeping it within its legal powers”). Thus, “visitorial
powers” include the power to examine the books and records of a corporation and
to take administrative action to enforce the laws applicable to that corporation. See
Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d at 143–46. 
413
 See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(a), 1820(b)(3). 
414
 Id. § 1818(t). 
415
 Id. § 1844(c)(1)–(2). 
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Section 484 does not allow state officials to examine or impose
administrative enforcement measures (e.g., cease-and-desist orders)
against national banks, except as provided in § 484(b) with respect
to state unclaimed property or escheat laws.416 However, § 484(a)
expressly authorizes “the courts of justice” to exercise “visitorial
powers” over national banks.417 Based on this authority, since 1871
state officials and private parties have successfully sued in federal and
state courts to obtain judicial remedies enforcing state laws against
national banks.418 For example, courts have issued subpoenas, writs
of mandamus, and penalties to compel national banks to produce their
records in compliance with state laws.419 In addition, federal and state
courts have upheld the right of state officials and private parties to
obtain affirmative judicial remedies to enforce state laws against
national banks.420 
In interpreting the meaning of § 484, the terms of section 54 of the
original NBA421 are highly significant. Section 54 contained the
predecessor language for both 12 U.S.C. §§ 481 and 484. Like § 481,
section 54 of the original NBA authorized the OCC to examine
national banks. After granting such examination authority, section 54
provided, “And [a national bank] shall not be subject to any other
416
 Id. § 484. For cases holding that state officials cannot examine or take adminis-
trative enforcement actions against national banks, see Nat’l State Bank v. Long, 630
F.2d 981, 987–89 (3d Cir. 1980); First Union Nat’l Bank v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d
132, 140, 143–50 (D. Conn. 1999). 
417
 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). 
418
 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S.
252 (1966); Colo. Nat’l Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41, 43–46, 51–53 (1940); First
Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 655–61 (1924); Guthrie v. Harkness,
199 U.S. 148, 152–53, 157–59 (1905); Waite v. Dowley, 94 U.S. 527, 532–33 (1877);
Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 383, 392–95 (1871); Brown
v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1989); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank, 739 P.2d 554, 556–63
(Or. 1987); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 516–25 (Cal. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
419
 See, e.g., Guthrie, 199 U.S. at 150, 156, 159 (mandamus); Waite, 94 U.S. at
532–33 (penalty); First Nat’l Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740–43
(C.C.N.D. Ohio 1881) (subpoena), appeal dismissed, 106 U.S. 523 (1883). 
420
 See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 659–61; Burke, 48 F. Supp.
2d at 145–46, 148–49, 150–51; Best, 739 P.2d at 563; see also Guthrie, 199 U.S.
at 159 (holding that, under the predecessor to § 484, national banks were “liable to
control in the courts of justice,” and, therefore, “the statute did not intend in
withholding visitorial powers to take away the right to proceed in courts of justice
to enforce . . . recognized rights”). 
421
 Act of June 3, 1864, c. 78, § 54, 13 Stat. 116. 
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visitorial powers than such as are authorized by this act, except such
as are vested in the several courts of law and chancery.”422 Thus,
section 54 reflected Congress’s understanding that the term “visitorial
powers” would include (i) examinations of national banks by the OCC
and (ii) the exercise of judicial authority over national banks by “the
several courts of law and chancery.”
The original NBA also made clear that both federal courts and state
courts could exercise “visitorial powers” over national banks in
appropriate cases. Section 57 provided that “suits, actions and proceed-
ings against any association under this act may be had in any circuit,
district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district
in which such association may be established; or in any state, county
or municipal court in the county or city in which said association is
located, having jurisdiction in similar cases.”423 Section 57 included
a proviso stating that “all proceedings to enjoin the [OCC] under this
act” must be filed in federal courts.424 By negative implication this
proviso made clear that judicial proceedings against national banks
could be brought in either federal or state courts.
In accordance with the language of section 57, the Supreme Court
upheld the jurisdiction of state courts to adjudicate claims filed against
national banks.425 In Morgan the Supreme Court noted that the
“exemption of national banking associations from suits in state courts,
established elsewhere than in the county or city in which such
associations were located, was . . . prescribed for the convenience
of those institutions, and to prevent interruption in their business that
might result from their books being sent to distant counties in
obedience to process from state courts.”426 Thus, the Court explained,
the venue provisions of section 57 were designed to shield national
banks from subpoenas issued by “distant” state courts. At the same
time the Court clearly recognized that local state courts were autho-
rized under section 57 to issue subpoenas requiring national banks to
produce their books and records.
The “visitorial powers” language of section 54 of the NBA was later
incorporated in section 5241 of the Revised Statutes. Section 5241
422
 Id. (emphasis added). 
423
 Id. § 57, 13 Stat. 116–17 (emphasis added). 
424
 Id., 13 Stat. 117. 
425
 E.g., First Nat’l Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132 U.S 141 (1889); Bank of
Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 383 (1871). 
426
 Morgan, 132 U.S. at 145 (emphasis added). 
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stated that “[n]o association shall be subject to any visitorial powers
other than such as are authorized by this Title, or are vested in the
courts of justice.”427 Thus, section 5241—like section 54 of the
original NBA and current 12 U.S.C. § 484(a)—expressly affirmed the
authority of “the courts of justice” to exercise “visitorial powers” over
national banks. In St. Louis the defendant national bank and the United
States (appearing as amicus curiae) asserted that section 5241 and
other provisions of the NBA prohibited state officials from suing in
state courts to enforce state laws against national banks.428 The
Supreme Court, however, rejected those arguments. The Court held
that state officials do not exercise prohibited “visitorial powers” when
they bring judicial proceedings to stop national banks from violating
state laws:
What the State is seeking to do is to vindicate and enforce its own
law, and the ultimate inquiry which it propounds is whether the
[national] bank is violating that law, not whether it is complying with
the charter or law of its creation. . . . . Having determined that the
power sought to be exercised by the [national] bank finds no justifica-
tion in any law or authority of the United States, the way is open for
the enforcement of the state statute. . . . The application of the state
statute to the present case and the power of the State to enforce it
being established, the nature of the remedy to be employed is a ques-
tion for state determination.429 
Thus, St. Louis conclusively establishes the authority of state
officials to obtain judicial remedies to enforce valid state laws against
national banks. The OCC argues, however, that St. Louis permits a
427
 Rev. Stat. § 5241 (emphasis added). 
428
 See First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, at 642–43 (1924)
(argument of bank’s counsel); id. at 645–48 (argument of Solicitor General of the
United States). 
429
 First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 660–61 (emphasis added); accord
First Union Nat’l Bank v. Burke, 48 F. Supp. 2d 132, 145–46, 148–49, 150–51 (D.
Conn. 1999). Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins maintain that I have “ignore[d]” the
significance of the statutory precursors to 12 U.S.C. § 484. Cayne & Perkins, supra
note 2, at 375. They also contend that the “vested in the courts of justice” clause
of § 484(a) has no relevance to the question of “[w]hether a lawsuit is properly brought
against a national bank.” Id. at 382. Both of these claims are mistaken. As I have
shown, § 484 and its precursors—sections 54 and 57 of the original NBA and § 5241
of the Revised Statutes—plainly authorized federal and state courts to entertain
lawsuits brought by private parties and state officials seeking judicial remedies against
national banks that refused to comply with state laws. See supra notes 417–28, infra
notes 433–34 and accompanying text. 
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state official only “to seek a declaratory judgment from a court as to
whether a particular state law applies to the Federally-authorized
business of a national bank or is preempted.”430 If the court holds
that the state law is not preempted, the OCC claims that “enforcement
of a national bank’s compliance with [that] law” is a matter “within
the OCC’s exclusive purview.”431 Thus, in amending § 7.4000 of its
regulations the OCC asserted that it has sole and unreviewable
discretion to decide whether to seek injunctive relief or other affirma-
tive judicial remedies to prevent national banks from violating applica-
ble state laws.432 
The OCC’s interpretation of St. Louis is clearly wrong. In the
excerpt from St. Louis quoted above, the Supreme Court declared that
“the nature of the remedy to be employed” to enforce a valid state
law “is a question for state determination.”433 Moreover, in St. Louis
the Supreme Court affirmed a state court judgment that granted
prohibitory relief, requested by the Missouri Attorney General, to stop
a national bank’s violation of Missouri law.434 In accordance with
430
 OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900. 
431
 Id. 
432
 See supra notes 6–13 and accompanying text. 
433
 St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 661 (emphasis added). 
434
 In St. Louis, the Attorney General of Missouri sued under a writ of quo warranto
to prevent a national bank from operating a branch that violated state law. The Attorney
General obtained a judgment in the Missouri Supreme Court that “ousted [the national
bank] from the privilege of operating this branch bank or any other.” 263 U.S. at
655, aff’g State ex rel. Barrett v. First Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 249 S.W. 619, 625
(Mo. 1923) (explaining that (i) the Attorney General of Missouri proceeded in quo
warranto “to prevent [the national bank] from committing an act . . . expressly
contravening a state statute” and (ii) the judgment in quo warranto “prohibited [the
national bank] by a general ouster from committing particular illegal acts”). In St.
Louis, the United States Supreme Court cited an earlier decision in which it affirmed
a Missouri Supreme Court judgment that awarded similar prohibitory relief in another
quo warranto proceeding. In that earlier case, the Missouri court determined that two
out-of-state corporations were guilty of price fixing and should be barred from doing
business in the state. See 263 U.S. at 661 (citing Standard Oil of Ind. v. Missouri,
224 U.S. 270 (1912) (affirming judgment in quo warranto that revoked the defendants’
corporate franchises in Missouri and also imposed fines)); see also Sage Stores Co.
v. Kansas ex rel. Mitchell, 323 U.S. 32 (1944) (affirming judgment in quo warranto
that prohibited two corporations from selling “filled milk” in Kansas in violation of
a state statute). The foregoing cases demonstrate, contrary to the OCC’s argument,
that the judicial remedy upheld in St. Louis was functionally equivalent to a permanent
injunction and went far beyond a mere declaration of the validity of Missouri’s anti-
branching law. 
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St. Louis, subsequent federal court decisions have repeatedly upheld
the authority of state officials to obtain affirmative remedies—
including injunctive relief—to prevent violations of state law by
national banks.435 Thus, contrary to the OCC’s view, § 484(a) unques-
tionably allows state officials to obtain compulsory judicial remedies
that directly enforce state laws against national banks.
In support of its claim of “exclusive visitorial authority,” the OCC
also cites 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B). Section 36(f)(1)(B) provides that
host state laws applicable to interstate branches of national banks
“shall be enforced” by the OCC.436 However, § 36(f)(1)(B) does not
expressly bar state officials from suing in federal or state court to
prohibit national bank branches from violating host state laws. The
relevant legislative history shows that this provision was intended to
provide the OCC with exclusive authority to perform examinations
of, or to take administrative enforcement actions against, interstate
branches of national banks.437 
When § 36(f)(1)(B) is read together with § 484(a), it becomes clear
that state officials retain the authority to obtain judicial remedies to
enforce applicable host state laws against interstate branches of
national banks. Judicial enforcement orders are a proper exercise of
the “visitorial powers” that are expressly vested in “the courts of
435
 See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Kostman v. First Nat’l Bank in St. Louis, 405 F.
Supp. 733, 735 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (holding, in reliance on St. Louis, that a state banking
commissioner was “entitled to injunctive relief” in order “to enforce the banking laws
of the State of Missouri and to prohibit national banks from violating the state laws”),
aff’d, 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 941 (1976); Colorado
ex rel. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ft. Collins, 540 F.2d 497, 498–99
(10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1091 (1977) (affirming judgment in favor
of the State of Colorado in a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief; declaratory
judgment was issued based on the defendant national bank’s “assurances that it would
follow the trial court’s declaratory judgment without the necessity of an injunction”);
Brown v. Clarke, 878 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1989) (affirming judgment in favor of a state
banking commissioner who “brought suit in federal court seeking relief that would
bar” a national bank from violating state law).  
Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins contend that “[n]one of the cases cited by Professor
Wilmarth serves as a foundation for his argument about the ‘vested in the courts of
justice’ clause in § 484.” Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 382 n.72. However, they
do not consider the obvious significance of St. Louis and Burke, discussed supra at
notes 420, 428–29, 433–34 and accompanying text, and the additional cases cited
in this footnote. 
436
 12 U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(B) (2000); see OCC IL 957, supra note 410, at 5. 
437
 See 140 CONG. REC. H12,786 (daily ed., Sept. 13, 1994) (colloquy between
Sen. D’Amato and Sen. Riegle). 
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justice” under § 484(a) and are not excluded by the specific terms of
§ 36(f)(1)(B). In contrast, the OCC’s reading of § 36(f)(1)(B) would
repeal a significant portion of § 484(a) because the OCC’s interpreta-
tion would prevent “the courts of justice” from exercising jurisdiction
over suits filed by state officials to prohibit interstate branches of
national banks from violating host state laws. Indeed, the OCC’s
position would give the agency sole and unreviewable discretion to
decide whether to enforce such laws. The OCC’s interpretation must
be rejected, because there is no evidence that Congress intended (i) to
repeal by implication a significant part of § 484(a) or (ii) to give the
OCC an exclusive and unreviewable prosecutorial discretion to decide
whether applicable host state laws should be enforced against national
banks.438 
In sum, the OCC acted unlawfully in amending § 7.4000 of its
regulations to declare that § 484(a) bars state officials from seeking
judicial remedies to enforce state laws against national banks. The
amended rule conflicts with the explicit text of § 484(a) because it
denies the authority of “the courts of justice” to exercise “visitorial
powers” that are expressly “vested” in them under § 484(a). Those
powers clearly include the right to exercise jurisdiction over lawsuits
filed by state officials seeking affirmative judicial remedies to stop
national banks from violating state laws.439 
b. Sections 484 and 36(f) Do Not Restrict the Authority
of State Officials to Enforce State Laws Against
Operating Subsidiaries of National Banks
Sections 484 and 36(f) do not support the OCC’s claim that it
possesses exclusive supervisory authority over operating subsidiaries
of national banks. The limitations on visitorial powers under § 484(a)
apply only to a “national bank.”440 Similarly, § 36(f)(1)(B) provides
438
 See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (holding that “repeals by
implication are not favored . . . [and t]he intention of the legislature to repeal must
be clear and manifest”; accordingly, “[w]e must read the statutes to give effect to
each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose”) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted); Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 424–26
(1995) (rejecting a proposed interpretation of a federal statute, because that interpreta-
tion would “attribute to Congress two highly anomalous commands” by (i) allowing
an executive official to “make determinations” that are “dispositive” of a legal
controversy “without any judicial check” and (ii) stripping the courts of their “capacity
to evaluate independently whether the executive’s decision is correct”). 
439
 See supra notes 417–29, 433–35 and accompanying text. 
440
 12 U.S.C. § 484(a). 
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that applicable host state laws shall be enforced by the OCC only with
respect to a branch of an out-of-state national bank.441 Thus, §§ 484(a)
and 36(f)(1)(B) apply only to national banks and do not restrict the
authority of state officials to use judicial or administrative proceedings
to enforce state laws against operating subsidiaries of national banks.
The term “national bank,” as used in § 484, is governed by the
definitions set forth in 12 U.S.C. §§ 221 and 221a(a). As those sections
and related federal banking statutes make clear, a national bank is a
financial institution that (i) files articles of association and an organiza-
tion certificate with the OCC,442 (ii) receives from the OCC a
certificate of authority to carry on the business of banking,443 and
(iii) is eligible to become a member of the Federal Reserve System
(“FRS”).444 Operating subsidiaries do not qualify as national banks
under §§ 221 and 221a(a) because they (i) are chartered as non-bank
corporations under state law, (ii) do not file articles of association or
organization certificates with the OCC, (iii) do not receive certificates
of authority to conduct the business of banking from the OCC, and
(iv) cannot become members of the FRS.445 Accordingly, operating
subsidiaries cannot be treated as national banks for purposes of §§ 484
and 36(f) and are not entitled to any immunity from the exercise of
state enforcement powers.
This analysis is supported by § 221a(b), which defines “affiliate”
to include any corporation that controls or is controlled by a national
bank.446 An operating subsidiary is an “affiliate” because, under the
441
 Id. § 36(f)(1)(B). 
442
 See id. §§ 21–24, 26. 
443
 See id. §§ 24, 27. 
444
 See id. § 282. 
445
 Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 21–24, 26–27, the OCC’s regulations provide: “A na-
tional bank becomes a legal entity after it has filed its organization certificate and
articles of association with the OCC as required by law.” Also, “[t]he proposed bank
shall not conduct the business of banking until the OCC grants final approval.” 12
C.F.R. § 5.20(i)(5) (2003). Under the OCC’s own regulations, it is obvious that an
operating subsidiary cannot qualify for legal status as a national bank. First, an
operating subsidiary cannot file an organization certificate or articles of association
that would satisfy the requirements imposed on national banks under 12 U.S.C.
§§ 21–23. Second, the OCC cannot give “final approval” to an operating subsidiary
in the form of a certificate of authority to commence the business of banking, as is
required for each national bank under § 27. Finally, an operating subsidiary is not
eligible to become a member of the FRS, but every national bank must become an
FRS member under § 282. 
446
 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b). 
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OCC’s regulations, the subsidiary must always be subject to the
control of its parent national bank.447 As confirmed by the legislative
history of § 221a and a related statute (12 U.S.C. § 52), an “affiliate”
is a separate and distinct legal entity and cannot be treated as part
of its parent bank.448 
Congress’s recognition of the separate legal status of an affiliate
is confirmed by 12 U.S.C. § 481. Under § 481, the OCC may examine
affiliates of a national bank to the extent “necessary to disclose fully
the relations between such bank and such affiliates and the effect of
such relations upon the affairs of such bank.”449 In contrast to § 481,
Congress did not include the term “affiliates” in § 484. Accordingly,
the only reasonable conclusion is that § 484’s limitation on visitorial
powers applies only to national banks and does not extend to their
affiliates, including their operating subsidiaries. Unlike § 484, Con-
gress did not insert in § 481 any restriction on the authority of state
officials to exercise visitorial powers over affiliates of national banks.
The only reasonable conclusion is that § 481 does not restrict the
447
 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1)–(2). 
448
 The definition of “affiliate” in § 221a(b) was added to the FRA in 1933. See
Act of June 16, 1933, c. 89, § 2, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 221a(b)). An important goal of the 1933 legislation (popularly known as the “Glass-
Steagall Act”) was “[t]o separate as far as possible national and [state] member banks
from affiliates of all kinds.” S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10 (1933). To achieve this goal
of separating national banks from their affiliates, the 1933 legislation included a
provision—presently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 52—which prohibits every national bank
from (i) issuing stock certificates that purport to represent an ownership interest in
any other corporation (except for a member bank or a corporation holding the national
bank’s premises) or (ii) conditioning the transfer of the national bank’s stock on the
transfer of the stock of any other corporation (with the same exceptions). See Act
of June 16, 1933, § 18, 48 Stat. 186 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 52); see also S. REP.
NO. 73-77, at 9–10, 16. For the general background of the 1933 legislation, see, for
example, Edwin J. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A
History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971). 
449
 12 U.S.C. § 481. The provision in § 481 giving the OCC authority to examine
“affiliates” of national banks was also added by the 1933 legislation. See Act of June
16, 1933, c. 89, § 28(a), 48 Stat. 192 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 481); see
also S. REP. NO. 73-77, supra note 448, at 10, 17. As the OCC recognized in a 1997
order, “[t]he term ‘affiliate’ was very precisely defined by Congress in the [1933]
statute . . . and the different treatment afforded banks and their affiliates in the [1933
legislation] is explicit and unambiguous in the language of the statute itself . . . .”
Decision of the Comptroller of the Currency on the Application by Zions First Nat’l
Bank, Salt Lake City, Utah, to Commence New Activities in an Operating Subsidiary,
Dec. 11, 1997, OCC Conditional Approval No. 262, 1997 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 127
[hereinafter 1997 OCC Zions Order], at **12–13. 
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states’ authority to regulate affiliates. Read together, §§ 481 and 484
plainly indicate that Congress has not preempted the authority of state
officials to supervise operating subsidiaries of national banks.450 
Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c and 371c-1 to regulate transac-
tions between national banks and their affiliates. Both sections
specifically exempt operating subsidiaries from being treated as
affiliates of their parent banks, unless the FRB decides to cancel that
exemption in a particular case.451 There was no reason for Congress
to include this specific exemption for operating subsidiaries in §§ 371c
and 371c-1 unless Congress understood that operating subsidiaries are
generally treated as “affiliates” that are separate and distinct from their
parent banks under § 221a(b).452 The OCC’s current view that
“operating subsidiaries and their parent banks [are] equivalents”453
is therefore untenable because the OCC’s position obliterates the
careful distinction that Congress has drawn between national banks
and their affiliates in § 221a, and it also reduces the special exemption
for operating subsidiaries in §§ 371 and 371c-1 to the status of
“meaningless . . . surplusage.”454 
450
 Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (holding that “[i]t is
generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely when it includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted). 
451
 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c(b)(2)(A), 371c-1(d)(1). 
452
 Indeed, as the OCC previously recognized, Congress would not have found it nec-
essary to give operating subsidiaries a special exemption from the affiliate transaction
provisions of §§ 371c and 371c-1—thereby permitting operating subsidiaries to be
treated as part of their parent banks under those two statutes—unless Congress
intended that operating subsidiaries should be treated differently from their parent
banks under all other statutes. See 1997 OCC Zions Order, supra note 449, at *36
n.46 (observing that §§ 371c and 371c-1 “demonstrate that when Congress intended
bank subsidiaries to be subject to the same standard as that applied to their parent
bank, Congress knew how to say so”). 
453
 OCC Docket 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,130; see also OCC Docket
04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900 (arguing that operating subsidiaries should
be treated as “incorporated departments of the [parent] bank itself”). 
454
 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643–44 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (rejecting an interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) that “would render at
least two other related statutes meaningless, in violation of the endlessly reiterated
principle of statutory construction . . . that all words in a statute are to be assigned
meaning, and that nothing therein is to be construed as surplusage”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted); see also Bd. of Governors v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450
U.S. 46, 58–59 n.24 (1981) (finding that the “structure of the Glass-Steagall Act . . .
reveals a congressional intent to treat banks separately from their affiliates,” and
rejecting a proposed interpretation of the Act that would cause one of its sections,
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In the field of mortgage lending, the Alternative Mortgage Transac-
tion Parity Act (“AMTPA”) demonstrates Congress’s intent to regulate
state-chartered non-bank lenders in an entirely different manner from
federally-chartered banks.455 AMTPA recognizes that the OCC and
other federal banking agencies “adopted regulations authorizing
federally chartered depository institutions to engage in alternative
mortgage financing.”456 AMTPA seeks to “prevent discrimination
against State-chartered depository institutions and other nonfederally
chartered housing creditors” by authorizing those state-chartered
lenders to enter into alternative mortgage transactions.457 To accom-
plish this purpose, AMTPA authorizes (i) the OCC to adopt regulations
permitting state-chartered banks to enter into alternative mortgage
transactions, (ii) the National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”)
to adopt similar rules for state-chartered credit unions, and (iii) the
OTS to adopt similar rules for all other state-chartered housing
creditors, including non-bank lenders.458 State-chartered housing
creditors may rely on authority granted by AMTPA only if those
lenders comply with applicable “licensing requirements imposed under
State law” as well as “applicable regulatory requirements and enforce-
ment mechanisms provided by State law.”459 
After carefully reviewing the terms, structure, and purposes of
AMTPA, three courts recently concluded that state-chartered, non-
bank mortgage lenders do not receive the same exemption from state
law that federally-chartered banks receive under OCC and OTS
regulations. All three courts determined that AMTPA ensures the
ability of state-chartered non-bank lenders to engage in the business
of alternative mortgage financing. However, these courts found that
AMTPA does not establish competitive equality or absolute parity
between federally-chartered banks and state-chartered, non-bank
dealing with “affiliates,” to become “meaningless”); see also Am. Textile Mfrs. Inst.,
Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981) (rejecting a proposed interpretation that
would render one provision of a statute “nugatory, thereby offending the well-settled
rule that all parts of a statute, if possible, are to be given effect”). 
455
 See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801–3803. 
456
 12 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(3) (emphasis added). 
457
 Id. § 3803(a). 
458
 Id. § 3803(a)(1)–(3); see Nat’l Home Equity Mortgage Ass’n v. OTS, 271 F.
Supp. 2d 264, 274 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that under AMTPA, “while OCC identifies
regulations for state-commercial banks, and NCUA does so for state-chartered credit
unions, OTS identifies regulations for all other state-chartered housing creditors”).
459
 12 U.S.C. § 3802(2); see Black v. Fin. Freedom Senior Funding Corp., 112
Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 455–57 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
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lenders because AMTPA does not exempt the latter group from state
laws such as licensing requirements and other regulations designed
to protect consumers.460 
Thus, AMTPA provides strong evidence of Congress’s intent to
preserve the states’ authority to regulate state-chartered non-bank
lenders in the field of mortgage lending. In particular, 12 U.S.C.
§ 3802(2) undermines the OCC’s position that state-chartered non-
bank mortgage lenders may disregard state licensing requirements and
other state regulations simply because they are owned by national
banks.461 
The OCC’s position that it possesses exclusive supervisory authority
over operating subsidiaries also runs afoul of Minnesota v. Fleet
Mortgage Corp.462 In that case the district court rejected the OCC’s
claim of “exclusive jurisdiction” over an operating subsidiary of a
national bank.463 The court determined that the operating subsidiary
was not “itself a bank” for purposes of section 133(a) of the GLBA.464
Based on that determination, the court held that (i) the OCC did not
have exclusive jurisdiction to enforce laws applicable to the operating
subsidiary and (ii) the operating subsidiary was subject to the shared
enforcement jurisdiction of the FTC and state officials under the FTC’s
Telemarketing Sales Rule.465 In rejecting the OCC’s claim of exclu-
sive jurisdiction, the court declared:
The OCC’s insistence that it must have exclusive jurisdiction over
[operating] subsidiaries in order to avoid having its authority “restrict-
ed” is not persuasive. . . . Congress simply chose not to provide
460
 See NHEMA v. OTS, 271 F. Supp. 2d at 271–73, 277; Black, 112 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 453–58; Glukowsky v. Equity One, Inc., 821 A.2d 485, 507–10 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
461
 See supra notes 406–09 and accompanying text. 
462
 181 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2001). 
463
 Id. at 1001. 
464
 GLBA, § 133(a), 113 Stat. 1383 (reprinted in 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 note (2000)).
Section 133(a) of GLBA provides that the FTC has authority to enforce provisions
of the FTC Act with respect to any “person” that controls, is controlled by or is under
common control with a bank or savings association, as long as that “person . . . is
not itself a bank or savings association.” Id. Congress determined that section 133(a)
was needed to clarify the FTC’s enforcement authority with respect to affiliates of
banks and savings associations, because the FTC Act exempts “banks” and “savings
and loan institutions” from the FTC’s jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2); see also
H.R. REP. NO. 106-74, at 137 (1999) (pt. 1); H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 161–62 (1999)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 256–57. 
465
 See Fleet Mortgage, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 997–1001. 
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exclusivity to the OCC in the GLBA. There is no direct authority
establishing exclusive jurisdiction over national bank operating
subsidiaries, and . . . there is no compelling reason to believe that
allowing [the FTC and the states to exercise] concurrent jurisdiction
would “produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of
[Congress]”.466 
The court concluded that section 133(a) of GLBA, which incorpo-
rates the definition of “bank” contained in section 3 of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1813, is unambiguous and “simply
does not include subsidiaries of banks.”467 The court also determined
that an operating subsidiary “fits precisely into the category of entities
described in the language of § 133 as an entity controlled by a bank
that is not itself a bank according to the prescribed definition.”468 The
definitions of bank and affiliate in § 1813, which the court construed
in Fleet Mortgage, are substantially identical to the definitions of the
same terms in §§ 221 and 221a.469 Thus, the holding in Fleet
Mortgage as to the meaning of “bank” in § 1813 squarely contradicts
the OCC’s claim that operating subsidiaries can be treated as national
banks under § 484.
3. Sections 24(Seventh) and 24a Do Not Preempt the
Authority of States to Regulate Operating Subsidiaries
of National Banks
The OCC asserts that 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) supports its claim
of preemptive authority over operating subsidiaries of national
banks.470 However, that statute does not exhibit any congressional
purpose to bar the states from regulating operating subsidiaries. Under
§ 24(Seventh), a “national banking association” has authority “[t]o
exercise . . . all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry
on the business of banking.”471 Like § 484(a), § 24(Seventh) refers
only to “national banking associations” and does not grant any explicit
authority or immunity to “affiliates.”472 Section 24(Seventh) may
466
 Id. at 1001–02 (emphasis added, citations and footnotes omitted). 
467
 Id. at 1000. 
468
 Id. (emphasis added). 
469
 Compare 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1)(A) (2000) (defining “bank”) and § 1813(w)(6)
(incorporating the definition of “affiliate” from § 1841(k)) with §§ 221, 221a(a)–(b).
470
 See OCC IL 957, supra note 410, at 6. 
471
 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh). 
472
 See Bd. of Governors v. Inv. Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 58 n.24 (1981) (observing
that § 24(Seventh) “by its terms applies only to banks,” while “[o]rganizations
affiliated with banks . . . are dealt with by other sections of the [Glass-Steagall] Act”).
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allow national banks to establish operating subsidiaries, but it contains
no language preempting the authority of states to regulate such
subsidiaries.
The fourth sentence of the first proviso of § 24(Seventh) declares:
“Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing
herein contained shall authorize the purchase by the [national bank]
for its own account of any shares of stock of any corporation.”473
This sentence indicates that national banks do not have power under
§ 24(Seventh) to make investments in subsidiaries in violation of
applicable “law”—a term whose plain meaning encompasses state
law—unless the bank can point to a specific, overriding grant of
authority under a federal statute.474 Unlike certain other types of bank
subsidiaries, operating subsidiaries do not derive their authority from
any specific statutory grant.475 Accordingly, the first proviso of
§ 24(Seventh) indicates a congressional understanding that operating
subsidiaries must generally comply with applicable state laws.
Under established canons of statutory construction, § 24(Seventh)’s
general language regarding the “incidental powers” of national banks
must be construed in a manner consistent with the more specific terms
of §§ 221, 221a, 52, 371c, 371c-1, and 481.476 As shown above in
Part III.G.2.b, the statutes dealing specifically with “affiliates” of
national banks demonstrate that Congress has not preempted the
473
 12 U.S.C. § 24(Seventh) (emphasis added). 
474
 See Video Trax, Inc. v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047–49, 1058
(S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that 12 U.S.C. § 24 does not preempt state laws from
applying to national banks, unless those laws conflict with a specific provision of
federal law); see also Best v. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 560–61 (Or. 1987)
(same); Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 520–23 (Cal. 1985) (same).
475
 The second, fourth, and fifth provisos of § 24(Seventh) authorize national banks
to invest in subsidiaries that (i) engage in the “safe-deposit business,” (ii) provide
agricultural credit, and (iii) operate as “banker’s banks.” Similarly, the Bank Service
Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1867, authorizes national banks and FDIC-insured
state banks to establish subsidiaries that operate as “bank service companies.” In
contrast, operating subsidiaries of national banks do not derive their authority from
any specific congressional grant of power. Under the OCC’s regulations, the term
“operating subsidiary” does not include “a subsidiary in which the bank’s investment
is made pursuant to specific authorization in a statute.” 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(2)(i)
(2003). 
476
 See Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 643–45 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding that the scope of “incidental powers” under § 24(Seventh) must be
construed in harmony with the specific limitations on insurance powers of national
banks under 12 U.S.C. § 92); see also Am. Land Title Ass’n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d
150, 157 (2d Cir. 1992) (same), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 971 (1993). 
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authority of state officials to regulate operating subsidiaries of such
banks.
The OCC also claims that section 121(a) of GLBA, codified as 12
U.S.C. § 24a, manifests a congressional intent to give the OCC
“exclusive visitorial authority” over operating subsidiaries of national
banks.477 Section 24a permits national banks to establish “financial
subsidiaries” that may engage in certain activities (e.g., securities
underwriting and dealing) that are not lawful for their parent banks.478
At the same time, § 24a requires national banks to satisfy several
conditions (including capital requirements, managerial ratings, and
community reinvestment standards) in order to establish and maintain
“financial subsidiaries.”479 
Under § 24a(g)(3), the term “financial subsidiary” does not include
a subsidiary that “engages solely in activities that national banks are
permitted to engage in directly and are conducted subject to the same
terms and conditions that govern the conduct of such activities by
national banks.”480 Thus, § 24a(g)(3) simply exempts operating
subsidiaries from the federal statutory requirements imposed on
financial subsidiaries under § 24a(a)–(f). Section 24a(g)(3) is not a
power-granting provision, and it does not reveal any congressional
purpose to bar the states from regulating operating subsidiaries.
The Senate committee report on GLBA expressly disclaimed any
intent to expand the authority of operating subsidiaries of national
banks by declaring: “Nothing in this legislation is intended to affect
any authority of national banks to engage in bank permissible activities
through subsidiary corporations.”481 In fact, Congress understood that
§ 24a would restrict—not expand—the OCC’s authority to define the
powers of operating subsidiaries.482 The conference report on GLBA
instructed the OCC to rescind a prior regulation that allowed operating
subsidiaries to conduct activities that were not lawful for national
banks.483 The OCC responded to GLBA by rescinding its prior rule
477
 See OCC IL 957, supra note 410, at 6; see also OCC Docket 04-03, supra
note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1901. 
478
 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)–(b). 
479
 Id. § 24a(a), (c)–(f). 
480
 Id. § 24a(g)(3). 
481
 S. REP. No. 106-44, at 8 (1999). 
482
 See H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 160 (1999) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1999
U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 255. 
483
 See id. (stating that § 24a would “supercede [sic] and replace the OCC’s Part
5 regulations on operating subsidiaries”). 
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and by amending § 5.34(e) of its regulations to make clear that
operating subsidiaries may conduct only those activities that are
permissible for their parent banks.484 It is therefore completely
illogical for the OCC to assert that § 24a—a statute intended to restrict
the OCC’s authority over operating subsidiaries—can now be con-
strued as a grant to the OCC of additional preemptive power with
respect to such subsidiaries.
H. The OCC’s Regulations Do Not Provide a Valid Basis
for Exempting Operating Subsidiaries from State
Regulation
1. The OCC’s Rulings Are Contrary to the Manifest
Intent of Congress
The OCC claims that §§ 5.34(e) and 7.4006 of its regulations485
bar state officials from exercising visitorial powers over operating
subsidiaries of national banks.486 However, neither of those rules
provides a valid basis for the OCC’s preemption claim.
Section 5.34(e) does not contain any clear statement of the OCC’s
intent to bar the states from regulating operating subsidiaries. Section
5.34(e) describes the federal-law standards that apply to operating
subsidiaries, including (i) the requirement that each operating subsid-
iary must restrict its activities to those permissible for its parent bank
and (ii) the application of federal supervisory standards to operating
subsidiaries.487 
In contrast to § 5.34(e), § 7.4006 does refer explicitly to the issue
of whether states have authority to regulate operating subsidiaries of
national banks. Section 7.4006 provides that, “Unless otherwise
provided by Federal law or OCC regulation, State laws apply to
484
 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1) (2003); Financial Subsidiaries and Operating Sub-
sidiaries, 65 Fed. Reg. 3157, 3160 (proposed Jan. 20, 2000) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 5.34); Financial Subsidiaries and Operating Subsidiaries, 65 Fed. Reg.
12,905, 12,911 (Mar. 10, 2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)). 
485
 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34(e), 7.4006. 
486
 See OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900–01; OCC IL 957,
supra note 410. 
487
 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e). The first sentence of § 5.34(e)(3) provides that “[a]n operat-
ing subsidiary conducts activities authorized under this section pursuant to the same
authorization, terms and conditions that apply to the conduct of such activities by
its parent national bank.” Id. § 5.34(e)(3). This sentence does not contain any explicit
declaration of the OCC’s intent to preempt state laws, and the remainder of § 5.34(e)(3)
discusses federal supervisory standards that apply to operating subsidiaries. Id. 
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national bank operating subsidiaries to the same extent that those laws
apply to the parent national bank.”488 Thus, according to § 7.4006,
federal law preempts the application of state laws to operating
subsidiaries to the same extent that federal law precludes the applica-
tion of state laws to national banks.
It is important to note, however, that § 7.4006 is an interpretive rule
and does not preempt state law of its own force. When the OCC
adopted the rule in 2001, the agency declared:
[§ 7.4006] itself does not effect preemption of any State law; it reflects
the conclusion we believe a Federal court would reach, even in the
absence of the regulation, pursuant to the Supremacy Clause and
applicable Federal judicial precedent.489 
Accordingly, § 7.4006 is not a legislative rule that has substantive
preemptive impact. It simply provides the OCC’s suggested interpreta-
tion of federal law on the question of whether operating subsidiaries
of national banks are subject to state laws. Given its purely interpretive
character, § 7.4006 “does not have the force and effect of law.”490
488
 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006. 
489
 Investment Securities; Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg.
34,784, 34,790 (July 2, 2001) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 7.4006)) (emphasis added).
As noted above, the OCC’s views as to the permissible exercise of “visitorial powers”
over “national banks” are set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000. Section 7.4000 does not
refer to limitations on visitorial powers with respect to operating subsidiaries. When
the OCC adopted its preemption rules and amended § 7.4000, the OCC explained
that “the application of state law to national bank operating subsidiaries is dealt with
in a different, preexisting regulation, 12 CFR 7.4006, which we did not propose to
change.” OCC Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1900 (emphasis added).
Thus, the OCC’s preemption and visitorial powers rules “make[] no change” to the
terms of § 7.4006. OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913. As a
consequence, the OCC’s recent rulemaking proceedings do not alter the purely
interpretive nature of § 7.4006 or its impact on state law. 
490
 Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 562 (Or. 1987) (discussing an
interpretive rule that expressed the OCC’s view on a similar preemption issue); accord
Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 518–19 (Cal. 1985) (same); 1 PIERCE,
supra note 323, § 6.4 at 324–25 (explaining that “a legislative rule has the same
binding effect as a statute,” while “interpretative rules are not binding on courts or
on members of the public”) (emphasis added). Because the OCC explicitly declared
that § 7.4006 “does not effect preemption of any State law,” the rule should be
evaluated by the courts as an interpretive rather than a legislative rule. A federal
agency’s characterization of its own rule is an “important factor in determining
whether a rule is interpretive” instead of legislative. Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73,
80 (1st Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999); accord Friedrich v. Sec’y
of Health & Human Servs., 894 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
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Similarly, as indicated by its “interpretive” designation, OCC IL
957491 presents the OCC’s view on the same question of whether
federal law bars the states from regulating operating subsidiaries. As
a consequence, this ruling also does not have any independent force
of law.
In evaluating the legal significance of § 7.4006 and OCC IL 957,
the key question is whether a reviewing court should defer to the
OCC’s “interpretation” of federal law set forth in those rulings.492
As discussed above, there are strong arguments against granting
Chevron deference to OCC “interpretations” that make preemption
determinations similar to those asserted in § 7.4006 and OCC IL
957.493 Moreover, § 7.4006 is expressly based on the OCC’s reading
of “applicable Federal judicial precedent.”494 A federal appellate court
refused to defer to similar interpretive rulings that were based on an
administrative agency’s assessment of Supreme Court decisions.495
As the appeals court observed, “There is . . . no reason for courts—the
supposed experts in analyzing judicial decisions—to defer to agency
interpretations of the [Supreme] Court’s opinions.”496 
Even if the Chevron doctrine applies to § 7.4006 and OCC IL 957,
it is clear that the OCC’s rulings are not entitled to judicial deference.
817 (1990); see also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 50 (1983) (holding that “[i]t is well established that an agency’s action
must be upheld, if at all, on the basis articulated by the agency itself”).  
Given the purely interpretive nature of § 7.4006, the Supreme Court’s analysis of
the preemptive impact of legislative rules in Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982), and City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57
(1988), does not apply to § 7.4006. In de la Cuesta and City of New York, the Court
considered agency regulations that—unlike § 7.4006—were expressly intended to
preempt state law by their own substantive force. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 145–47;
City of New York, 486 U.S. at 59–66. 
491
 Supra note 410. 
492
 See 1 PIERCE, supra note 323, § 6.4 at 325 (explaining that “[a] court may choose
to give binding effect to the position taken by an agency in an interpretative rule,
but it is the court that provides the binding effect of law through its process of statutory
interpretation; the agency’s interpretative rule serves only the function of potentially
persuading the court that the agency’s interpretation is correct”). 
493
 See supra notes 270–78 and accompanying text (presenting reasons why OCC
preemption determinations should not receive Chevron deference). 
494
 See supra text accompanying note 489 (quoting 66 Fed. Reg. at 34,790). 
495
 See Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
496
 Id. at 1341 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); accord New York,
New York, LLC v. NLRB, 313 F.3d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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Under the “first step” of Chevron, a reviewing court must reject an
agency interpretation that “flout[s] Congressional intent” on an issue
where “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question.”497 The
Supreme Court emphasized that “[i]n determining whether Congress
specifically addressed the question at issue, a reviewing court should
not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in
isolation. The meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases
may only become evident when placed in context.”498 In addition,
a reviewing court should use “traditional rules of statutory construc-
tion” in determining whether the relevant statutes, taken together,
manifest a clear congressional intent on the question at issue.499 
When § 484 is read in context with the statutes dealing with
“affiliates” of national banks, it becomes clear that Congress did not
preempt the authority of states to regulate operating subsidiaries of
national banks. As shown in Part III.G.2.b, the terms of §§ 221, 221a,
52, 371c, 371c-1, and 481 demonstrate that Congress intended to draw
a sharp distinction between national banks and their “affiliates”
(including operating subsidiaries). In particular, a careful comparison
of §§ 221a, 481, and 484 shows that (i) state officials must file lawsuits
instead of administrative complaints to enforce state laws against
national banks,500 but (ii) Congress did not restrict the authority of
state officials to regulate state-chartered “affiliates” (including operat-
ing subsidiaries) of national banks.501 AMTPA and the first proviso
of § 24(Seventh) provide further evidence that Congress did not
exempt operating subsidiaries from their general duty to comply with
applicable state laws.502 Accordingly, § 7.4006 and OCC IL 957 are
invalid because they conflict with the clear intent of Congress as
revealed in the applicable statutes.503 
497
 Am. Land Title Ass’n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 157, 155 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842); accord Indep. Ins. Agents of Am. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d
638, 643–45 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Bd. of Governors v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,
474 U.S. 361, 368 (1986) (holding that “[t]he traditional deference courts pay to
agency interpretation is not to be applied to alter the clearly expressed intent of
Congress”). 
498
 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). 
499
 Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 211 F.3d at 643–45 (quote at 643); see also Am.
Land Title Ass’n, 968 F.2d at 155–57. 
500
 See supra Part III.G.2.a. 
501
 See supra notes 440–51 and accompanying text. 
502
 See supra notes 455–61, 470–76 and accompanying text. 
503
 In addition to failing “step one” of Chevron, due to their inconsistency with
the clear intent of Congress, the OCC’s interpretive rulings also fail under “step two”
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In the final analysis, § 7.4006 is invalid because it represents a
unilateral, unauthorized attempt to change the statutory definition of
“national bank.” As shown above, the OCC’s expansion of the
definition of “national bank” to include operating subsidiaries is
contrary to Congress’s explicit definitions of “national bank” and
“affiliate” in § 221a and related statutes.504 In Minnesota v. Fleet
Mortgage Corp.505 the district court rejected the OCC’s argument that
an operating subsidiary was “itself a bank” because the OCC’s position
conflicted with “unambiguous” congressional intent.506 Similarly, in
because they do not provide a “reasonable” construction of the relevant statutes. See,
e.g., Am. Land Title Ass’n, 968 F.2d at 155–57; Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., 211 F.3d
at 643–45; Perdue v. Crocker Nat’l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 520–25 (Cal. 1985), appeal
dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). As shown below in Part III.H.3, the OCC’s rulings
conflict with fundamental principles of corporate law and infringe upon the states’
sovereign power to regulate state-chartered corporations. 
504
 See supra notes 442–54 and accompanying text. 
505
 181 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2001). 
506
 Id. at 1000; see supra notes 458–65 (discussing Fleet Mortgage Corp.). In con-
trast to Fleet Mortgage, a federal district court in California deferred to the OCC’s
position in two recent decisions holding that state officials cannot regulate state-
chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. Nat’l City Bank v. Boutris, No.
S-03-0655 GEB J., 2003 WL 21536818, at *3 (E.D. Cal., July 2, 2003) (Burrell, J.);
Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1165–70 (E.D. Cal. 2003)
(Burrell, J.). However, the California court did not consider the clear distinction that
§§ 221, 221a, 371c, 371c-1, and 481 draw between “national banks” and their
“affiliates” (including operating subsidiaries). In addition, the court did not consider
the relevance of AMTPA and the first proviso of § 24(Seventh), nor did the court
discuss or mention the Fleet Mortgage decision. Finally, the court did not consider
the drastic impact that the OCC’s rulings would likely have in undermining the
traditional authority of the states to regulate state-chartered corporations and state-
licensed providers of financial services. For all these reasons, I believe that the
California court clearly erred in granting deference to the OCC’s claim of “exclusive
visitorial powers” over operating subsidiaries.  
In Wells Fargo v. Boutris, 265 F. Supp. 2d at 1170, the California court cited WFS
Financial, Inc. v. Dean, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1024 (W.D. Wis. 1999). In Dean, the court
held that a regulation of the OTS preempted the application of state laws to state-
chartered operating subsidiaries of federally-chartered thrift institutions. For two
reasons, I believe that Dean does not provide persuasive authority for the Boutris
decisions. First, the court in Dean did not consider the impact of the OTS’s rule in
subverting the states’ traditional authority to regulate state-chartered corporations.
Second, Dean expressly relied on the expansive rulemaking authority granted to the
OTS under section 5(a) of HOLA. See 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1026, 1028. As shown above
in Part III.F.2, the courts have repeatedly held that the OTS’s authority to preempt
state law under HOLA is far greater than the OCC’s power to displace state law under
the NBA. 
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Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp.507 the Supreme
Court struck down an FRB rule that attempted to define “bank” in
a manner that conflicted with the plain terms of the governing
statute.508 For the same reasons, § 7.4006 is unlawful and does not
support the OCC’s claims of exclusive visitorial authority over
operating subsidiaries of national banks.
2. The OCC’s Rules Undermine the Enforcement of
Consumer Protection Laws Against National Banks and
Their Operating Subsidiaries
The OCC’s position set forth in § 7.4006 and OCC IL 957 should
also be rejected because it significantly weakens the enforcement of
consumer protection laws against national banks and their operating
subsidiaries. As discussed above, the OCC declared that (i) state
officials have no law enforcement jurisdiction over national banks and
their operating subsidiaries and (ii) the OCC has sole authority and
discretion to decide whether applicable state laws should be enforced
against such entities. Unless the OCC’s position is overturned, the
frequency and effectiveness of government enforcement measures will
undoubtedly decline with regard to national banks and their
subsidiaries.
As previously shown, the states have played a major role in
enforcing fair lending laws against financial institutions.509 In addi-
tion, state officials have been the leaders in combating fraud and other
misconduct in the securities and mutual fund industries. New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer spearheaded the investigation and
joined with other state officials and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) in obtaining a landmark settlement agreement
with ten large Wall Street investment banking firms, including five
firms affiliated with major banks.510 That agreement requires the ten
507
 474 U.S. 361 (1986). 
508
 See id. at 368–75 (invalidating an FRB regulation that conflicted with the “plain
meaning” of the definition of “bank” under § 2(c) of the BHCA). 
509
 See supra notes 357–59 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement mea-
sures taken by state officials to stop predatory lending, resulting in the payment of
large financial penalties by Providian National Bank, First Alliance, and Household
International). 
510
 E.g., Charles Gasparino, The Stock-Research Pact: How Settlement Train Kept
on Track, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at C1 (stating that the settlement “is a victory
for one regulator in particular, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer,” who
“spearheaded” the investigation). 
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firms (i) to adopt broad structural reforms to eliminate conflicts of
interest that caused their research analysts to issue biased and mislead-
ing investment advice and (ii) to pay $1.4 billion in disgorged profits,
penalties, and funding to ensure the availability of independent
research to investors.511 News reports confirm that it was Attorney
General Spitzer—not federal regulators—who sparked investigations
of conflicts of interest and other abuses involving research analysts
and investment bankers at Wall Street firms.512 
Attorney General Spitzer and Massachusetts Secretary of State
William Galvin also led the investigative and enforcement efforts to
stop late trading, market timing, and other abusive practices involving
mutual funds.513 Some of these abuses occurred at funds affiliated
with leading national banks, including Bank of America, Bank One,
Fleet, and Wachovia.514 In March 2004, Bank of America and Fleet
511
 E.g., Rachel McTague & Kip Betz, Research Analysts: Federal, State Securities
Regulators, NYSE, NASD, Spitzer Finalize Wall Street Settlement, 35 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 730 (2003) (reporting on settlement agreement entered into by five
independent investment banking firms—Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman
Brothers, Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley—and the following five affiliates of
major banks: Credit Suisse First Boston, J.P. Morgan Securities, UBS Warburg, U.S.
Bancorp Piper Jaffray, and Citigroup Global Markets); Randall Smith et al., Wall
Street Firms to Pay $1.4 Billion To End Inquiry: Record Payment Settles Conflict-of-
Interest Charges, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2003, at A1 (same). 
512
 E.g., Gasparino, supra note 510, at C1; Gretchen Morgenson, Accord Highlights
Wall St. Failures, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at C1 (stating that “regulators at the
[SEC], the New York Stock Exchange and NASD, all charged with protecting
investors, fell down on their jobs during the stock surge of the late 1990s,” and “[i]t
took Eliot Spitzer . . . to spotlight the issue”). 
513
 E.g., Kip Betz & Rachel McTague, Crime: Spitzer Brings Criminal Charges,
SEC Sues Over Alleged Late Trading in Funds, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2018
(2003) [hereinafter Betz & McTague, Spitzer Brings Criminal Charges]; Martha
Kessler, Mutual Funds: Mass. Regulators Charge Prudential Over Late-Trading
Issues, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2100 (2003). 
514
 Kip Betz & Martha Kessler, Mutual Funds: N.Y. AG Launches Probe of Fund
Industry; Hedge Fund Pays $40M to Resolve Claims, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1505 (2003) (reporting that Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation of late-trading
and market-timing abuses by Canary Capital Partners, a large hedge fund, indicated
that “Canary obtained trading opportunities with key mutual funds” affiliated with
Bank of America and Bank One); Mutual Funds: BOA Names Outside Advisers to
Review Practices: Restitution Fund Is Established, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
1693 (2003) (reporting that, in response to Mr. Spitzer’s investigation of Canary
Capital and his indictment of a Bank of America mutual fund broker, Bank of America
launched an internal review of its mutual fund practices and agreed to establish a
restitution fund to compensate shareholders in affiliated mutual funds who were
injured by Canary Capital’s market-timing and late trading in those funds); Mutual
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agreed to pay $675 million to settle charges filed by Attorney General
Spitzer and the SEC regarding late-trading and market-timing abuses
occurring in mutual funds managed by the two banks.515 In November
2003, Attorney General Spitzer filed criminal charges against three
former executives of a small, special-purpose national bank that
allegedly helped a hedge fund to make illegal trades in mutual funds.
The OCC ordered the bank to liquidate after the bank’s misconduct
was revealed by Mr. Spitzer’s investigation.516 
In the mutual fund scandals, as in the Wall Street research debacle,
federal regulators failed to take timely or effective measures to protect
consumers from serious abuses, while state officials performed a vital
public service in investigating and exposing shocking misconduct.517
Funds: FleetBoston Units Charged by SEC, New York, Over Market-Timing Scheme,
36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 387 (Mar. 1, 2004) (reporting that the SEC and
Attorney General Spitzer had filed civil complaints against two subsidiaries of
FleetBoston for allowing outside parties to engage in “a ‘massive’ mutual-fund timing
scheme” affecting several of the mutual funds managed by those subsidiaries); Laura
Johannes et al., Fraud Charges Widen Scope of Scandal Facing Mutual Funds, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 12, 2003, at C1 (reporting that Massachusetts regulators had filed civil
fraud charges for late trading violations against the former Prudential Securities, which
had merged into Wachovia Securities, a joint venture in which Wachovia Corp. is
the majority owner). 
515
 Mutual Funds: BOA, FleetBoston Agree on $675 Million To Resolve SEC, N.Y.
Charges Over Abuses, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 513, 513 (2004) (reporting
on settlements requiring Bank of America and Fleet to pay a total of $675 million
in disgorgement, penalties and fee reductions). 
516
 See Betz & McTague, Spitzer Brings Criminal Charges, supra note 513; Todd
Davenport, Security Trust, 3 Former Execs Accused of Fraud, AM. BANKER, Nov.
26, 2003, at 3 (noting that—according to a joint press release issued by Mr. Spitzer,
the OCC and other federal regulators—“Mr. Spitzer’s investigation of late trading
and market timing implicated Security Trust and ‘triggered an investigation by the
other agencies’ ”). 
517
 See, e.g., Paula Dwyer et al., Breach of Trust, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at
98, 98 (stating that Attorney General Spitzer’s investigation “ignited one of the biggest
financial scandals in U.S. history,” while “[t]he SEC put too much trust in mutual
funds to do the right thing. The agency failed to look deeply enough at industry
practices to detect patterns of abuse.”); Tom Lauricella et al., Spitzer Gambit May
Alter Fund-Fee Debate: Alliance Capital Offers Fee Cut As Part of Proposed
Settlement, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2003, at C1 (stating that “Mr. Spitzer’s office alone
triggered the [mutual fund] investigation in early September. The SEC has scrambled
to catch up.”); Mike Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Missed Chances: Behind the
SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget, ‘90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 2003,
at A1 (concluding that (i) the SEC “fail[ed] to spot almost every major financial
scandal in recent years” because it was a “timid, poorly managed bureaucracy at a
time when the markets it polices and the frauds it seeks to prevent were increasingly
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Members of Congress have lauded state officials and criticized the
SEC for their respective enforcement efforts related to the mutual fund
industry.518 In response to congressional criticism, SEC Chairman
William Donaldson acknowledged that the SEC “cannot be every-
where . . . . We depend on state and local [law enforcement]
authorities to uncover malfeasance that may fly under our radar.”519
Other SEC officials have agreed that state enforcement agencies play
an essential role in complementing the SEC’s efforts to protect
consumers from fraudulent and unfair practices in the financial
markets.520 
Thus, state enforcement has proven to be a highly effective and
necessary supplement to federal efforts to protect consumers from
misconduct involving providers of financial services. It was Attorney
General Spitzer—not regulators at the OCC, FRB, or SEC—who first
uncovered the conflicts of interest and trading scandals that implicated
complex” and (ii) “Mr. Spitzer’s small team has shown that regulators can do a lot
with limited resources, if they deploy them strategically.”); Editorials: Eliot Spitzer,
Once Again, BUS. WEEK, Sept. 15, 2003, at 120 (editorial stating “Hooray for the
state AGs . . . . Why did [the SEC] leave it to a state AG to oversee the mutual-fund
industry, just as it did with Wall Street research? . . . Once again, it is the state AGs
who are the heroes to individual investors.”); Review and Outlook: Revenge of the
Investor Class, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2003, at A20 (editorial stating that (i) “with
his investigation of the mutual fund industry, the New York Attorney General has
been doing a public service” and (ii) “the SEC should have done more to frown on
market timing, which wasn’t a secret on Wall Street.”). 
518
 E.g., Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds Face Overhaul As Spitzer and SEC Fight
for Turf, WALL ST. J., Oct. 31, 2003, at A1; Rachel McTague, Mutual Funds: Kerry
Introduces Mutual Fund Measure To Address Trading Abuses, Fee Issues, 35 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 2033 (2003). 
519
 Rachel McTague, Enforcement: Donaldson Reinforces Message: State Enforce-
ment Welcome, With Caveats, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1559 (2003) (quoting
Chairman Donaldson’s comment at a congressional hearing). 
520
 See Richard Hill, Securities Regulation: Conn. Regulator Declares State Over-
sight of Industry Trumps Distant Federal Efforts, 35 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
2103, 2103–04 (2003) (reporting that Antonia Chion, an associate director in the SEC’s
Division of Enforcement, told a meeting of state legislators that “states have a
complementary role with the SEC in punishing wrongdoers and preventing future
abuses . . . . [C]riminal actions brought at the state level combined with civil
remedies levied by the [SEC] are an effective one-two combination.”); Richard Hill,
Corporate Governance: Spitzer Decries CEOs in Ad, Saying Their Language Casts
Doubt on Awareness, 36 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 521, 522 (2004) (reporting that
Mark Schonfeld, an associate regional director for the SEC’s northeastern region,
“praised state regulators for coming up with creative enforcement methods” and also
said that the SEC has “achieved remarkable success when we’ve worked together
with the states.”). 
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securities affiliates and mutual funds operated by major banks and led
to the forced dissolution of a small national bank.521 State regulators
and consumer advocates argue that the OCC lacks the motivation and
administrative resources to enforce consumer protection laws against
national banks and their operating subsidiaries.522 In a recent budget-
related resolution, the House Financial Services Committee also
questioned whether the OCC has sufficient administrative resources
to “investigate all consumer complaints for 2150 national banks . . .
from a single customer assistance center.”523 The Committee ex-
pressed further concern that the OCC’s assertion of exclusive authority
over “consumer law enforcement activities that typically have been
undertaken by the States . . . could weaken the OCC’s ability to carry
out its primary mission of ensuring the safety and soundness of the
national bank system . . . .”524 
521
 See supra notes 510–18 and accompanying text. 
522
 See, e.g., 2004 Georgetown Lecture by Spitzer, supra note 201, at 7–13; Testi-
mony of Diana L. Taylor, supra note 354, at 12–19; NCLC Comments, supra note
354, at 12–14; Jathon Sapsford, Critics Cry Foul Over New Rules on Bank Review,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2004, at C1. According to the OCC, its resources for enforcing
consumer protection laws include 1800 bank examiners and a single consumer
complaint center located in Houston, Texas. See OCC Questions and Answers, supra
note 5, at 10. However, the OCC’s examiners are primarily responsible for evaluating
the safety and soundness of 2100 national banks and “all” of their “affiliates”
(including operating subsidiaries). See 12 U.S.C. § 481; OCC NR 2004-3, supra note
29, at 5; see also Sapsford, supra (noting that “[c]ritics say the OCC has found little
evidence of predatory lending among the banks it regulates because it has only 1800
examiners, who are more focused on the quality of the banks’ lending portfolios than
[on] their policies for interacting with consumers”). OCC Chief Counsel Julie Williams
reportedly admitted, during a public meeting with consumer advocates in 2003, that
the OCC could not provide “a comprehensive list of the operating subsidiaries of
national banks” because “the number and names of the operating subsidiaries were
constantly changing.” NCLC Comments, supra note 354, at 13 n.26. Because large
banking organizations have entered more risky lines of business and have adopted
more complex organizational structures, it has become increasingly difficult for
regulators to assess the safety and soundness of such entities. See Wilmarth,
Transformation, supra note 139, at 316–407, 454–75. Accordingly, there are strong
reasons to doubt whether the OCC can afford to devote a significant portion of its
limited supervisory resources to ensure that consumer protection laws are properly
enforced against more than 2000 national banks and a myriad of operating subsidiaries.
523
 2004 House Fin. Serv. Comm. Budget Res., supra note 279, at 16; see also
id. (noting that “State banking agencies and State attorney generals’ offices employ
nearly 700 full time examiners and attorneys to monitor and enforce consumer law
compliance”). 
524
 Id. 
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In fact, the OCC’s record in protecting consumers is not impressive.
Since June 2000 the OCC has taken public enforcement actions against
only seven national banks based on claims of abusive or predatory
lending practices. All seven enforcement proceedings involved special-
purpose credit card banks or community banks.525 To date the OCC
has not issued a single public enforcement order against any of the
largest national banks or their subsidiaries for abusive or predatory
lending, even though allegations of misconduct were filed against
several of them.526 
In one well-known case, the OCC refused to help hundreds of
consumers who complained after Fleet raised the interest rates on their
credit cards despite promises of a “fixed” rate.527 When an aggrieved
customer filed a federal class action in December 2000 alleging
deceptive lending practices by Fleet, the OCC responded by submitting
amicus briefs on behalf of Fleet in both the district court and the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals.528 The Third Circuit, however, determined
that plaintiff presented a genuine issue for trial based on her claim
that Fleet’s disclosures were misleading and violated the Truth in
Lending Act.529 Based on the Third Circuit’s opinion, one can
525
 See OCC Docket 04-04, supra note 1, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913. The largest of
the seven enforcement actions, against Providian National Bank, was taken in response
to an investigation initiated by a California state prosecutor. See supra notes 356–57
and accompanying text. In contrast to the seven public enforcement actions announced
by the OCC during 2000–2004, state authorities initiated more than 4000 enforcement
actions related to abusive mortgage lending practices in 2003 alone. See supra note
358. 
526
 See supra note 354 and accompanying text. 
527
 See Bravin & Beckett, supra note 197 (quoting a representative letter in which
the OCC declined to help a complaining customer of Fleet and said, “we can only
suggest that you contact private legal counsel regarding any additional remedies”);
Testimony of Diana L. Taylor, supra note 354, at 13. 
528
 See Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), 2001 WL 1486226 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 2001),
at *2 (referring to “the amicus brief filed by the [OCC]”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
342 F.3d 260, 262 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the appearance of counsel for the OCC
as amicus curiae). 
529
 Fleet’s credit card solicitation materials quoted a fixed annual percentage rate
(“APR”) and assured prospective customers that this “fixed APR” was “NOT an
introductory rate” and “won’t go up in just a few short months.” Roberts v. Fleet
Bank, 342 F.3d 260, 263 (3d Cir. 2003). Fleet’s solicitation materials also represented
that the fixed APR would change only if the customer failed to make required
payments or closed her account. About a year after the plaintiff in Roberts received
her credit card, Fleet notified her that it was raising its APR by 2.5% in reliance on
a general provision of Fleet’s cardholder agreement. That provision, which allowed
Fleet to change the terms of its credit card agreements at any time, had not been
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certainly question whether the OCC acted properly when it concluded
that federal law did not give customers any reasonable grounds for
proceeding against Fleet.530 
Two other cases indicate that state officials are far more likely than
the OCC to take strong and effective enforcement measures against
major national banks. In June 1999 Minnesota Attorney General Mike
Hatch sued U.S. Bancorp for selling confidential customer information
to telemarketers in violation of the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
and three Minnesota statutes that prohibited consumer fraud, false
advertising, and deceptive trade practices.531 U.S. Bancorp settled the
case by paying a $3 million fine and agreeing to implement new
policies designed to safeguard its customers’ privacy.532 U.S. Ban-
corp’s “egregious” and widely-condemned sales of customer data
helped spur Congress to adopt the privacy provisions contained in Title
V of GLBA.533 However, even though Comptroller Hawke criticized
banks for selling customer information to telemarketers under circum-
stances that were “seamy, if not downright unfair and deceptive,”534
the OCC never took public enforcement action against U.S. Bancorp.
In December 2000 Attorney General Hatch sued Fleet’s mortgage
operating subsidiary for privacy violations arising out of a similar
included or quoted in Fleet’s solicitation materials. Id. at 264. The Third Circuit
concluded that “[c]onstruing the TILA strictly against the creditor and liberally in
favor of the consumer, as we must, we believe that the TILA disclosures [made by
Fleet] in this case, read in conjunction with the solicitation materials, present a material
issue of fact as to whether Fleet clearly and conspicuously disclosed its right to change
the APR.” Id. at 266. 
530
 See Bravin & Beckett, supra note 197 (describing a representative letter sent
by the OCC to a Fleet customer). 
531
 Peter P. Swire, The Surprising Virtues of the New Financial Privacy Law, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1263, 1288 (2002); Scott Barancik & Dean Anason, U.S. Bancorp
Charged with Selling Data On Customers, AM. BANKER, June 10, 1999, at 1. 
532
 Lavonne Kuykendall, After Privacy Policy Makeover, U.S. Bancorp Covets Rec-
ognition, AM. BANKER, Aug. 14, 2001, at 1 [hereinafter Kuykendall, Privacy
Makeover]; Lavonne Kuykendall, Managing Privacy: Fined, U.S. Bancorp Learns
About the Fine Line, AM. BANKER, Aug. 8, 2001, at 1. 
533
 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6827; Swire, supra note 531, at 1265–73 (describing the
privacy provisions included in Title V of GLBA); id. at 1288–89 (describing U.S.
Bancorp’s conduct as “particularly egregious,” and discussing the impact on Congress
of the charges against U.S. Bancorp); see also Barancik & Anason, supra note 531
(reporting that Minnesota’s suit against U.S. Bancorp “fed a growing firestorm over
consumer privacy” and “lawmakers were demanding a legislative crackdown”). 
534
 Swire, supra note 531, at 1288 (quoting speech given by Comptroller Hawke
to the Consumer Bankers Association on June 7, 1999, two days before Attorney
General Hatch filed suit against U.S. Bancorp). 
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telemarketing scheme, in which Fleet’s subsidiary sold confidential
customer data and provided other assistance to telemarketers who
solicited the subsidiary’s customers for “membership programs.”535
Attorney General Hatch charged Fleet’s subsidiary with violations of
the FTC’s Telemarketing Sales Rule and the same three Minnesota
statutes cited in the U.S. Bancorp case.536 Once again, the OCC did
not take enforcement action against Fleet. Instead, as it did in the Fleet
credit card case, the OCC filed an amicus brief that supported Fleet’s
unsuccessful attempt to dismiss the lawsuit.537 In contrast to the OCC,
the FTC filed an amicus brief on behalf of Minnesota.538 
Since 1999 the OCC brought only two public enforcement actions
alleging violations of customer privacy rules—one against a California
community bank and the other against two former employees of a
Colorado community bank.539 Thus, as in the case of predatory
lending, the OCC’s enforcement of consumer privacy laws has
followed a pattern of public jawboning, a handful of public prosecu-
tions against smaller national banks, and the absence of any public
proceeding against a major national bank.540 It would be reassuring
to infer from this pattern that only small national banks have been
guilty of predatory lending practices or privacy infractions. That
535
 Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 962 (D. Minn. 2001).
536
 Id. at 964–65 (describing the factual allegations and legal claims made by Attor-
ney General Hatch against Fleet Mortgage); Kuykendall, Privacy Makeover, supra
note 532 (same); see supra notes 462–69 and accompanying text (discussing
Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 995 (D. Minn. 2001)). 
537
 Fleet Mortgage, 181 F. Supp. at 999–1000 (describing the OCC’s arguments,
as amicus, supporting Fleet Mortgage Corp.’s motion to dismiss). 
538
 See id. at 996 (referring to the appearance of counsel for the FTC and the OCC
as amici curiae). 
539
 See Paul Beckett, ‘Payday’ Loans Are Dealt Blow By Regulators: ACE Cash
and California Bank Face Fines as U.S. Comptroller Seeks to Curb Lending Practice,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002, at C1 (describing an administrative order issued by the
OCC against Goleta National Bank and explaining that the order was partly based
on the “failure [of Goleta’s agent] to safeguard customer files on loans issued by
Goleta” as that failure “could have compromised the customers’ right to privacy”);
Todd Davenport, E-Mail Leads to a Ban, AM. BANKER, Apr. 8, 2003, at 1 (reporting
that the OCC had “barred from the [banking] industry” two former employees of Grand
Valley National Bank, because they “violated privacy regulations by e-mailing
confidential [customer] loan files to an unauthorized third party”). 
540
 See supra notes 329–34, 338, 525–39 and accompanying text (discussing the
OCC’s public statements condemning predatory lending, its public enforcement
actions against seven smaller national banks, and the absence of any public proceeding
by the OCC against a major national bank). 
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inference clearly seems unwarranted, however, given the number of
lending abuses and privacy violations asserted against leading national
banks by consumers and state officials.541 
A search of the OCC’s database for publicly available enforcement
orders issued during the past decade fails to reveal a single instance
in which the OCC issued an enforcement order against one of the eight
largest national banks for violating a consumer protection law.542
Unfortunately, the OCC’s self-interest provides a plausible explanation
for the agency’s failure to prosecute publicly any major national bank
for consumer protection violations. As discussed above, the OCC’s
prestige and budgetary resources depend on its ability to attract and
retain the allegiance of large multistate banks.543 As a consequence,
the OCC’s bureaucratic incentives create a clear risk of regulatory
capture whenever the OCC considers the possibility of taking vigorous
enforcement action against one of its most important constituents.
Given these circumstances, the OCC should not be allowed to prevent
state officials from carrying out their responsibility to protect consum-
ers against unlawful practices committed by national banks or their
operating subsidiaries.544 
541
 See supra notes 354, 527–39 and accompanying text. 
542
 As of September 30, 2003, the eight largest bank holding companies whose
lead bank subsidiaries operated under national charters were Citigroup (parent
company of Citibank), Bank of America, Wells Fargo, Wachovia, Bank One,
FleetBoston (parent company of Fleet Bank), U.S. Bancorp (parent company of U.S.
Bank), and National City. See Industry Snapshot: Bank and Thrift Holding Companies
with the Most Assets; On Sept. 30, 2003, AM. BANKER, Jan. 30, 2004, at 6. By running
the names of each of the eight banks through the “Enforcement Actions Search”
database on the OCC’s website and reviewing the descriptions of all enforcement
orders in which any of the eight banks were named as an interested party since
December 31, 1993, one discovers that most of the orders were removal orders or
industry-wide prohibitions imposed against bank employees for violations of law. See
OCC, Legal and Regulatory: Enforcement Actions Search, at http://www.occ.treas.gov/
enforce/enf_search.htm; see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(g), 1829 (2000). 
543
 See supra notes 193–203 and accompanying text. 
544
 Mr. Cayne and Ms. Perkins contend that “the OCC has affirmatively reached
out to state officials in an effort to engage them in a cooperative role with respect
to enforcement of state law against national banks.” Cayne & Perkins, supra note
2, at 383. In fact, however, the OCC’s “reach[ing] out” has been limited to making
a pro forma invitation to state officials to “contact the OCC” with information
regarding possible violations of law by national banks or their operating subsidiaries.
In extending this invitation, the OCC emphasized that (i) the OCC retains sole and
exclusive authority to decide whether to “take supervisory action” against a national
bank or its operating subsidiary and (ii) the OCC will take such action only if it
concludes that a national bank has violated what it deems to be an “applicable law.”
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3. The OCC’s Rules Violate Fundamental Principles of
Corporate Governance and Invade the Sovereign Power
of the States to Regulate State-Chartered Corporations
The OCC’s attempt to bar the states from regulating operating
subsidiaries of national banks violates fundamental principles of
corporate governance and infringes upon sovereign state interests
protected by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Section
7.4006 and OCC IL 957 ignore the legal separation between a national
bank and its operating subsidiaries and also obliterate many of the
subsidiaries’ legal obligations under their state corporate charters. As
a consequence, the OCC’s rulings run afoul of federal court decisions
that emphasize the importance of construing federal statutes in
harmony with state corporate law doctrines. For example, in United
States v. Bestfoods545 the Supreme Court declared that the legal
separation between a subsidiary and its parent corporation is a “general
principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our economic and legal
systems.”546 Federal court decisions repeatedly rejected attempts to
interpret federal statutes in a manner that would override longstanding
principles of state corporate law, such as the doctrine of corporate
separation, absent clear evidence that Congress intended such a
result.547 
OCC AL 2002-9, supra note 34, at 3–4. In the very same document, the OCC declared
that “[e]xclusive federal oversight, uniform federal regulation, and state law preemp-
tion constitute three essential and distinct elements of the national bank system.” Id.
at 3. Thus, state officials are free to provide information regarding suspected violations
of state law to the OCC, but the OCC insists upon (i) exercising total prosecutorial
authority and discretion over such information and (ii) deciding whether any state law
is “applicable” to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. Not surprisingly,
state officials have viewed the OCC’s invitation as the complete antithesis of
“cooperative” law enforcement. See 2004 Georgetown Lecture by Spitzer, supra note
201, at 10–13. 
545
 524 U.S. 51 (1998). 
546
 Id. at 61 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Dole Food
Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 474–75 (2003) (declaring that “[a] basic tenet of
American corporate law is that the corporation and its shareholders are distinct
entities. . . . A corporate parent which owns the shares of a subsidiary does not,
for that reason alone, own or have legal title to the assets of the subsidiary; . . . .”)
(citations omitted); Minnesota v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 181 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1000
(D. Minn. 2001) (observing that “operating subsidiaries hold a separate incorporated
status from their parent banks, and subsidiaries are not chartered as federal banks”).
547
 E.g., Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 62 (rejecting a proposed reading of a pollution
control statute (“CERCLA”) that would impose automatic liability on a parent
corporation for the acts of its subsidiary, because “nothing in CERCLA purports to
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Congress has clearly expressed its view that natural banks and their
“affiliates” should be treated as strictly separate legal entities.548 The
OCC itself has relied on principles of corporate separation in present-
ing legislative proposals to Congress. During congressional hearings
on GLBA, the OCC invoked the corporate separation doctrine (includ-
ing the reluctance of courts to “pierc[e] the corporate veil”) to support
its argument that Congress should not be greatly concerned by the
possibility that “banks would end up being liable for the debts of their
subsidiaries—beyond their own investments and loans.”549 Having
advised Congress that national banks and their subsidiaries are separate
and distinct entities under corporate law, the OCC cannot claim any
congressional mandate for its current view that “an operating subsid-
iary should be considered a part of the [parent] bank, and thus ‘itself
a bank’ by extension.”550 
With the OCC’s blessing, many national banks have organized state-
chartered corporations as operating subsidiaries, and those banks
represent to customers, counterparties, and regulators that their operat-
ing subsidiaries are distinct legal entities. In the area of mortgage
reject this bedrock principle [of corporate separation] and against this venerable
common law backdrop, the congressional silence is audible”); Dole Food, 538 U.S.
at 475–76 (refusing to conclude that “as a categorical matter, all subsidiaries are the
same as the parent corporation” because “the text of the [relevant statute] gives no
indication that Congress intended us to depart from the general rules regarding
corporate formalities”); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 85, 86
(1987) (refusing to construe a federal statute to “pre-empt a variety of state corporate
laws of hitherto unquestioned validity,” because the “longstanding prevalence of state
regulation in this area suggests that, if Congress had intended to pre-empt all [such]
state laws . . . it would have said so explicitly”); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905
F.2d 406, 412, 415 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating an agency rule that would “overturn
or at least impinge severely on the tradition of state regulation of corporate law,”
because “nothing in the statute and legislative history suggests so broad a [congressio-
nal] purpose”); see also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977)
(quoted supra note 402). 
548
 See supra notes 446–50 and accompanying text (discussing the text and legisla-
tive history of 12 U.S.C. §§ 221a, 52, 481). 
549
 H.R. REP. No. 106-74, at 101 (1999) (pt. 1) (discussing the OCC’s views). Simi-
larly, in a 1997 order, the OCC quoted an earlier ruling in which it described an
operating subsidiary as “a separate, legal entity, apart from its parent [bank], operating
under its own charter and articles of incorporation . . . .” 1997 OCC Zions Order,
supra note 449, at *45 (quoting Jan. 1968 letter from Deputy Comptroller of the
Currency Watson). 
550
 Fleet Mortgage, 181 F. Supp. at 999 (describing the OCC’s position); see also
OCC Docket No. 03-16, supra note 1, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,130 (asserting that “operating
subsidiaries and their parent banks [are] equivalents”). 
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lending, national banks could have forgone the operating subsidiary
structure and, instead, could have conducted all of the subsidiaries’
activities directly under their charters as national banks.551 However,
many national banks have consciously chosen the option of:
establishing operating subsidiaries as a vehicle to limit the portion
of their capital exposed by their mortgage operations . . . . This
protects the assets backing up the bank’s entire deposit base . . . from
being exposed to claims arising from the mortgage lending activities,
as they would be if those activities were conducted directly in the
bank.552 
Thus, national banks have deliberately chosen to take advantage of
the legal protections provided by the state corporate charters of their
operating subsidiaries, including limited liability. As a result, those
subsidiaries are in no position—even with the OCC’s encourage-
ment—to disregard the corresponding state-law duties that attach to
them by virtue of those charters.553 
The OCC’s claim of exclusive supervisory powers over operating
subsidiaries would significantly weaken the historic primacy of the
states in matters of corporate regulation. The OCC’s view would
deprive states of all authority to license, examine, and regulate state-
chartered corporations controlled by national banks. In practical effect,
the OCC’s position would “federalize” state-chartered subsidiaries by
placing them under the OCC’s sole and exclusive supervisory con-
trol.554 This “interpretation” of the OCC’s scope of authority over
551
 See 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)(1), (3) (2003) (stating that operating subsidiaries may
conduct only those activities that are permissible for their parent banks under the same
circumstances). 
552
 Brief of Amici Curiae American Bankers Ass’n et al. at 14, Wachovia Bank
v. Burke, No. 303CV0738 (D. Conn. 2003), available at http://www.cbanet.org; see
also Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 404 (acknowledging that national banks have
organized state-chartered operating subsidiaries “to obtain the benefits of incorpora-
tion, such as the limitation of liability inherent to corporations”). 
553
 Cf. First Nat’l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252,
at 261 (1966) (admonishing the Comptroller of the Currency that he may not “pick
and choose what portion of the law binds him”). 
554
 See Cayne & Perkins, supra note 2, at 404–05 (explaining that, under the OCC’s
rules, national bank operating subsidiaries need only follow “the ministerial provisions
of state law that provide for the incorporation and governance of state-chartered
corporations. As a regulatory matter, however, operating subsidiaries are viewed as
mere divisions of the bank . . . [and] are subject to examination and supervision by
the OCC to the same extent as the national bank. . . . [T]here is no reason why a
state or any other regulator should supervise the activities of a national bank’s
operating subsidiaries.”). 
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operating subsidiaries is indefensible. The federal government intrudes
upon the states’ sovereign powers and exceeds the boundaries of its
own authority under the Tenth Amendment when it attempts to
“convert [state-chartered corporations] into creatures of the federal
government” without the permission of the chartering states.555 In an
555
 See Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315, 335–40 (1935)
(holding that section 5(i) of HOLA violated the Tenth Amendment, because it
permitted state-chartered savings institutions to convert to federally-chartered entities,
supervised by a federal agency, without state permission); Chi. Title & Trust Co. v.
4136 Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 126–29 (1937) (holding that section 77B
of the federal Bankruptcy Act did not authorize the filing of a bankruptcy petition
on behalf of a corporation whose charter had expired under state law, because any
such filing would create “an intrusion by the Federal Government on the powers of
the State” and would create serious problems under the Tenth Amendment as construed
in Hopkins Federal).  
The OCC has claimed that Hopkins Federal is “factually inapposite” because the
agency’s preemption and visitorial powers rules do not change the “charter type or
corporate status” of state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks. OCC
Docket 04-03, supra note 6, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1902. The OCC, however, has overlooked
a crucial aspect of Hopkins Federal. In that case, the Supreme Court declared that
section 5(i) of HOLA was unconstitutional not only because it allowed state savings
institutions to convert to federal charters but also because it permitted them to escape
the supervisory control of the chartering state. The Court emphatically held that the
federal government could not divest a state, without its consent, of the authority to
regulate corporations of its own creation:  
A corporation is a juristic person organized by government to accomplish
certain ends, which may be public or quasi-public, though for other purposes
of classification the corporation is described as private. . . . This is true of
building and loan associations in Wisconsin and in other states. They have
been given corporate capacity in the belief that their creation will advance
the common weal. The state, which brings them into being, has an interest
in preserving their existence, for only thus can they attain the ends of their
creation. . . . How they shall be formed, how maintained and supervised,
and how and when dissolved, are matters of governmental policy, which it
would be an intrusion for another government to regulate by statute or
decision, except when reasonably necessary for the fair and effective exercise
of some other and cognate power explicitly conferred [by the Constitution].
296 U.S. at 337 (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also id. at 340 (holding that
Wisconsin had standing to repel “an assault upon the quasi-public institutions that
are the product and embodiment of its statutes and its policies” and to prevent such
institutions from “deviat[ing] from the law of their creation”).  
In Chicago Title the Supreme Court, after quoting the last sentence of the foregoing
excerpt from Hopkins Federal, declared that “[h]ow long and upon what terms a state-
created corporation may continue to exist is a matter exclusively of state power. . . .
The circumstances under which the power shall be exercised and the extent to which
it shall be carried are matters of state policy, to be decided by the state legislature.”
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analogous case, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S.
Corps of Army Engineers,556 the Supreme Court refused to give
deference to a federal agency’s interpretation of federal law, because
the agency’s position would have created “significant constitutional
and federalism questions” by “permitting federal encroachment upon
a traditional state power” without any “clear indication that Congress
intended that result.”557 As shown above, there is no “clear indication”
of congressional support for the OCC’s radical attempt to transform
state-chartered operating subsidiaries into de facto national banks,
thereby overriding the states’ traditional authority to regulate state-
chartered corporations and state-licensed providers of financial ser-
vices.558 
When Congress has considered it necessary to regulate state-
chartered business corporations, it has done so explicitly and incremen-
tally by statute, most recently in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.559
Congress has never chosen to “federalize” corporate law by enacting
302 U.S. at 127–28 (citations omitted, emphasis added). The Court held that the federal
government could not “breathe life” into a corporation that had been dissolved under
state law and, therefore, the corporation’s stockholders could not “resuscitat[e] and
continu[e] the corporation” by “invok[ing] the aid of a federal statute.” Id. at 128–29.
In sum, based on Hopkins Federal and Chicago Title, it is clear that the Tenth
Amendment bars the federal government from destroying the states’ sovereign
authority to determine the nature, scope, and duration of powers that may be exercised
by state-chartered corporations. 
556
 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
557
 Id. at 172, 174; accord Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1340–41
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the “constitutional avoidance canon of statutory
interpretation trumps Chevron deference”—accordingly, the court refused to give
deference to an agency interpretation that raised serious constitutional questions and
was not supported by any “affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
558
 See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987) (declar-
ing that it is “an accepted part of the business landscape in this country for States
to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights that are
acquired by purchasing their shares”); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,
475–76 (2003) (refusing to revise the doctrine of corporate separation “so far that,
as a categorical matter, all subsidiaries are deemed to be the same as the parent
corporation”); supra notes 398–409, 545–47 and accompanying text (discussing
Congress’s longstanding support for state regulation of corporate governance and
financial services). 
559
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). For a useful summary of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see
Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 62–67 (2002) (App.).
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a comprehensive, preemptive regime that ousts the states from super-
vising state-chartered entities.560 Similarly, Congress has not
560
 In sharp contrast to the OCC’s assertion of exclusive federal control over state-
chartered operating subsidiaries, the regulatory regime for business corporations in
this nation has long followed a policy of decentralization, which has made possible
a horizontal competition among the states and a vertical competition between the states
and the federal government. The competitive dynamic inherent in our system of
corporate regulation is similar to the competition among the states, and between state
and federal regulators, that has occurred within the dual banking system. See supra
Part III.B.2. For discussions of the regulatory competition that has been fostered by
the federalism principles inherent in American corporate law, see Renee Jones,
Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 J. CORP. L.
(Spring 2004) (forthcoming 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id  459400; Brett McDonnell, The Ambiguous Virtues of
Federalism in Corporate Law, Minn. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 03-10 (July 15, 2003),
available at http://ssrn.com.abstract  424681; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition,
117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); Jonathan R. Macey, Securities and Exchange Nanny,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at A10.  
As noted by Brett McDonnell and Mark Roe, Congress has from time to time, by
specific legislation, imposed federal standards that limit the scope of the states’
authority over business corporations. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act is the most recent
example of congressional intervention in this area. However, there have been ebbs
as well as flows in the amount of congressional oversight of business corporations.
For example, in the 1980s and early 1990s, influenced in part by important Supreme
Court decisions, Congress chose not to preempt the states’ authority with respect to
(i) the establishment of fiduciary duty rules for corporate officers and directors and
(ii) permissible defenses to corporate takeovers. During the same period, the courts
rejected several attempts by the SEC to override state law in those areas. The courts
determined that the SEC did not possess the requisite authority to adopt regulations
preempting state laws in those fields. See McDonnell, supra, pt. VII.; Roe, supra,
at 603–34.  
Commentators who support a continuing role for the states in regulating corpora-
tions argue that “corporate federalism” produces benefits similar to those described
above with regard to the dual banking system. See supra Part II.B.2. For example,
supporters contend that state regulation of corporations (with a superintending check
from Congress) fosters experimentation, innovation and flexibility in corporate law,
while preserving a “safety valve” that permits corporations to escape from outmoded,
oppressive or corrupt regulation. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping
Federalization of Corporate Law, REGULATION, 26, 30–31 (Spring 2003), available
at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n1/v26n1-5.pdf; Jones, supra, pts. II.,
III.; Macey, supra; McDonnell, supra, pts. V., VII.; Ribstein, supra note 559, at 57–61.
For a concise, recent overview of arguments made by advocates and opponents
of “the enduring institution of federalism in corporate law,” compare, for example,
Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job Than the
States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 BUS. LAW. 1025 (2002) (quote at 1025), with
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition,
57 BUS. LAW. 1047 (2002). 
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authorized the OCC to adopt regulations “federalizing” an important
category of state-chartered corporations. In the absence of any explicit
grant of authority from Congress, the OCC’s sweeping claim of
exclusive supervisory control over state-chartered operating subsidia-
ries is not entitled to judicial deference, and should be rejected as
invalid under the prudential rule applied by the Supreme Court in Solid
Waste Agency.
IV. Conclusion
In both design and practical effect, the OCC’s new preemption and
visitorial powers rules create a regime of de facto field preemption.
Under these rules national banks and their operating subsidiaries are
no longer required to observe any state laws except for “incidental”
laws that, in the OCC’s opinion, “promote” the ability of national
banks to conduct their federally-authorized activities. The new rules
effectively permit the OCC to “pick and choose” the state laws that
apply to national banks and their operating subsidiaries. The rules also
give the OCC sole discretion to decide whether to enforce any such
laws against the agency’s regulated constituents.
The OCC’s new preemption regime is clearly designed to advance
the OCC’s self-interest by persuading large, multistate banks to operate
under national charters. The OCC’s rules give large state banks with
interstate branches powerful incentives to convert to national charters
so that they too can obtain a blanket exemption from inconvenient
state laws. Unless overturned, the OCC’s rules will probably destroy
the competitive balance that Congress has long maintained within the
dual banking system. Within the relatively near future, the banking
industry is likely to resemble today’s thrift industry, with large
multistate institutions holding federal charters and the state system
being reduced to a dwindling number of small, community-based
institutions. Assuming that outcome, the dual banking system will
cease to function in any real sense. There will no longer be a
meaningful chartering option for banks, and banks will therefore lose
their current “escape valve” from outmoded or arbitrary regulation.
As a consequence, the competitive dynamic between federal banking
agencies and state bank commissioners, which has produced a remark-
able record of regulatory innovation and flexibility over the past
century, will lose all or most of its force. The states’ loss of authority
over large banks and their operating subsidiaries will have other
adverse consequences. The ability of states to regulate the most
important providers of financial services will be greatly impaired, and
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there will be a corresponding loss of protection for consumers
victimized by illegal, deceptive, and unfair financial practices. Given
the OCC’s powerful incentives for attracting and retaining the loyalty
of major banks, the OCC should not be entrusted with sole responsibil-
ity for enforcing consumer protection laws against its regulated
constituents. The OCC’s rules will also deprive the states of any
meaningful role in regulating a significant category of state-chartered
business corporations. The OCC’s rules thus represent a major
expansion of federal control over corporations, a step that could
provide further momentum toward the adoption of a general federal
corporate law.
Undoubtedly Congress could command, by affirmative legislation,
a drastic change in our financial system similar to that imposed by
the OCC’s new rules.561 However, Congress has not done so. Over
the past century Congress has repeatedly acted to preserve the dual
banking system and to maintain a competitive equilibrium between
state and national banks. In 1994 Congress made clear in the Riegle-
Neal Act that it remained strongly committed to the fundamental tenets
of the dual banking system, including the general application of state
laws to both state and national banks. The Riegle-Neal Act endorsed
the judicially-established principle that state laws do apply to national
banks in the absence of an irreconcilable conflict with federal law.
Without a fresh grant of authority from Congress, the OCC had no
authority to adopt its far-reaching rules. Congress and the courts must
therefore act to overturn the OCC’s rules and restrain the agency’s
future ability to preempt state laws.
561
 See, e.g., Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 57–58 (2003) (per curiam)
(discussing Congress’s broad authority to regulate banking and other financial services
under the Commerce Clause). It should be noted, however, that the Tenth Amendment
appears to place some constraints on the power of Congress to interfere with the states’
supervisory authority over state-chartered corporations. As a consequence, Congress’s
power to regulate state-chartered operating subsidiaries of national banks may not
be unlimited. See supra note 555 and accompanying text; cf. Citizens Bank, 539 U.S.
at 58 (acknowledging that “the power [of Congress] to regulate commerce, though
broad indeed, has limits” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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